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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the relationship of collaboration and conflict between France’s 
state-owned oil group, the Société Nationale Elf Aquitaine, and successive 
governments during the critical decade, 1976-1986, before wide-scale privatisation 
was initiated. The group’s development reflects the broader trend in government 
- industry relations away from dirigisme to market economics by both senior 
managers and politicians alike. Created as an instrument of government with a 
“national interest” mission, the group was expected to work for and with 
governments. This partnership was conditioned by the international nature of the 
oil industry. Directly exposed to the impact of the oil crisis, the group suffered from 
the switch made in France from oil to nuclear energy as the main source of power. 
This development accelerated not only the diversification of the group’s product 
range and multinationalisation of its activities but also modified its relations with 
government. It remained in public ownership, but became financially independent 
and acted increasingly like a private company. Governments were also affected by 
the economic crises of the 1970s, and by France’s closer integration into Europe. 
While Elf maximised its profits, governments relied on the oil group’s wealth. This 
confusing combination of dependence and governments’ use of their powers of 
ownership produced many conflicts. Yet Elf s leaders could also exploit the state 
link through grand corps networks to achieve their own goals. These ambiguities 
were sharpened during the decade because Elf was shifting between two modes of 
relationship: an instrument of government enjoying privileged links with the state 
and an independent private multinational. Partial privatisation in 1986 somewhat 
resolved the contradictions but heralded new challenges. Under the impact of the 
Single Market programme and GATT agreements, French governments divested 
themselves of powers they could no longer exercise, French firms shifted 
partnership with the state to partnership with foreign firms and the development of 
each individual firm became subject to its performance in the market.
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INTRODUCTION
The subject of government intervention in industry is highly controversial. The 
extent to which government should own companies or intervene in the affairs of a 
nationalised industry has traditionally provoked a divergence of opinion according 
to ideological beliefs. Often those on the Left have argued that insofar as a public 
sector company is solely or partially the property of the nation, governments should 
control its activities in the public interest. Increasingly, however, many on the Left 
have asserted that ownership is not essential for control and indeed, in some cases, 
ownership may limit effective control. Full or partial private ownership within an 
effective regulatory framework has been presented as an alternative. Politicians of 
the Right, who have traditionally taken a more liberal view, argue that government 
control can only hamper a company's competitiveness. For them, the main concern 
of any company, state-owned or private, should be its profitability and the most 
efficient means towards achieving this end is for government to give those running 
the company the freedom to make their own choices. Some on the Right, however, 
argue that while public ownership can distort the allocation of resources by its 
effects on capital markets, states cannot abrogate all responsibilities for maintaining 
and supervising markets. It is in part this view which has given rise to the present 
trends towards the privatisation of state-owned companies and the creation of 
regulatory agencies, trends prevalent in all industrialised countries.
The subject of government-industry relations is particularly interesting in the context 
of France. France has a statist tradition, and governments have often intervened in 
very directive ways in the affairs of industry and the running of firms. The waves of 
nationalisations throughout the 20th century and the introduction of economic 
planning in the postwar period are just two of the more obvious examples of 
government intervention. By means of both these forms of intervention, 
governments gave the state-owned companies a steering role in the economy. As 
a result, the public sector in France, especially in the postwar period until 1986, was 
often more dynamic and played a more vital role in the economy than the private
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sector However, the growing trend in world trade and more open markets from the 
1970s encouraged governments to adopt a more liberal attitude vis à vis their public 
sector companies. In France this led to a blurring of the public/private divide. Yet 
until the election of the Chirac government in 1986 French governments ran counter 
to this liberal trend by retaining a large public sector. Indeed, in 1982, the public 
sector was significantly extended.
The changing world economic situation over the last 25 years has pushed 
companies to become more competitive and governments to be less generous. 
Companies have been obliged to take responsibility for their own survival. In other 
words, state-owned companies, just like privately-owned ones, have been obliged 
to adopt tough strategies in order to survive and prosper. Control of their 
environment and profitability have been their most important objectives. The 
choices made in the achievement of these objectives are in themselves a valid 
subject of investigation. So too are the actors who make the choices and the 
motives which inspire their decisions.
The interest of this subject also lies in its focus upon the activities of a company. 
These are also a determining factor in the importance it acquires. That is to say, 
certain goods are more essential to an economy than others, so the company 
providing them is likely to be privileged to a greater extent than those providing less 
essential commodities. Nothing about a company is static, however. Its activities 
evolve according to the changing environment in which it operates, the needs of 
suppliers, of customers, of controlling institutions. A company can therefore be very 
different even over a decade, not just in dimension and sphere of influence but also 
in the nature of its activities. Furthermore, its evolution reflects a changing 
environment. Political, economic and social change can therefore be explored 
through developments which have taken place in the microcosm which is the 
company.
The Thesis
The thesis explores the nature of relations between a major French public sector 
company and governments during the critical decade, 1976-1986, before large- 
scale privatisation was initiated. Public sector companies were either created by 
government or were existing companies of which government took ownership. 
Ownership could be total or partial but in France was usually not less than 51 %. 
Public sector companies traditionally came into existence because government 
wished to use them as instruments of national policy. They were to be found in 
those sectors of the economy concerned with such essential public services as 
defence, energy, transport or communications. Their existence frequently arose 
from market failure, that is, the fact that the cost of the service was not commercially 
viable for a private company.
Public sector companies traditionally fell into two categories: the non-competitive 
monopolies such as rail transport, gas and electricity, whose principal market was 
domestic, and those belonging to the competitive market sector, more commercially 
oriented, and obliged to be profitable in order to compete in an international 
environment. The public sector company which provides our case-study belonged 
to the latter category.
It was always somewhat paradoxical that a company of this type existed. On the 
one hand it was an instrument of national policy, and as such, expected to respond 
to demands made upon it by government in the national interest. In addition, while 
governments wanted to use the company to serve their own ends, they did not want 
it to be a drain on the national budget. On the contrary, they wanted it to be 
financially independent. On the other hand, in order to compete and survive at an 
international level, the company had to be profitable, and to achieve that goal, 
company managers would try to avoid potentially burdensome demands that 
national governments might wish to impose upon their company. Rather, company 
leaders sought to use state power, both domestically and abroad, to further the 
growth and profitability of the company.
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Relations between government and a state-owned company of the market sector 
were therefore inherently ambiguous. In such companies, while the President of the 
Republic appointed as the chairman the person whom he thought would take it in 
the direction he required, after that appointment, it was the leaders of the firm who 
decided company strategies. There was nevertheless an on-going two-way contact 
between the company and government, and over certain important projects, close 
collaboration. Circumstances change, however. Presidents of the Republic, 
ministers, government officials and company chairmen are replaced. Occasions 
occurred when, either the company was perceived by ministers as transgressing 
government objectives, or not conforming to its original goals, or different ministries 
were seen by senior management to be obstructing company strategies. It was then 
that conflicts arose. Over the long term, however, although the dominant partner 
was frequently difficult to identify, in the case of Elf Aquitaine, there seems to have 
been a compatibility of objectives between managers and ministers.
Our thesis is that between 1976 and 1986, the shift in government - industry 
relations in France from dirigisme to market economics by both senior managers 
and politicians alike, although inevitably a tense and sometimes conflictuel process 
remained, nevertheless, fundamentally collaborative. In this context, even the 
advent of a Socialist government in 1981, entailing a wave of nationalisations and 
restructurings affecting the oil industry, did not create a major conflict. In short, the 
path to privatisation and the decline of cf/ng/s/ne began long before the Single 
European Act and the election of the Chirac government in 1986. The decade 
nevertheless marked a vital turning-point in government - industry relations in 
France. From being an instrument of government and enjoying privileged links with 
the state, the company which provides our case-study was acquiring the character 
of a private multinational. Moreover, for their part, governments were gradually 
realising that as the French economy became integrated into the international one, 
their ability to direct it was waning. It was this evolution which brought into sharp 
relief ambiguities inherent in the government - industry partnership.
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The Inherent Ambiguity: Management or Government Control?
According to a high-ranking official in the company which forms our case-study, the 
Société Nationale Elf Aquitaine (SNEA), the problematic nature of its relations with 
government arose from its twofold character:
"Ce groupe a été géré un peu comme une entreprise privée mais, 
même si ce n'était pas toujours écrit, il avait toujours une mission 
d'intérêt national, même si ça a évolué, donc c'est toute la difficulté."^
The problems associated with the subject of relations between a public sector 
company and government therefore stemmed from two main sources: the fact that 
government did not control what it owned and that governmental ideas about the 
concept of national interest evolved.
Let us examine initially the first point. Government was the major shareholder in the 
public sector company which forms our case-study, yet in general it allowed the 
company to decide its own strategies. Although there were extensive means of 
control attached to this major share, the company had considerable scope for 
determining its own destiny. How did this situation arise?
Although the role of supervisory institutions was to ensure that company decisions 
did not transgress broader state objectives, government controllers tended to 
support the interests of their client. In the case of the SNEA, successive French 
governments had an interest not only in the survival of a national oil company but 
in its growth. It is for this reason that the group was encouraged to expand, 
diversify and behave like a privately run company. Governments are concerned 
with broad economic, social and international questions, for example, the trade 
balance, the avoidance of social conflicts, regional development and good 
international relations. So long as company strategies coincided with government's 
broad aims, government not only gave top managers the freedom they needed to 
pursue their ambitions but actively collaborated in their realisation. Should
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company plans transgress larger government objectives, as for example, when the 
company might wish to make huge investments abroad when it was making large- 
scale redundancies at home in one sector of its activities, it was then that 
government could obstruct the company's ambitions.
In negotiations with supervisory institutions, the company enjoyed the advantage 
of having the monopoly of expertise, that is, those in decision-making posts within 
the company could call upon people in departments who had become specialists 
in the different activities of the company. Supervisory ministries could not possibly 
match the precision of information held by the company. Moreover, there was within 
the company a continuity of leadership. Those involved in negotiations on behalf 
of the company would have been in their posts for a considerable time and would 
have acquired the skill to argue in the interests of the company. In France the 
appointment of a public company chairman must have the approval of the President 
of the Republic and in the history of the SNEA, two chairmen have actually been 
former ministers. By contrast, negotiators in supervisory ministries were much less 
knowledgeable and less skilled, considerably younger and keen to move from their 
civil service posts to more lucrative ones. As a result of all these factors, company 
policy tended to influence state policy.
The company had another advantage at the negotiating table, whether it was a 
question of responding to government demands or requesting support for its own 
strategies. It was the fact that the state authorities were often divided. Institutions 
involved in the formulation of sectoral policies frequently have opposing objectives. 
One typical example is that road builders in a transport ministry often clash with 
officials from the environment ministry. But there are also wider conflicts inherent 
in government. Finance ministries, for example, always have tense relations with 
"spending ministries". The significance of such conflictuel relations is that the 
company can exploit these differences in its own interests.
13
The task of supervising the activities of a large company are complicated by size. 
We have already mentioned that a company's activities are not static but evolve 
according to the economic environment. Whereas their original role may have 
necessitated close government supervision, companies, as they grow, diversify their 
interests and these may not necessarily justify inclusion in the public sector. As a 
result, a company which has been created with a public service mission can be 
diverted through its activities towards the private sector.
Whether public or private, a company's pursuit of supplies and markets often leads 
it towards the internationalisation of its activities. Here also supervision by national 
government is complicated by the fact that abroad the company's activities are 
regulated by a foreign government and it will be subject to demands made upon it 
by that government. While supervision by the company's home government is 
made more problematic, a company can derive considerable benefits from 
internationalisation because in negotiations with national authorities it can offset 
domestic demands with international ones.
Whether public or private, a company's strategies for growth and the control of its 
environment will be identical. Diversification and internationalisation are examples 
of such strategies. If, as already mentioned, supervisory ministries support the 
interests of companies and companies themselves are a dominant force in 
negotiations with government, it follows that government policy can be manipulated 
to defend private interests. Although this situation may seem paradoxical, it is 
nevertheless inevitable. Increasingly, over the last 30 years the governments of 
advanced industrialised nations have encouraged the concentration of their 
industries so that they might face international competition from a position of 
strength. The social, economic and political consequences of strategic industries 
going into decline have been a constant worry to governments. The financial 
independence and prosperity of national industries were therefore of considerable 
benefit to them. Not only did prosperous public companies not impose a financial 
burden on the national budget but they could be used by governments to assist
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failing firms, to stimulate sectors of industry, to provide employment and to 
industrialise regions.
During the decade with which we are concerned, 1976-1986, good relations did not 
always exist, however, between the top management of public sector companies 
and supervisory ministries. Conflicts occurred leading governments to use the 
powers attached to their majority shareholding in the company. The causes of such 
conflicts were varied. Company policies were seen to be encroaching upon broader 
governmental objectives. Equally, governments sometimes wished to impose on the 
company activities which its top management considered contrary to its interests. 
However, the intensity of the conflict depended on the people in decision-making 
posts within the company and supervisory ministries, on their ambitions, their 
personalities, their loyalties and how they perceived their role. External factors 
such as the economic situation or the proximity of elections also affected the 
outcome of conflicts. The result could be the veto of company decisions, the 
replacement of the chairman or a reorganisation of the policy process. However, 
the combined influence of company management and groups within government 
who supported their interests could be sufficiently powerful for the status quo to be 
preserved.
Let us now consider the second point: the way in which the evolution of politicians’ 
concept of national interest complicated relations between government and public 
sector companies. This evolution affected all state-owned companies, but 
especially Elf Aquitaine, our case-study, because the nature of its activities made 
it particularly vulnerable to developments in the wider world.
In 1974 Giscard d'Estaing became president of the Republic. As a liberal, he 
believed in less protection for state-owned companies. It was unfortunate for the 
state oil group that his arrival coincided with the world oil crisis which affected the 
company acutely since it had also just lost its extensive Algerian assets. National 
consumption fell, so the company suffered in its upstream and downstream
15
activities, with overcapacity of its refineries at home and the high cost of exploration 
in new oil producing areas outside the franc zone. Moreover, the switch made in 
France from oil to nuclear energy as the main source of power meant that the state 
oil sector no longer benefitted from the privileged position it had enjoyed. The mid- 
1970s was also a time when the European Commission was becoming critical of 
any restrictions imposed by member states on the free trade of oil products within 
Europe, such as the 1928 legislation, still in force in France. The chosen solution 
to France's state oil company's financial problems was to bring in private capital by 
merging Elf Erap, an établissement public* with its rich subsidiary the Société 
Nationale des Pétroles d'Aquitaine (SNPA), which was then only 51 % state-owned, 
thus creating the Société Nationale Elf Aquitaine. The chairman of Erap was 
strongly supported in this move by the ministers of Industry and Finance.
Giscard d'Estaing and his second prime minister, Raymond Barre, were also eager 
to liberalise the state oil group which they considered should be run like a private 
firm. This view was endorsed by their appointment of Albin Chalandon, a staunch 
supporter of Giscard and convinced liberal, as new chairman of the SNEA in 1977. 
For Chalandon, the profitability of the state oil group was a top priority. Throughout 
his term of office he vigorously pursued the diversification and internationalisation 
of the company in the face of opposition from his highly dirigiste minister of Industry, 
André Giraud, and waged a constant battle with the administration because of the 
burden of regulation to which public companies are subject.
With the arrival of a Socialist President and government in 1981, the state oil group 
was affected by their nationalisation programme. The Socialists' objective was to 
extend the public sector by taking complete or partial control of nine important 
industrial groups. French industry had suffered from the world economic crisis 
which had created a lack of demand and overcapacity in several areas of heavy 
industry. Since 1973 investment had stagnated. As a result, much of French
A company whose capital is 100% state-owned
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industrial equipment was outdated and unable to achieve gains in productivity 
provided by new technologies. Loss of competitivity, lack of finance and the 
inability to invest were seen as French industry's main weaknesses. By taking 
control of these nine groups which covered sectors in difficulty as well as sectors 
of advanced technology, the government aimed to fulfill two ambitions: to
restructure industry in such a way that state funds were directed towards the métiers 
d'expertise of each group, and to free firms from short-term financial constraints so 
that they could make long-term decisions for investment in new technologies. In the 
restructuring process the SNEA, which was in a relatively healthy position, was 
chosen as one of the three leaders in French chemicals and, as such, invited to 
take a majority share in the two plastics and petrochemical firms it had hitherto 
owned jointly with Total (Ato and Chloé). It was also expected to absorb the loss- 
making heavy chemical activities of newly nationalised Péchiney Ugine Kuhimann. 
Government intervention did not stop here. The SNEA's chairman, Chalandon, was 
actually replaced for not agreeing to the terms on which Total should be 
compensated for its share in Ato and Chloé.
Soon after the implementation of the Socialists' nationalisation programme, the 
government realised that state investment funds were rapidly decreasing. 
Moreover, now that as a result of restructuring, certain of the newly nationalised 
groups were in a healthier state, they were demanding financial support to make 
further acquisitions. The denationalization of subsidiaries of nationalised groups 
was approved by Prime Minister Fabius and his minister of Finance as little as two 
years after the implementation of the nationalisation programme. The complex 
nature of Socialist policies is illustrated by its effect on the state oil group. On the 
one hand the SNEA was obliged to absorb loss-making chemical assets in the 
restructuring of industry, on the other, it was allowed to purchase the American 
company, Texas Gulf at a very high price. That purchase was, in fact, the biggest 
investment ever made by a French public sector company abroad, and it took place 
despite the fact that one of the stated objectives of the nationalisation programme 
had been to make public sector companies prioritise investment in France.
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The Socialist government's behaviour developed into that of ideology 
accommodating to economic imperatives. The process of denationalization or 
privatisation was more in line with the liberal doctrines of the Centre-Right 
government of Chirac during the period, 1986-88. In fact, the Chirac government 
made the privatisation of the industrial groups and banks, particularly those 
nationalised by the Socialists, one of the key elements of its economic strategy. Not 
only would privatisation raise urgently needed state revenue, but it would give 
companies the liberty they needed to pursue their policies unhindered by 
government controls. Like the Socialists, the neo-Gaullists were also responding 
to economic imperatives. Although the nationalisation programme had restored 
health to certain companies, all had slipped between 1981-85 in the world 
classification of firms. The neo-Gaullists also realised that firms in which the state 
was not sole shareholder easily acquired the funds they needed on financial 
markets.
To raise revenue on international markets was a major motivation behind the 
government's sale of 11% of the state's 67% share in the SNEA in October 1986. 
This partial privatisation was really the second stage in a process which had begun 
in 1976 when Erap merged with SNPA and thereby reduced the state's share in the 
new group from 100% to 67%. The 1986 privatisation, an evolution rather than a 
revolution, according to the then chairman, Michel Pecqueur, would enable the 
group to increase its capital in order to take advantage in the long term of 
interesting deals on national and international markets. The more immediate needs 
of the group were to make good losses caused by the drastic fall in oil prices which 
began in 1985 and to replace income from Lacq* and Frigg** due to be exhausted 
by the mid 1990s. In a wider context, this further loosening of the state's hold on 
the company would give it greater liberty to pursue its international strategy and
* *
Lacq - gas field in South West France, discovered in 1958. Managed by 
the Société Nationale des Pétroles dAquitaine (SNPA) and source of that 
company's wealth
Frigg - North Sea gas field, discovered in 1971 by Elf Norway
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make it less vulnerable to demands which national governments might wish to 
impose.
The arrival of the Socialist government of Michel Rocard in 1988 heralded an end 
to the policy swings of the first seven years of the decade. Not for Rocard the 
heavy interventionism of President Mitterrand's first term of office, nor the liberal 
approach of Chirac's right-wing government. Rocard and his successors, Cresson 
and Bérégovoy, took a more cautious and pragmatic free-market approach. There 
were no new nationalisations and no new privatisations. These governments, 
however, encouraged the trend towards greater internationalisation of French 
industry and facilitated public sector companies' access to private capital markets.
Privatisation ran parallel, during the decade with which we are concerned, with the 
growing Europeanisation of the French economy, a trend which also strengthened 
the market at the expense of the state. In the context of France's closer integration 
in the EU, two points stand out; constraints on the macro-economic policy of French 
governments and more competitive conditions for French firms. Firstly, the macro- 
economic policy of successive governments was increasingly constrained by 
France's membership of the European Monetary System (EMS), launched in 1979, 
and designed to create a zone of monetary stability in Europe. As France's 
dependence on trade with its European partners increased, it became more 
sensitive to the price of imports and exports, a determining factor in its trade 
balance and in the value of the franc vis-à-vis the currency of France's neighbours. 
Within the EMS, should a country's currency be overvalued because of high 
inflation, the choices open to government were to devalue or adjust domestic policy 
by contracting demand and raising interest rates. The necessity to maintain parity 
with the currencies of its neighbours imposed on successive French governments 
the obligation to fight inflation, reduce public expenditure and maintain the trade 
balance. Apart from a period of expansionary policies in 1981-82, French 
governments, during the decade with which we are concerned, pursued policies of 
budgetary constraint, low growth and stable prices.^ Secondly, since France's trade
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with Europe increased threefold between 1960 and 1990, French firms were 
increasingly exposed to competition from European firms. In addition, a more 
tightly-knit Europe from the mid-1970s and relaunch of European integration from 
1986, in preparation for the Single Market, accelerated the implementation of EC 
competition policy in France. Rulings which prevented national governments from 
promoting domestic industries were enforced with increasing vigour. This marked 
an end to the privileges which public companies, such as Elf, had enjoyed, for 
example, those emanating from the laws of 1928, government intervention in the 
promotion of mergers and public procurement contracts.^ As Dumez and 
Jeunemaître remark,
“the European competitive norm obliged state-owned enterprise to 
perform in the same way as private enterprise in the context of the 
market. Therefore any reason for keeping such concerns under state 
ownership vanished."*
Founded originally to provide France with secure supplies of hydrocarbons, by the 
end of the 1980s, the SNEA was a diversified multinational group in which the oil 
business was just one of its three major activities. The development of the group 
between 1976 and 1986, shows how governments, whatever their ideologies, also 
have broad national concerns which, during this decade, ensured that their public 
sector companies pursued strategies of growth, diversification, internationalisation 
and, paradoxically, independence from government.
The Lessons of Existing Approaches to Government-industry Relations
The tensions between governments and public sector corporations, identified 
above, have been analysed from a variety of angles. Some writers who have 
considered this subject take as the basis of their investigation a company or 
companies of the same type, whereas others focus on the industrial group, and yet 
others explore a whole sector of industry. Most tend to incorporate in their studies 
the findings from several disciplines but emphasise, according to their own 
specialisms - political science, sociology, management, economics, history - a
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certain aspect of the question. These specialisms include public policy-making, 
company strategies in a national and international environment, the influence of the 
industrial group, the influence of company top managers, developments within a 
sector of industry at national and at world level or, viewed over a period of time, a 
whole network of factors contributing to the growth of a company.
Let us examine more closely a certain number of studies which relate to our subject 
of government-industry relations in the context of France's national oil champion. 
They can be grouped according to the broad approach adopted by their authors: 
those who concentrate on a progression in institutional relationships over time, 
those who analyse the phenomenon of leadership and those who consider the 
behaviour of firms vis à vis their environment.
An analysis of the world oil industry. Le Nouvel Enjeu Pétrolier, by an industrial 
economist, J-M. Chevalier, explains how the oil crisis of 1970-71 brought about a 
change in the world oil situation, affecting the exporting countries, the importing 
countries and the oil companies. For roughly the first 100 years of its existence the 
world oil industry was dominated by the international cartel. It was a period of rapid 
technical progress and therefore falling costs. Although the selling price of 
hydrocarbons should have fallen, the big oil companies blocked prices. It was the 
national oil companies, formed in Europe in the aftermath of World War II, who 
entered the oil market as newcomers and brought prices down. However, an 
increase in the demand for hydrocarbons in the industrialised world throughout the 
1960s and the discovery of new high-cost zones of production (off-shore), which 
could be used as a reference, put the exporting countries in a position of strength 
in which they could demand higher prices for their crude oil. This was the context 
of the oil crisis of the early 1970s. The consequences have been manifold. The 
exporting countries chose either to cooperate with the cartel or, for the more 
aggressive among them, to use their hydrocarbon resources for their own industrial 
development. The importing countries, faced with rising costs, sought the best 
conditions for obtaining necessary supplies. Whereas in the pre-crisis period.
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States, through their national companies, could determine the conditions in which 
they were supplied with oil and decide on an energy policy favourable to their own 
economic development, since the crisis they have been characterised by a lack of 
policy. They have been obliged to accept the terms obtained by their own suppliers. 
These can be either the private multinationals, established on their territory, or their 
own national companies. Whereas in the pre-crisis period, public and private 
interests were opposed, since the early 1970s, all companies have been subject to 
the same costs which are passed on to the consumer, that is, all companies, 
whether public or private behave in the same way.®
Chevalier's analysis has a bearing on our study for several reasons. Not only does 
it explain the world background to the oil crisis and the changes it brought, but also 
provides a lucid case-study of Algeria. It shows how France, in the pre-crisis 
period, used its new national oil companies to supply the nation with hydrocarbons 
in very favourable conditions to itself. The case of Algeria is a very pertinent 
example of the way in which the oil exporting countries turned the tables in 1970-71 : 
they began to determine how their own natural resources should be used and 
dictate to the foreign oil companies the conditions in which they could exploit 
Algerian oil. Chevalier's study also clarifies the French post-war statist approach 
to industry through his explanation of how hydrocarbons form part of an importing 
country's energy policy and the criteria for such a policy, for example, to encourage 
national exploration, security of supply, relative costs. These were the very criteria 
which gave birth to the company which is the subject of our study. According to 
Chevalier's analysis, the changed world situation since the oil crisis, which 
encouraged public oil companies to behave like private ones because all were 
equally exposed to world competition, was an important factor in shaping the 
relations between government and industry. This is the subject of our investigation.
The study by N.J.D. Lucas, Energy in France: Planning, Politics and Policy, is that 
of the political economist. His investigation covers all branches of the energy sector 
in France and their development in the 20th century. Lucas stresses why an energy
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policy was needed, in other words, why governments intervened in the energy 
sector. Primarily there was a need for supplies which a country like France lacked 
at certain strategic moments in its history. In addition, the different sources of 
energy had to be coordinated with a view to security of supply and cost. 
Furthermore, there was a need for a long-term view in the collective interest. It is 
no surprise therefore that the large energy companies were all state-owned 
enterprises. Lucas traces the development of relations between them through much 
of the 20th century. He outlines their evolution from state organised, non­
competitive institutions, with purely domestic markets through the large-scale 
conversion to oil in the late 1950s and 1960s, up to the post-crisis situation in which 
there was a new perception about the uncertainties of secure oil supplies, less state 
protection for all, greater competition among the institutions and the rapid 
development of nuclear energy. In all sectors of energy after the oil crisis, the 
prevailing preoccupation was for companies to control their environment. This 
implied the control of supplies, of markets, of technology and of finance. However, 
the future of each sector depended to a certain extent on government decisions to 
expand it, reduce it or allow it the freedom to be run like a private concern. For 
example, France's two national oil companies, because of their international 
associations, but especially after the oil crisis, received little government direction 
or state funds, whereas the CEA became what the state oil sector was in the 1950s 
and 1960s, that is, France's instrument for independence in energy supplies. 
Consequently, a large proportion of the CEA's activities were financed by 
allocations to the budget of the Ministry of Industry and Ministry of Defence. Yet 
even the CEA developed commercially oriented operations designed to generate 
income, for example, uranium mining, reprocessing and reactor construction.®
As Lucas points out in his analysis of the nature and operation of state control, 
governments, in a sense, wanted the best of several worlds. They wanted public 
enterprises to be independent of state resources, they wanted to hold on to their 
large shareholdings in the companies and they wanted to exercise control through 
government representatives on the conseil d'administration. As a result.
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government control over the companies of the energy sector was tighter or more 
relaxed according to the size of the state shareholding in the enterprise and 
according to its need for state finance. Not surprisingly, among the controlling 
institutions, it was the Ministry of Finance which dominated the policy process, since 
it was this agency which allocated investment capital, fixed prices and it was bodies 
attached to that ministry which measured performance. The policy process was not 
a clear-cut affair, however, as Lucas demonstrates in his description of how the 
various agencies interacted in the formulation of policy and the planning process. 
For example, he illustrates on the basis of results of successive plans, that it was 
the demands of the most powerful enterprises which determined government policy. 
In addition, there were several actors with different priorities: the top politicians. 
President, Prime Minister and Minister of Industry who were responsible for 
appointments and for the organisational structure, there were the state companies 
which provided government with detailed information about their needs and there 
was the Minister of Finance whose chief role was to reduce public expenditure. It 
was when the priorities of all actors converged that national energy policy was most 
stable, as with oil policy in the 1950s and 1960s and more recently with French 
nuclear policy.
For the purposes of our present investigation, Lucas' study is enlightening because 
he underlines a definite progression in successive French governments' attitude to 
the oil sector. Under de Gaulle, the state oil companies were used as instruments 
of his ambition for independence in energy supplies. The discovery of Algerian oil 
provided the means to implement this super dirigiste policy intended to protect the 
French market and eliminate imports from outside the franc zone. In France, 
throughout the 1960s, there was a strong consensus among top politicians and 
company executives that cheap oil should replace to a large degree other sources 
of energy: gas, coal, electricity, a policy which brought great prosperity to the state 
oil companies. Their fortunes were radically changed, however, with the departure 
of de Gaulle, followed by the nationalisation of French oil assets in Algeria and the 
rise in crude oil prices. A fear in government circles of relying excessively on oil.
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coupled with Giscard d'Estaing's view that state enterprises should be less 
protected, obliged the state oil company to determine its own destiny. Lucas points 
out how the control of their environment became their objective in this more liberal 
climate.
As Lucas explains, the influence of the President of the Republic on the energy 
sector was very strong. He appointed like-minded men not only at the head of 
public enterprises but also in key administrative posts to ensure that they took the 
sector in question in the direction he required. The paradox, which Lucas aptly 
underlines, then presented itself, for although the President chose men he could 
trust and assigned them powerful instruments of state enterprise, he thereafter 
risked becoming the victim of a technocratic monster he could not control. This 
phenomenon is particularly relevant for our study of conflictual relations between 
government and industry. Guillaumat, Giraud and Chalandon are all cases of 
trusted men who soon showed their independent minds.
A further study which highlights a progression in the fortunes and role of the SNEA, 
as well as the influence of personalities on its development is provided by Pierre 
Péan and Jean-Pierre Séréni in Les Emirs de la République. They trace the history 
of what is today the SNEA from its creation up to 1982. The authors are in fact 
journalists and their study is directed at a general public, so an anecdotal and 
somewhat romanticised view of the company's development is given. Their account 
is nevertheless illuminating, not only because it incorporates a range of 
perspectives: political events, international affairs, a changing economic
environment and the behaviour of key personalities, but because it illustrates in a 
concrete fashion what is explained in more theoretical terms in other works, for 
example, the precise role of civil servants, corps strategies and corps rivalries in 
action and the workings of government-company collaboration. The main idea 
underlying the account is the growth of the SNEA to become one of France’s top 
industrial groups. The factors contributing to its growth were its close links with 
successive governments - a relationship of dependence on government in the early
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stages became one in which the company initiated government policy - the 
personality, achievements and political involvement of its leaders and the group's 
international dimension. Events are set in a contemporary context so the reader 
can appreciate the impact of national and international affairs on the company.^
As the studies by Lucas and Péan and Séréni show, the President of the Republic 
certainly influences the appointment of public sector company leaders, although he 
may not be responsible for their future behaviour. There is another important factor, 
peculiar to France, which can determine who is appointed at the head of large firms. 
This is the phenomenon of political élitism which Ezra Suleiman explores in Elites 
in French Society. This study deals with the identity of the leaders of large firms 
who mostly belong to one of the grands corps de l'Etat. Suleiman analyses how 
corps members accede to and maintain their powerful positions in society. Their 
secret lies in the academic successes gained in France's most prestigious teaching 
establishments, in the links fc)etween the training they receive and the corps in which 
they exercise their profession, in the capacity of the grands corps to transform 
themselves, so as to adapt to changes in society, and in the image corps members 
have of themselves and their ability to impose this image on the public at large.®
What is relevant for our study, and here lies another ambiguity surrounding 
government-company relations, is that although corps members are trained for state 
service, to which they devote the early years of their career, a large proportion then 
move rapidly into top jobs in the business world. Pantoaflage* has advantages to 
both sides. Corps members are attracted to the material benefits of the business 
world while businesses and industry value the network of influential contacts which 
corps members bring with them from previous government posts. A further 
phenomenon of corps behaviour, which reinforces the government-company link, 
is the fact that particular grands corps colonise key posts in certain sectors. For 
example, members of the Corps des Mines have traditionally occupied prestigious 
positions in both the administrative and industrial branches of the energy sector.
The move from state service to a post in the private sector
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Since leaders of each corps see its raison d'être in the preservation of positions it 
has captured and because of the constant exchanges of personnel between the 
government and business worlds, the result is that people with very similar 
background and training occupy influential positions in the public and private 
sectors. Suleiman's thesis is that this élite behaviour gave rise to important 
consequences: a blurring of the distinction between the management of the public 
and private sectors, brought about through a consensus in the objectives pursued, 
objectives of modernisation, efficiency, competitivity and the fact that French post­
war economic growth was largely achieved through the pursuit of common 
objectives.
The studies which concentrate on the large firm’s behaviour do not do so 
exclusively. They also incorporate many of the approaches already reviewed, 
government-company interaction, an evolving relationship between the authorities 
and state enterprises and the corps dimension.
The Politics of Public Enterprise by Harvey B. Feigenbaum is a political scientist's 
study of French oil policy. He begins by explaining why France had a strong 
interventionist tradition and why public enterprise was traditionally chosen as an 
instrument for intervention in France. However, a central idea throughout the study 
is that the traditional portrait of France as a strong state is actually false because 
successive French governments failed to control the public enterprises of the oil 
industry, except in their early stages. In spite of regulation and "national champion" 
firms, company incentives towards growth, diversification and internationalisation 
led public enterprises to be at cross purposes with public authorities. This was 
particularly true of the oil companies which are multinationals par excellence. 
Feigenbaum demonstrates through numerous examples that public interest goals 
were not pursued by the enterprises specifically created to do that very thing. How 
did this situation arise? Although government agencies responsible for formulating 
oil policy existed and, like Lucas, Feigenbaum also gives a description of their 
functions, his analysis is more enlightening because he reveals how forces at work 
within the various regulatory bodies, for example pantouflage, corps incentives, the
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influence of individuals, actually favoured the interests of companies rather than the 
regulators. This weakening of public control was reinforced by the enormous size 
and diversity of major oil companies' activities and the fact that oil is a world 
industry. A state-owned oil company's markets are international and to compete, 
it must behave like its rivals, the big private multinationals. The findings of the 
Schwartz Report of 1974 is one of the illustrations of a public firm's behaviour which 
Feigenbaum uses. The Report highlighted the fact that oil companies paid virtually 
no taxes, that they gave false information concerning prices, that they adopted 
anticompetitive practices and that relations between them and the administration 
were highly ambiguous.®
After drawing comparisons with oil companies and public corporations in other 
countries and showing how they, like their French counterparts, served state 
policies in their early stages but later diverged from their public interest mission as 
they grew larger, more complex and more profitable, Feigenbaum, by way of 
conclusion, poses the question: what is the state? Public sector firms are a part 
of the state yet their record shows that many of them do not serve the national 
interest. He suggests ways in which France's national oil companies might better 
serve the public interest. For example, in renouncing their profit-maximising 
incentives a whole multitude of benefits would accrue to the public. However, 
successive governments, whether Conservative or Socialist, have been bound to 
a profit-maximising ideology common to all Western economies. Although 
Mitterrand, when he came to power in 1981, made the nationalisation of certain key 
industrial groups the centrepiece of his economic strategy, the Socialists quickly 
learned that they would have to elicit the confidence of the business world. As a 
result, the operation of the public sector remained largely unchanged under the 
Socialists from that of previous governments. Feigenbaum's concluding comment 
is that while the French state was strong, in that it had a record of using its public 
firms as an instrument of policy in very positive ways, it was not autonomous but 
captured by the prevailing orthodoxy and fragmented by conflicting sectoral 
interests within itself.
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A dominant theme in Feigenbaum's study, that of collusion between the highest 
echelons of government and company top management, is also the subject of Le 
Complot Pétrolier by Philippe Simonnot, formerly one of Le Monde's top political 
journalists. Highly polemical in tone, this study is based on the findings of the 
Schwartz report and on documents surrounding the ERAP-SNPA merger of 1977. 
Through these documents Simonnot exposes the malpractices of national company 
top management in which supervisory ministries were also implicated. Not only 
does he elucidate the accusations of the Schwartz report but uses the evidence of 
the ERAP-SNPA merger documents to show that supervisory ministers were quite 
unconcerned about the control they theoretically exercised in the newly formed 
SNEA, where the state was to maintain a 70% share. Simonnot demonstrates how 
the official communiqué drawn up by the ministers of Industry and Finance 
emphasised the capitalist nature of the operation in order to flatter and gain the 
approval of the private shareholders. He also shows, by means of a confidential 
letter sent from the Chef da la Mission de Contrôle des entreprises pétrolières, that 
the representative of the Ministry of Finance was ready to fall in line with 
Guillaumat's wishes that the composition of the board of the new SNEA (70% state- 
owned) should retain the same government representation as that of the former 
SNPA (51% state-owned). Furthermore, the fact that top government officials 
involved in the merger had no intention of submitting the project to a parliamentary 
vote (in contravention of Article 34 of the Constitution) because they considered that 
ERAP, although an établissement public, operated like a private company, was a 
further indictment against the authorities. Simonnot's documents and explanatory 
comments are extremely illuminating for our study of government-industry relations. 
Not only do they reinforce one another, but they also add weight to assertions made 
eleswhere, as in Feigenbaum's study, that public policy defends private interests.
To obtain the defence of its interests by government is just one of the means by 
which the large firm or industrial group controls its environment. Elie Cohen and 
Michel Bauer, sociologists by profession, investigate many other of the firm's 
strategies in Qui gouverne les groupes industriels? Like Feigenbuam, they too
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perceive the firm as capable of influencing and even manipulating government 
policies. Their analysis of the nature of industrial power covers the different 
mechanisms by which the firm structures its markets through, for example, cartels, 
mergers aimed at upstream and downstream integration and multinationalisation. 
Advantages gained must be constantly renewed, however, through mobilising 
scientific resources, market research and the accumulation of finance. Relations 
with government are all important to the large firm in the achievement of its 
ambitions. On the one hand, the firm can influence broad government policies, on 
the other, it can exploit contradictions within the state to ensure that aid from 
different agencies converge on its own policies. The authors see the divided state, 
the firm's monopoly of expertise and the continuity of its leadership as the means 
by which it can influence government actions.
A firm’s strategies must be planned and imposed. This is the role of its leaders. 
Like Suleiman, Cohen and Bauer also investigate who they are and how they 
exercise their leadership. Their main argument is that the leadership of many large 
firms does not depend on ownership nor on long experience within the company. 
Recruited from outside, leadership usually depends on membership of one of the 
grands œrps de l ’Etat and on previous prestigious positions in ministerial cabinets 
or in the higher echelons of ministries. It is this membership of an élite group, the 
contacts accumulated and the negotiating skills acquired in top administrative posts, 
rather than by experience of the firm's activities, which legitimise appointment as 
leader.
Another strategy by which the large firm controls its environment, 
multinationalisation, is explored by J-P. Anastassopoulos at a/, in Les 
Multinationales Publiques. For these management theorists, the public multinational 
is a contradiction in terms because it is subject to the demands of its home 
government, but for its own prosperity, it must pursue its activities in an international 
context. This view is somewhat abstract, however. The reality is that while 
belonging to the state can be an obstacle to multinationalisation, a firm's
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development is also influenced by changing circumstances. In practice state 
policies can provide opportunities for internationalisation, that is to say, public 
companies are well supported by their home state in many of their activities, for 
example, research, public procurement contracts. What is more, in certain areas, 
for example, advanced technological sectors, private firms benefit as much as 
public firms from state aid. In addition, subsidiaries abroad, whether t>elonging to 
public or private firms, have the same objectives of profitability. The home state can 
nevertheless present a potential handicap to a public sector company. The key to 
successful multinationalisation is to make national policy coincide with company 
policy, that is, companies must convince home state authorities that 
multinationalisation is a condition of achieving state objectives, an echo of the 
analysis by Cohen and Bauer. The large firm's traditional arguments are that the 
national market is too small, that there is a necessity for industries of world scale 
and the search for cheaper sources of supply.
Mention must be made of two further works directly related to our case-study and 
which provice insights into both the power of the industrial group and the role of the 
public multinational. Firstly, Christophe Babinet's unpublished history of the SNEA, 
traces the company’s growth from its beginnings up to the mid-1980s. A historian 
by training, Babinet had unlimited access to E lf s archive, to senior managers and 
top civil servants. He sees Elf as one of France’s few industrial successes, 
attributable to the company’s capacity to remain linked to government but to 
develop its own autonomy. In his view this achievement was due both to the 
ambivalence of government supervisors who “played the company’s game” and to 
the group’s international activities which provided it with a multiplicity of 
interlocuteurs, especially the leaders of Francophone African states.
The Franco-African dimension is the subject of the second study, in effect, a 
“confession” made by Loik Le Floch-Prigent, former chairman of Elf*, during his
Chairman of Elf 1989-1993
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imprisonment for suspected abuse of funds in 1996. Although the affaire Le Floch 
took place in the years after those with which we are concerned, his revelations 
about the interdependence of interests between successive French governments 
and Elf in African states confirm that there has been a striking continuity in 
government - company diplomatic arrangements. Moreover, the way in which Elf 
seems to have assumed successive governments’ foreign policy responsibilities in 
Africa reflects the group’s role in other spheres, as both instrument of government 
and initiator in its own right.
The Approach of this Thesis
The works reviewed inform our analysis of government-industry relations in the 
context of France's state oil group between 1976 and 1986 and provide different 
approaches for a case-study. None of these, on its own, is entirely satisfactory. In 
our investigation we shall in fact adopt an eclectic approach. That is to say, the 
historic, the elitist and the company-centred approaches will be combined. The 
focus will be closest to that of Feigenbaum in so far as it concentrates on the origins 
of the company, on its development from a strong statist organisation to a privately 
oriented multinational, on problems of government control and on government- 
company interaction and collusion.
The new contribution of the present study is, firstly, that while a survey of the early 
years of the company will be given, our investigation concentrates on a period often 
years, 1976-1986. This decade has been chosen, not only because the SNEA was 
created in its present form in 1976, but because both dates mark the group's 
evolution towards partial privatisation. Feigenbaum's research focuses for the most 
part on the 1960s and 1970s. Secondly, Feigenbaum's argument is directed at 
showing how public sector companies diverged from their national interest mission 
as they became more powerful. The present study will show that over the long term, 
there was in fact a convergence of objectives between government and the state oil 
sector. The concept of national interest can be interpreted in a variety of ways.
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One is that the SNEA, France's top industrial group, has brought France, the 
French and their governments many benefits. It has provided employment both 
nationally and internationally and like other public sector companies, it has been 
exemplary in its social policies. It has made a substantial contribution to French 
regional development and has pioneered many technical innovations. Furthermore, 
it was due to the SNEA's wealth that the group was invited to absorb various loss- 
making chemical activities in the restructurings of 1983. In other words, the group's 
healthy cash-flow came to the aid of strategic sectors of French industry. In 
addition, the group's extensive international activities, especially in developing 
countries, have contributed not only to the social, economic and technological 
development of these regions, but also to closer diplomatic relations between these 
regions and France. These examples clearly show that the SNEA has a good 
record of responding to national concerns.
In addition to the works reviewed, our analysis of government - industry relations 
has been informed by a range of interviews with senior managers at the SNEA, CFP 
and CEA and with top civil servants in ministries and government agencies. The 
interviews were conducted between 1986 and 1990. All this material has been 
supplemented by our findings in further published works combining the approaches 
mentioned above, in articles from the French and British press, in specialist and 
trade journals and in company reports.
Our investigation is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 surveys the background 
of our case-study into government-industry relations in France and identifies trends 
of development to which we return in subsequent chapters. It traces the growth of 
France's state-owned oil sector from a cluster of government-controlled firms in the 
post-war period to the formation, in 1976, of the SNEA, a privately-oriented, 
diversified industrial group and one of France's largest firms. The chapter 
highlights the political motives which inspired its creation and the protectionist 
methods used in its expansion, considering throughout the role of company leaders 
and government actors and interaction between them. The chapter also reviews
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how the state oil group dealt with the reversal of its fortunes, produced by the loss 
of its Algerian assets and oil crisis of 1973, leading to the switch from cheap to 
expensive oil in France, more widespread economic difficulties and a less protected 
environment. Finally, we examine how a more self-reliant and commercially 
oriented company was bom out of the new competitive conditions of the mid 1970s.
Chapter 2 analyses how company policy was made. It investigates the paradox that 
while governments established the structures and set the broad objectives, they did 
not manage state-owned firms which largely determined their own policies and 
influenced those of governments. Firstly, through a review of the institutions 
concerned in the formulation of oil policy, the chapter analyses the complexities of 
the decision-making process; the proliferation of actors involved; the conflicts 
between them; the fact that between 1976-86 oil policy became less coherent; the 
weakening of government influence in the face of greater internationalisation and 
privatisation of companies. Secondly, the chapter considers the nature and 
purposes of government control over the state oil group. Thirdly, it analyses how 
this control worked in practice, since the government-company relationship was not 
as it appeared. We consider how governments' dependence on the firm, divisions 
among government actors, their lack of policy for specific sectors and companies' 
greater internationalisation allowed senior managers to determine their own policies 
and largely to influence those of governments.
Chapter 3 explores in greater depth government-company interaction by examining 
senior managers as members of a state-created techno-bureaucratic élite. We 
consider the technocratic model and ask to what extent E lfs leaders have 
conformed to it and whether a state-created élite is appropriate to the current world 
of market competition and privatisation. Firstly, the technocratic model and its 
consequences for government-industry relations are explored. Secondly, a specific 
grand corps, the Corps des Mines, to which many of Elfs leaders belonged, is 
examined: its origins, features and mode of operation. We analyse how the 
success of corps strategies meant that in the late 1960s, the state oil sector was still 
one of its strongholds.
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Chapter 4 analyses the government-company relationship in the international 
sphere. It explores the paradox of the public multinational, considering how 
governments supported and hindered Elfs international activities, whilst Elf, not 
only used the state link to expand its interests abroad, but achieved considerable 
autonomy vis à vis its major shareholder through the international nature of the oil 
business. Firstly, the chapter investigates the extent to which successive 
governments encouraged Elfs expansion abroad, initially to protect French 
interests, then to improve the international competitiveness of French firms. 
Secondly, it considers how, as a public company. Elf was vulnerable to the 
ideological and economic imperatives of governments which could handicap the 
firm's international expansion. Thirdly, it examines how Elf and French 
governments benefitted in many areas from the convergence of their interests. 
Fourthly the chapter explores how the international nature of the oil business 
encouraged Elf to behave like a private multinational and in so doing to gain 
considerable freedom of manoeuvre vis à vis governments.
Chapter 5 explores Elfs diversifications into chemicals and pharmaceuticals. It 
investigates to what extent the initiatives and long-term strategies of France's 
largest firms facilitated government policy. The chapter starts by considering that 
although Elfs early chemical acquisitions took place with little government 
intervention, the extent to which the group had strengthened its chemical branch by 
the early 1980s, enabled government to make it the centre of its chemical 
restructurings. Next, the chapter considers how the group's diversifications into 
pharmaceuticals also took place without government intervention, yet these 
diversifications solved many of the problems which beset governments. Finally, the 
chapter focuses on the conflict between Industry minister, André Giraud, determined 
to assert public control and the would-be autonomous chairman, AI bin Chalandon, 
over the diversification issue.
Chapter 6 explores Elfs progression towards privatisation and shows that the 
process was gradual and assumed different forms. It considers how privatisation
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was initiated by large companies and supported by governments of Left and Right. 
Firstly, the chapter examines the nature of government-company collaboration over 
the ERAP/SNPA merger of 1976, first official denationalization of ERAP, and 
highlights the measures adopted by ministers and top managers to secure the 
success of the transaction. Secondly, the chapter investigates how the controversial 
Chalandon era of 1976-83 marked a further stage in the group's market orientation. 
Thirdly, the chapter considers the partial privatisation of Elf in the context of the 
Chirac government's privatisation programme of 1986-88. It explores how the 
motives and factors favouring the programme were applicable to Elf but that the 
changes were not as radical as promised, indicating that the French privatisations 
of 1986-88 were not as market-oriented as they appeared.
Finally, in conclusion, we both summarise and synthesise our findings, as a basis 
for considering the broader implications of our case-study. What light does this in- 
depth study throw on traditional institutional analyses of government - industry 
relations and the model of dirigisme? Certainly the asymmetry of the formal power 
distribution between state and company disguises a more complex two-way 
relationship. Equally the passage from public ownership to semi-privatisation 
represents a much less dramatic change than many have suggested.
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CHAPTER I 
FROM STATISM TOWARDS LIBERALISM
The early history of the French state oil company, up to the time it became the 
Société Nationale Elf Aquitaine (SNEA) in 1976, was dominated by successive 
governments' awareness of the growing importance of oil as a source of energy and 
by the need for secure supplies. France does not have plentiful supplies of 
hydrocarbons on its territory and has therefore always been dependent on foreign 
sources. This dependence proved highly dangerous for national security in two 
world wars, forcing governments to intervene in the coordination of national 
supplies.
What governments chose to do was to control national supplies rather than having 
them controlled by outsiders. This implied control of the raw materials and of the 
finished products, in short, the creation of an integrated oil industry. The inter-war 
years witnessed successive governments' attempts to achieve this through the 
purchase of a substantial share in the existing private company, the Compagnie 
Française des Pétroles (CFP), and through legislation. These attempts were 
inadequate, as shown by France's relative lack in crude oil resources compared 
with those of Germany just prior to World War II.
A more strongly interventionist approach was favoured by governments after the 
war. The necessity of reconstruction convinced post-war governments of the need 
for an entirely state-owned industry which could be used as an instrument of 
government policy. The idea also conformed with the philosophy of the immediate 
post-war head of government, Charles de Gaulle, whose ambition it was that France 
should regain its position as a world power. Independence in the areas of energy 
and defence were prerequisites for regaining this position.
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The policy of pétrole franc or the introduction of crude oil from the franc zone into 
national supplies to the detriment of imports from elsewhere was the instrument for 
achieving this dirigiste organisation of the French oil market. In addition, the law of 
1928 was the weapon used by government both to sell national oil on the French 
market and to enable the state oil companies to build up a refining and distribution 
industry.
Close collaboration between government and industry brought about the partial 
merger of the different state oil companies in the mid-1960s. Total amalgamation 
was not achieved until the mid-1970s. Governments believed that this regrouping 
was necessary in order to strengthen the state oil sector in the face of international 
competition.
The oil industry is a world industry and therefore acutely vulnerable to world events. 
A state-owned oil company operating outside its national boundaries will naturally 
be seen as an agent of its home state. This can bring advantages as well as 
difficulties. The aftermath of the Algerian war and Algeria's accession to 
independence brought problems for the French state oil group which threatened its 
very existence. However, the large-scale programme of internationalisation 
pursued from the 1960s and accelerated after the departure from Algeria and the 
oil crisis of 1973 benefited in certain respects from French foreign policy.
Greater internationalisation made necessary by the departure from Algeria and the 
oil crisis actually ensured the state oil group's survival. Diversification into new 
activities, also a result of the world oil crisis, made good the losses suffered by 
certain sections of the industry. Both internationalisation and diversification meant 
that the group was less subject to supervision by national government. What is 
more, since the oil crisis, oil-producing states have taken greater control of their 
own production. The oil companies, whether national or international, private or 
state-owned, were therefore obliged to compete for contracts on the same footing 
and behave in a similar fashion. For their part, the governments of importing 
countries could no longer exploit the resources of the oil-producing countries by
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means of their national oil companies. They had to rely on the oil firms to obtain the 
most favourable terms. These changed conditions led to a blurring of the distinction 
between the public and private oil companies.
Initially a collection of small companies, created by government for the specific 
purpose of providing the nation with secure supplies of oil and gas, France's state 
oil sector developed over roughly thirty-five years to become a major industrial 
group of national and international stature. While strong presidential support and 
a consensus in government gave life to the state oil sector immediately after World 
War II and provided it with opportunities to expand, from the mid-1970s world 
events and changed economic conditions, combined with a less supportive 
president and governments, encouraged Elf Erap to behave like any privately run 
company.
This chapter is divided into eight sections which examine chronologically, from the 
First World War until 1976, when the SNEA was created in its present form, the 
growth of France's state-owned oil group. Presidential support, government 
initiatives and close collaboration between managers and ministers dominate in the 
early stages, covering the sections: The Origins; The Liberation; The Capture of 
Outlets; The Birth of a Group. However, events leading to the nationalisation of 
French oil assets in Algeria and coinciding with the oil crisis, examined in The 
FrancO'Aigehan Crisis, destroyed the continuity of state policy developed since 
1928. The result was a new perception about the difficulties and uncertainties of 
maintaining cheap and secure supplies of oil. This view, together with prevailing 
ideas about the need to make French firms less vulnerable to foreign competition 
and more self-reliant, determined the future behaviour of the state oil group and 
governments' reaction to it. How the company and governments responded to 
these new economic conditions will be discussed in the last three sections; 
Internationalisation, The Crisis in Refining and Diversification, Towards Liberalism.
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T he O rigins
Oil did not have an important share of French energy supplies in the early years of 
the twentieth century and provision was in the hands of the international companies 
and some French-owned private importers. It was in the area of national defence 
that French governments were made to realise the threat posed by France's serious 
lack of hydrocarbon resources. The shortage of oil in World War I obliged the 
authorities, during the inter-war years, to intervene in the organisation of national 
oil supplies. The result was a mixed formula of government control and free market. 
Although this organisation went some way towards strengthening national suppliers 
and may have been adequate in peacetime, the imperatives of the second world 
confrontation revealed its weaknesses.
World War I
With no oil resources on its own territory, France depended on imported oil 
products and crude oil mainly from the USA and Russia. In World War I this 
dependence proved dramatic. Clémenceau's appeal to President Wilson on 15th 
December 1917 has become legendary:
"Si les alliés ne veulent pas perdre la guerre, il faut que la France 
combattante à l'heure du suprême choc germanique possède 
l'essence, aussi nécessaire que le sang dans les batailles de 
demain".^
At the time of Clémenceau's appeal, provoked by Germany's preparations for a final 
onslaught, Russia was about to surrender and Standard Oil, France's main supplier, 
had halted its deliveries. This highly dangerous situation was to haunt the military 
hierarchy and permanently affect French oil policy which was characterised 
henceforth by a constant preoccupation with obtaining secure supplies of oil.^
The uncertainties of war aggravated France's already weak position regarding oil 
supplies. Unlike Great Britain and Germany, where government intervened to
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support oil exploration, there was no such state intervention in France. The French 
oil industry consisted of a small number of private refiners and distributors 
dependent on imports. As for development in other areas of the industry - drilling 
material, transport, methods of prospection - there had been little progress.
The Inter-War Years
In December 1917 the governments of the Third Republic, who had so far relied on 
private initiative, were obliged to intervene. The first step was to take over the 
monopoly for buying and selling oil products. This initiative was achieved by the 
creation in August 1918 of a Commissariat Général aux essences et œmbustibles, 
which intervened at all stages of the industry. The officially defined role of this 
agency was
"étudier, proposer et provoquer toutes études propres à intensifier à 
la fois les recherches et la production nationale de gisements de 
pétrole et autres combustibles liquides en France et dans les colonies 
et les protectorats"^
This was the first official expression of a government resolution to organise 
prospection in France and French territories and it is in this decision that we see the 
beginnings of France's state oil sector.
For the next ten years, however, there was interminable controversy over the choice 
between a state monopoly or measures to liberate the oil market, and governments 
hesitated between the two extremes. The parliamentary debates about the 1928 
law reflect deep divisions of opinion."* While a free market would enable a refining 
industry to develop, it would also allow access by the powerful international 
companies.
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It was the international companies which dominated the world oil industry at the 
time. That is to say, they controlled levels of production of crude oil and the price 
at which it was sold to importing countries. The 1920s was a period of 
overproduction, yet oil consumption was uneven, since coal was the main source 
of energy and the uses of oil were still limited. On account of the uncertain nature 
of the market, the already cartellised international companies would drive up prices 
to an artificially high level to ensure their own profitability. This would result in a 
price war, since the small and medium-sized companies feared for their survival. 
The next stage in the process was "dumping", when oil was sold at any price, even 
at a loss. Although "dumping" increased sales, it reduced profitability and this led 
to a further stage, also based on the cartel arrangement, in which the large 
companies reduced their oil production, so that they could at least sell at a profit.®
The Law of 1928
Given the instability of the market, many national governments attempted at the time 
to bring order to the chaos and gain control of their own oil supplies. In France it 
was the then intendant militaire, Louis Pineau, who devised what became known as 
la loi de 28.® The main principles of the 1928 law were that the import of crude oil 
and oil products were to be subject to state control. That is, licences were needed 
for any imports exceeding 300 tonnes* per month. These licences were also 
subject to a time limit, 20 years for crude oil and 3 years for oil products. 
Established importers were granted licences for a quantity equivalent to their 
maximum imports over the previous 5 years. In addition, companies regulated by 
the law were required to supply public services as a priority, to keep reserve stocks 
of oil and to take on contracts deemed to be in the national interest.^ Thus, by 
means of the 1928 law, government armed itself with a legal weapon to strengthen 
its role as supreme arbiter over the national market.
1 tonne = 1000 kilogrammes.
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The implications of the law were extensive. The licence system enabled 
government to exercise control over imports in order to impose quotas. From now 
on the quotas fixed by the international companies would be replaced by quotas 
decided by the French government. In the words of H.B. Feigenbaum the plan was 
a "fight fire with fire technique: an attempt to mitigate dependence on a foreign 
monopoly by creating a monopsonic buyer".® The underlying intention was that 
French interests should be protected in the face of the considerable power of the 
international companies. French interests implied national defence and national 
independence. These were to be protected by maintaining, with the help of the 
1928 law, a diversified range of oil supplies, while at the same time strengthening 
the existing French companies.®
The legislators were not therefore opposed to the benefits which the international 
companies could provide. They had devised the law as a midway solution which 
would avoid both the abuses of the free market and the financial and diplomatic 
complications of a state monopoly. In many respects the international companies' 
interests were also being protected, for the intention was
"to respect as far as possible their established rights so as to allow 
them to recoup the cost of their installations; to decide on an import 
system which excludes no one; in short, to fix reasonable quotas on 
all our suppliers."^®
The 1928 law was in fact a compromise solution, not a pure state monopoly but a 
monopoly delegated to private importers via import licences (monopole délégué). 
As Feigenbaum points out, it was actually a political ploy aimed at preventing the 
state import monopoly desired by the Parliamentary Left, yet it also represented a 
victory for French importers.Insofar as ten years after the institution of this 
legislation, France had fifteen refineries compared with two in 1928, one can 
conclude that the aims of the law were achieved.
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State entrepreneurship
Regulation was not the only instrument used by government to achieve its ends. 
State entrepreneurship was also employed through the government's purchase In 
1929 of a 35% share in the Compagnie Française des Pétroles (CFP).^^ The CFP 
had been created in 1924 to manage the Deutsche Bank's share of the Turkish 
Petroleum Company (later to be called the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) with the 
break-up of the Ottoman Empire), which fell to France in the San Remo Treaty. 
Raymond Poincaré, who headed the government in 1923, was aware that state 
involvement in the exploitation of these crude oil reserves would put enormous 
strain on the Treasury, and, being in any case opposed to state control, his idea 
was to find private investors. The obvious place to look was to the ten French 
importing firms known as the Cartel des Dix, who joined up with the major 
investment banks, especially the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas. Although 
initially the Cartel des Dix had been opposed to forming a single firm, since it would 
be more vulnerable to state control, perceptions changed when new Iraqi oil 
reserves were discovered. Thus the CFP was formed. Poincaré's fear that state 
control might frighten away private investors meant that he kept state influence to 
a minimum. With the 1929 recession and a drop in demand, together with a fear of 
"dumping" by the Majors^ ,^ government purchased a 35% share in the CFP. In this 
way, two forms of state intervention served to protect the new French oil industry, 
enabling it to develop in its upstream and downstream activities. State 
entrepreneurship secured substantial supplies of crude oil, while regulation 
protected the French importer distributors.
Louis Pineau was responsible for more than just the 1928 law. As a part of his 
scheme to give the French government greater control in the provision of its own oil 
supplies, he had created in 1925 the Office National des Carburants Liquides 
(ONCL) to take responsibility for the practical problems of oil exploration, for 
gathering data on the physical properties of regions, on the organisation of oil 
prospection in France and the empire and on techniques of dr i l l ing .The ONCL's
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starting point was to carry out further studies in regions which had already shown 
signs of promise, that is, Aquitaine, Languedoc and Alsace in métropolitain France, 
North Africa, Madagascar and French Equatorial Africa in the empire. Syndicats 
d'études were formed (with help from the CFP and the gouvernements généraux) 
and associated themselves with the ONCL in the form of mixed economy 
companies. It was from these that the foreign subsidiaries of Elf Aquitaine were to 
grow.
However, shortly before World War II, apart from having drawn up regional maps, 
the prospection efforts of the colonial syndicats d'études had produced virtually 
nothing. Moreover, governments of the Third Republic had reduced their financial 
support in the aftermath of the 1929 world economic crisis. It is therefore no 
surprise that France was still very poorly provided for in energy supplies on the eve 
of World War II compared with its major opponent, Germany. An indication is that 
whereas German hydrocarbon resources amounted to 500,000 tonnes, France had 
only 40,000 tonnes/^
It is ironic that two months before the outbreak of war, a major discovery of natural 
gas was made at St. Marcet in the Haute Garonne, due to the exploration efforts of 
the Centre de Recherches du Pétrole du Midi (CRPM), created in 1937. In 
anticipation of the imminent conflict, the French government took 100% control of 
the newly discovered oil field by creating the Régie Autonome des Pétroles (RAP) 
on 29th July 1939. This établissement public would be responsible for exploiting 
St Marcet and surrounding area and be financed temporarily by advances from the 
Ministère des Travaux Publics.^ ® Another strand of the future Elf Aquitaine had 
been born.
World War II
At the outbreak of hostilities in May 1940, however, exploitation of the gas field of 
St Marcet had hardly begun. Although France had access to a number of sources
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of crude oil, which temporarily reassured the authorities, when the Franco-German 
armistice was signed in June, all sources of crude oil were either acquired by the 
German authorities or obstructed. First in line was the company at Pechelbronn in 
Alsace. Although a small oil field, it was at the time the only established source of 
crude oil on French soil. This was taken over by the Germans in the days following 
the armistice. A few weeks later, on 4th July, with the ending of Franco-British 
relations due to the events at Mers El Kebir, France lost access to Iraqi oil and the 
British government prohibited deliveries of oil to French tankers in Syria and the 
Lebanon and sequestered the assets of the CFP. Furthermore the US suspended 
delivery of industrial raw materials to France, while the British naval blockade of the 
Atlantic cut off French subsidiaries of American oil groups from their mother 
companies. For France a further source of oil was Roumania where three 
companies had grown up, bringing together French, Belgian, British and American 
capital. Although the French devised a plan to sabotage their own oil installations 
in Roumania in order to cut Germany off from their energy supplies, it failed, and 
French oilmen were expelled. This marked the climax of worsening relations 
between France and Roumania, which was gradually transferring its loyalties to 
Germany. The expulsion of the French oilmen was just part of a much larger plan 
by which the Germans aimed to exploit the resources of the lands they conquered. 
A further stage was the surrender to Germany of France's shares in Roumanian 
oil.^^
Thus in the space of a few months France was deprived of virtually all its sources 
of oil supply: stocks of petrol and gasoil amounted to no more than one tenth of 
average annual needs. Yet it is paradoxical that the Vichy period was of capital 
importance to the French oil industry, not so much as regards results but because 
it set up the legal framework and main elements of what would become in the 
post-war period a public oil sector.
Owing to the strategic nature of oil, although it was of minor importance in the 
energy balance, it was vulnerable to state intervention. In January 1941 oil became
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the object of a Comité d'Organisation, one of the committees established to develop 
production programmes, acquire and share out raw material,control the running of 
firms and intervene in the fixing of prices. Another form of state intervention was a 
Groupement d'achat des carburants, created in October 1941, which all buyers of 
fuel had to join. Most important of all these government-controlled organisations 
was the Direction des Carburants (DICA), which succeeded the ONCL in 1939. 
Although its influence was slight compared with that of the Direction des Houillères 
or Direction de l'Electricité, it had extensive powers, covering the definition and 
implementation of fuel supply policy, the setting up of programmes for production, 
import, transport and stocks, together with responsibility for controlling a whole 
range of areas from prospection to distribution, scientific research and teaching. It 
should be noted that the RAP became associated with it.
A further form of state intervention, but in this case it was aimed at obstructing 
German greed, was that the government asserted its rights over a vast area of 
South West France, spurred on by the discovery of natural gas at St. Marcet. A law 
of 18th July 1941 gave government the right to prospect and exploit an area of 2.8 
million hectares, which encompassed the area already granted to the RAP in 1939. 
In November 1941 the area was handed over to the Société Nationale des Pétroles 
d'Aquitaine (SNPA), a company created for the purpose, in which the state had a 
55% holding, the private shareholders being the CFP, St. Gobain, Pechiney, 
Rhone-Poulenc. In this way a further strand of the future Elf Aquitaine was 
created.^®
The Vichy period was one of maturation for the state oil group. The major 
structures which would later form the Société Nationale Elf Aquitaine (RAP and 
SNPA) were in place, modern methods of prospection and drilling were being 
mastered, an oil services industry was being formed and a legal framework had 
been establislied. In addition, t^ams of professionals had been formed through 
contacts mad^ during the hostilities ^nd in oil exploration activities overseas. 
However, th^ pr©-)/Vor|d War II organisation of the French oil market would not be
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adequate to confront the necessities of reconstruction. Stronger government 
agencies, capable of coordinating and planning, would be needed in the aftermath 
of the war to reinforce and give direction to what had already been established.
T he L iberation
It was immediately after the war that the state oil companies received a major 
political impetus. The nationalisation of all key industries was the chief 
preoccupation of the Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Française (GPRF). 
Although oil did not at the time occupy a large share of France's energy sources like 
coal, gas and electricity, the humiliating defeat of the war, together with memories 
of dramatic oil shortages in World War I, convinced the post-war government that 
oil was a strategic product and that it was essential to have an integrated oil 
industry under French control.
Driving forces
The means chosen to achieve this end was the policy of "national oil" and strong 
government commitment to support the industry. Both these elements are stressed 
in the ordonnance for the creation of the Bureau de Recherches de Pétrole (BRP), 
government's instrument for the implementation of a "national oil" policy.
"Du pétrole produit et raffiné en France et dans son empire est la 
seule solution parfaite aux problèmes d'approvisionnement du pays 
en hydrocarbures....
The text of the ordonnance closes with the words:
"il apparaît donc essentiel de consacrer à la recherche des gisements 
d'hydrocarbures l'effort maximum; l'importance des crédits 
nécessaires en même temps que la continuité de vue absolument 
indispensable sont les caractéristiques de ces recherches... Seul un 
établissement public disposant pour plusieurs années de ressources 
importantes et certaines est susceptible d'apporter à ce problème une 
solution heureuse".^^
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It was de Gaulle, as head of the GPRF, who signed the ordonnance for the creation 
of the BRP on 12th October 1945. With his military background, he was fully aware 
of the strategic importance of oil. Furthermore, his ambition for France to be 
independent in the area of defence made him a natural ally of supporters of the 
policy of "national oil". It was auspicious for the future state oil industry that the 
newly appointed head of the DICA, Pierre Guillaumat, should be a family friend of 
de Gaulle and hold very similar convictions.^
The son of General Adolphe Guillaumat, Minister of War in 1926, Pierre Guillaumat 
was educated at the military academy of La Flèche (Sarthe), run by his father, and 
then at the Ecole Polytechnique. Rated among the top students, he was entitled, 
on leaving, to join the prestigious Corps des Mines and then embarked on a career 
in the colonial service. His education destined him for posts in the Service des 
Mines, first in Morocco, then Indo-China and Tunis. In 1940, having joined the 
Service des Renseignements "Air", based in Tunis, he was able to build up a whole 
network of contacts, many of whom were involved in the oil business.^^ He returned 
to France in 1944 with considerable knowledge and strong convictions about oil 
exploration. For Guillaumat, systematic prospection was the only way to achieve 
results and this demanded considerable sums of money, continuity and effective 
work teams, all of which at the time needed strong government suppod/* It was 
these beliefs which were to underpin not only Guillaumat's directorship of the DICA 
from 1944-1951 but also his chairmanship of different branches of the state oil 
sector, a career spanning over 30 years.
Working closely with Guillaumat at the DICA in the immediate post-war period were 
two other colleagues who were also to play key roles in the state oil companies. 
They were Jean Blancard and Paul Moch, both polytechniciens and ingénieurs au 
Corps des Mines. Referred to as "/es trois Bouddhas", Guillaumat, Blancard and 
Moch were to be largely responsible for ensuring the continuity of management 
essential for the growth of the future state oil group.^ ®
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In 1945, however, the ambition of "les trois Bouddhas" was not to change what 
existed already, but to reinforce and direct the oil activities already begun in France 
and its colonies. This would be achieved by means of the BRP, a completely new 
entity. It was to be a kind of research centre, "le nerf de la recherche, la pièce 
maîtresse de cette industrie nationale à laquelle on rêve déjà."^® Not involved 
directly in exploration, the BRP had the quality of a holding company and inherited 
public shares in a whole range of oil activities in France and its colonies.^^ As 
regards financial backing, the plan was that the BRP should be supported by public 
funds - accounted for in the general budget - by a share in the profits from 
discoveries it financed and by reimbursements for loans it made to subsidiaries. In 
addition, the ordonnance of 1945 instituted a special tax on certain imported oil 
products. This was to feed the Fonds de Soutien aux Hydrocarbures (FSH), created 
in 1950. Then in 1953, a form of tax exemption, the Provision pour Reconstitution 
de Gisement, similar to the American depletion allowance* was instituted.^
In 1945 gaining acceptance for the idea of an integrated oil industry, supported by 
state funds, yet showing no obvious results for several years, demanded 
considerable conviction, perseverance and administrative skill. The chief tactic 
employed by Guillaumat and his close colleagues was to ensure the support of 
people of influence, primarily at the Ministry of Finance. It should be noted that in 
the pre-war period the Budget Department made every effort to prevent investment 
in oil exploration. Guillaumat therefore made a point of involving the heads of 
Treasury and Budget closely in the daily running of the BRP. For example, he 
brought together for monthly meetings h\s comité spécial at which the Treasury, 
Budget, Customs and Direction des Impôts were represented. Until his departure 
in 1977 all important questions were discussed by this comité spécial which.
Under the depletion allowance, American companies are authorised to 
deduct 22% of their wellhead rent from their taxable profits (up to a 
maximum of 50%).
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according to Péan and Séréni, was "an efficient way to defuse conflicts" 29
Moreover, on several occasions throughout its history, directors of the Treasury and 
Budget were intimately involved in the state oil group's development. One Treasury 
director, François Bloch-Lainé, had a seat on the board of the Entreprise de 
Recherche et d'Activités Pétrolières (ERAP)“  and Roger Goetze combined for 
nearly ten years the post of Budget director with the chairmanship of the Société 
Nationale de Recherches et d'Exploitation Pétrolières en Algérie (SN Repal), the 
BRP's main Algerian subsidiary.^^ Another technique of involving the Finance 
Ministry was to appoint Inspecteurs des Finances to the DICA, bastion of the Corps 
des Mines.^^ To this day the deputy Director of the DICA is invariably a member of 
the Cour des Comptes or Inspection des Finances.
This interpenetration of the worlds of government, industry and finance, apparent 
throughout Elf Aquitaine's history, was extremely beneficial to the group's 
development. We should note that in 1945, while Guillaumat himself combined the 
directorship of the DICA with that of the BRP and took every advantage of this 
ambiguity in his functions, Paul Moch combined the deputy directorship of the BRP 
with the chairmanship of the RAP. In the words of Péan and Séréni: "Ainsi à eux 
deux, Guillaumat et Moch verrouillent complètement le secteur d'Etat naissant".^^
It is therefore no surprise that for the first five-year plan (1946-1950) 56 billion 
francs were allocated to oil research. There was general agreement in political 
circles that it was money well spent and that France's dependence on foreign oil 
supplies should be reduced.
The policy of pétrole franc
According to the ordonnance of 1945, the BRP's major task was to establish "un 
programme national de recherches et d'en assurer la mise en oeuvre dans l'intérêt 
exclusif de la nation"^. The task carried two important implications:
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(i) undertaking geological examinations of all the territories of rUnion française 
and prospection in regions which seemed technically and economically 
promising
(ii) the use of a mixed economy formula in the development of a French oil 
industry
Accordingly, and in view of the extent and urgency of the task in hand, it seemed 
obvious to share the costs and risks with foreign companies. The USA was the 
most advanced in the area of oil exploration, so it was natural that the newly created 
French companies should seek to become associated with the Majors.^ Although 
the first real association in Tunisia of the BRP with Shell and Gulf Oil provoked 
violent debates in the press and parliament throughout 1949, towards the end of the 
1950s several subsidiaries, both in métropolitain France and its territories, had 
become associated with the Majors.
Important discoveries
The perseverance of Guillaumat's teams was rewarded by a series of spectacular 
discoveries throughout the 1950s, at Lacq in South West France, in Gabon, the 
Congo and the Sahara.
In 1951 the gas field at Lacq was discovered by one of the SNPA's teams and at the 
time was one of the most important in Europe with 200 billion cubic metres of 
reserves. Although the gas did not come on stream until 1957, due to the difficulties 
posed by its high sulphur content - which, ironically, would later constitute a 
considerable part of the SNPA's wealth - for the next twenty years it remained the 
chief source of finance of the SNPA and subsequently of Elf Aquitaine.^
In French Equatorial Africa the syndicat de recherches set up there in the 1930s 
had begun to prospect Gabon and the Congo. The underdevelopment of the 
region, poor hygiene and lack of equipment, meant that even by 1945, little
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progress had been made. Although the BRP took a majority share In the syndicat 
de recherches, creating the Société des Pétroles de l'Afrique Equatoriale Française 
(SPAEF) in 1949, a series of failures and waning investments prompted association 
with the Majors. Agreements were signed with Shell and Mobil in 1958, leading to 
modest discoveries in Gabon, but the main advantage of these associations was 
that French oilmen were initiated into the techniques of off-shore drilling. The Suez 
crisis of 1956 forced the Fourth Republic to increase their allocation of capital to oil 
exploration in the Gulf of Guinea and efforts finally bore fruit in important 
discoveries in 1956-1957 in Gabon - Ozouri, Pointe Clairette M'bega, Animba, 
Tchengue - and in the Congo - Pointe-Indienne.^^
Simultaneously, the Sahara was revealing its great reserves of oil. This region had 
interested geologists since the 1930s, but it was in the post-war period that 
prospection began in earnest. Initially it was concentrated in the Northern Sahara 
where some small discoveries were made. Then, thanks to the creation of the SN 
Repal in 1946, owned jointly by the BRP and the Gouvernement Général d'Algérie, 
many financial problems were overcome, due to the influence of the chairman, 
Roger Goetze, both with the rue de Rivoli - he became deputy director of the 
cabinet of Mendès-France after the war - and with the Gouvernement Général 
d'Algérie. Although the SN Repal experienced several years of failure at the 
beginning of the 1950s, its association with the Compagnie Française des Pétroles 
d'Algérie, the Algerian subsidiary of the CFP, resulted in the discovery of the 
Hassi-Messaoud oil field and Hassi R'Mel gas field in 1956 and 1957 respectively. 
A further fruitful association of a French state company, the RAP, and Shell resulted 
in another important discovery, the oil field of Edjeleh, at the end of 1955.“
Oil shares
In addition to association with the Majors and the CFP, another method by which the 
state oil companies sought private investment was the purchase of oil shares by the 
public. With the creation of the BRP in 1945, efforts were made by Paul Moch,
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considered to be the financial brain of the three founders, to interest the major 
banks in oil exploration. To little avail, however. It was only in 1954 after the 
discovery of oil by Esso at Parentis in South West France that oil shares began to 
arouse public interest. To quote Péan and Séréni, "Du jour au lendemain la France 
se passionne pour le pétrole".^ Two months after the discovery, a financial 
company appeared, Finarep, in which Crédit Lyonnais and Paribas figured among 
the main shareholders. In the same year the SNPA's shares were quoted on the 
Bourse. This interest in oil shares was beneficial to several parties. For the 
Ministry of Finance, it eased the burden on public funds which, until then, had alone 
borne the brunt of exploration, the BRP was seen less in the light of a strain on the 
public purse, banks made profits by increasing the number of share issues and 
among private savers there was general enthusiasm for potential profit.^
The combination of government support to the BRP, association with the 
international companies and private investment was a successful formula. The 
major discoveries throughout the 1950s completely changed the scale of the state 
oil companies' operations. By the late 1950s they were managing vast oil-producing 
regions of world scale. When de Gaulle returned to power in 1958, he saw that the 
impetus he had given to the policy of independence in energy supplies had paid off.
Babinet summarises the growth of the state oil sector thus:
"partie de presque rien dans les années 50, la production pétrolière 
de la zone franc avoisine les 8 millions de tonnes annuelles en 1960 
et double en 2 ans grâce au Sahara, pour atteindre 18 millions en 
1962."^’
T he Capture  of O utlets
The logical sequence of the policy of pétrole franc was the development of the 
downstream branches of the industry. This process took place in several stages. 
First of all, the CFP and Majors were obliged to buy "national oil", then a public 
network of refining and distribution companies was created and, finally, a 
substantial part of the national market would be given to them. The methods used
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were highly dirigiste. Government made use of legislation to force rival firms to 
cooperate in achieving the aims of the state oil sector. Notwithstanding the support 
the companies enjoyed with the Ministry of Industry, the task of expansion found 
several obstacles in its path. In addition to the fact that the state companies were 
late-comers to the market, they met opposition from the strong international oil 
groups established on French territory, from the Ministry of Finance, from Brussels 
and from divisions within themselves. Furthermore, the section of government 
committed to supporting a national oil industry, namely the DICA, had to tread a 
delicate path in reconciling the wishes of the different factions.
By 1958 "national oil" was flowing and the gas from Lacq was playing an important 
part in France's energy balance. Until now the state oil companies had devoted all 
their energies to exploration, but had neglected setting up a refining and distribution 
network. Therefore, when Algerian oil arrived, they were faced with the problem of 
how to sell it.^  ^ The French market had been supplied by the CFP and subsidiaries 
of the Majors since the 1930s, so the arrival of the BRP and RAP naturally aroused 
their hostility. The attitude of the Majors was that they made an important 
contribution to French supplies, whereas the view of the CFP was that it had been 
created precisely in order to refine crude oil for the national market. In fact, its 
refining subsidiary, the Compagnie Française de Raffinage (CFR), had received 
from government the right to refine 25% of the crude oil destined for the French 
market.^
The top management of the BRP therefore devised a plan of action as follows: first 
they aimed to saturate the national market by replacing oil from the established 
French suppliers by oil produced by the state companies and, second, to prepare 
to export. However, "national oil" came at just the wrong moment. The Suez crisis 
convinced the oil-importing countries of Western Europe that there were 
considerable risks attached to obtaining their supplies exclusively from the Middle 
East. Furthermore, two new suppliers, Libya and the USSR, had appeared on the 
world scene as formidable competitors to European refiners. In addition, the USA
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had limited its imports of oil, which virtually amounted to shutting out the European 
companies from a market which represented 60% of the free world. Moreover, other 
European countries, for example, Italy, Germany, Belgium, had also created state 
oil companies and, like France, were seeking to sell oil on the European market, 
which was fast becoming saturated."^
The weapon of "devoir national"
Insofar as the RAP and BRP would need several years to create a refining and 
distribution network from nothing, the best solution was to use the capacity of 
refiners already established in France, those of the CFP and Majors. However, this 
was not acceptable to either party for a variety of reasons. For the CFP, its own 
Middle East production already exceeded the capacity of its refineries and 
distribution network. It ran the risk, should it attempt to reduce production, of being 
prevented from exploring in those countries which now actually wished to increase 
the quantities of oil extracted. The CFP also ran the risk of sanctions from its 
international partners and of jeopardising the privileged links it had built up with 
them.^^ For the international groups. Shell, Mobil, Esso, BP, but also the CFP, oil 
produced by the French state companies was more expensive than Middle East oil, 
less well adapted to their refineries due to its low sulphur content and, in addition, 
it deprived them of their rente minière - the profit realised on the price at which they 
bought crude oil from their production subsidiaries and sold it to their refining 
subsidiaries.^
It was for these reasons that initial talks with the CFP and Majors broke down. The 
negotiators of the state oil companies were obliged to take stronger measures. 
Through contacts at the Finance Ministry, the Elysée and the DICA and the support 
of Jean Marcel Jeanneney, Minister of Industry, the CFP and Majors were obliged 
to buy oil produced by the state companies."*^ The weapon used was Article 3 of the 
1928 law, which imposed on holders of import licences
"l'exécution de contrats d'intérêt national pour l'acquisition de pétrole
brut, de produits dérivés et succédanés, et la fabrication dans leurs
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usines de produits d'origine pétrolière utiles à l'économie générale du 
pays."^
Thus, importers were obliged not only to buy considerable quantities of national oil 
but also to refine them.
Confirmation was obtained from the Conseil d'Etat that the contracts were in fact in 
the national interest, with the proviso that all companies must be treated in the same 
way in implementing the law. According to Article 3, the volume of crude oil each 
company should buy was determined by its position on the French market. As a 
result, the CFP and Majors were obliged to buy quantities of crude not exceeding 
30% of their outlets. Regarding the price at which they bought national oil, this was 
also determined by the company's position on the market, by the quantities 
imposed, by the quality of the oil, and by the price at which the foreign refining 
subsidiaries were supplied with crude oil by their mother company.^
It should be noted that decisions about quantities and prices were not imposed in 
an authoritarian way. Both the DICA and companies wished to avoid conflict. The 
DICA was fully aware that the international groups controlled 60% of the French 
refining and distribution market, whereas the international groups were conscious 
of their weak legal position. Moreover, the CFP was well aware of the strength of 
support enjoyed by the state oil companies at the Ministry of Industry and the 
Elysée and that a battle with the administration might put it at a disadvantage.
The necessity for an integrated group
Although the state oil companies were successful in selling their crude oil by means 
of the contrats d'intérêt national, this was only the first step. In the long term it was 
essential for them to have a completely integrated industry. The reasons were 
numerous. The price at which the Majors bought "national oil" was lower than the 
price at which they supplied their own refineries with their own crude oil. This 
constituted a loss for the state companies. In addition, the 1928 law with its
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licensing and quota system was in conflict with the Treaty of Rome. Article 37 of the 
Treaty anticipated the gradual removal of state monopolies. Furthermore the 
Majors would soon acquire licences for Saharan exploration themselves and at that 
point they would no longer buy from the state oil companies.®® The necessity for a 
vertically integrated state oil group was also obvious to the French administration 
as well as to the state producers. According to one of Babinet's sources: "C'était 
l'idée naturelle, évidente, que des producteurs importants ne peuvent être 
indéfiniment producteurs sans être aussi raffineurs."®  ^ Consequently the project for 
a Société Industrielle des Pétroles (SIP), created jointly by the BRP and RAP, 
obtained the support of the Minister of Industry, J-M Jeanneney, with the proviso 
that a single, united group should be formed, not a host of small refining companies 
competing with one another. In addition there would be no question of reducing the 
CFP's share of the refining-distribution market to make way for the new group. The 
relationship with the CFP should be one of saine œncurrence.
The DICA's task was not an easy one. It was committed to supporting the state 
companies' efforts to build up a refining-distribution group, while simultaneously 
recognising the important contribution of the international oil groups to French 
supplies and protecting the CFP. This company was already in possession of an 
oil industry of its own and was indispensable to France. The DICA's task was 
further complicated by de Gaulle's foreign policy, opposed to NATO and to an 
understanding with the Majors, yet favouring a rapprochement with the Arab 
countries and the developing world.®^
The nature of the future SIP was the object of much deliberation, but the solution 
finally retained showed two dominant characteristics, which revealed the 
preoccupations of the administration. On the one hand, it was essential that the 
new group form a united whole. The reasons were that, in the immediate post-war 
period,, a host of companies had appeared at the initiative of the RAP and BRP. 
Certain companies which had made important discoveries, for example, the SNPA 
and SN Repal, had become very rich and aimed at a considerable degree of 
autonomy from the BRP, which consequently had difficulty controlling them.
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According to one of the SN Repal's geologists; "Le BRP ne commandait pas 
véritablement ses filiales... Elles restaient très indépendantes, refusaient toute 
coordination."^ The second characteristic of the new organisation was that it 
should be a state group, whose policies would "automatically conform to instructions 
from government".
The Union Générale des Pétroles
The new group became effective on 14th November 1960 under the name of the 
Union Générale des Pétroles (UGP). According to the official communiqué, it would 
consist of "des participations égales de la RAP et de la SN Repal et d’un 
groupement de sociétés ayant également atteint le stade de la production, telles 
que la SPAEF" and would ensure, in conjunction with private oil groups, the 
transport, refining and distribution of oil from the franc zone.^ By way of reconciling 
the interests of all parties the communiqué underlined, on the one hand, that oil 
produced in the franc zone by national companies should also be used and sold in 
the franc zone, on the other, that a sufficient part of the French market should be 
left for the CFP and international groups, whose investments had already given 
France a modern and well-adapted refining and distribution industry. The 
communiqué incorporated three important points concerning the nature and role of 
the UGP. First, the new group would not be privileged in any way, but compete on 
an equal footing with other companies. Second, it would acquire a majority share 
in the transport, refining and distribution activities of Caltex^ amounting to no more 
than 4% of the French market. Third, the various refining and distribution groups 
in France were invited to make agreements with the state oil companies, so that 
each year a reasonable share of French oil supplies should be made up by oil 
produced in the franc zone.
There were, however, numerous obstacles to the UGP's development. First of all, 
among the refining and distribution companies in France, the most successful had 
already been acquired by the CFP, whereas those prepared to be taken over by the 
UGP usually had specific difficulties and saw their survival in being bought up by 
the state group. The example of Caltex was a case in point.^ In addition, the CFP,
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naturally opposed to the UGP's existence, since it had itself been created twenty- 
seven years earlier to fulfil the same role, made every effort to obstruct the new 
group's attempts to gain a share of the refining-distribution market. The national 
press of the day, no doubt backed by the CFP and Majors, also added fuel to the 
controversy:
"Pourquoi engager des fonds de l'Etat pour créer un nouveau réseau 
de distribution de l'essence et du fuel alors que cette distribution est 
faite jusqu'ici avec une progression de moyens qui donne toute 
satisfaction aux usagers?"®^
A more dangerous obstacle was the Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances. Even 
before the creation of the UGP, Antoine Pinay, Minister of Finance from January 
1959 to January 1960, considered the structure of the new group too statist and 
opposed the views of J-M Jeanneney. Tension rose from 1962 when Valéry 
Giscard d'Estaing was appointed Finance Minister. Opposed in principle to public 
sector companies, Giscard d'Estaing expressed his disapproval of this new 
extension to the state group in the following terms:
"C'était une création fâcheuse au moment où la France avait une 
souverainté totale au Sahara; elle devient plus dangereuse et inutile 
encore à l'heure actuelle. Je pense qu'il est indispensable qu'un seul 
groupe pétrolier (la CFP) défende les intérêts de l'Etat français."®®
A further obstacle to the UGP's expansion was the rivalry which existed among the 
different companies composing the group; RAP 33.3%, SN Repal 33.3%, GEP®® 
33.3%. The GEP brought together four of the BRP's producing subsidiaries; SNPA 
40%, SPAEF 40%, CEP®° 15%, PREPA®^  15%. It was a device to allow the BRP to 
become involved in industrial activities. The conflicts arose from the fact that 
certain companies were resentful that their share of the new firm was not 
proportionate, either to the position they occupied vis-a-vis the BRP or to their 
wealth.
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Conflicts were to some extent resolved by the system of a rotating chairman and by 
the DICA. Regarding the system of chairmanship, the heads of the three 
companies holding shares in the UGP, Paul Moch for the RAP, Roger Goetze for 
the SN Repal and Jean Blancard for the BRP, were to take turns as chairman. In 
the event it was Pierre Guillaumat, not Roger Goetze, who succeeded Paul Moch, 
the UGP's first chairman. For its part the DICA went to considerable lengths to 
make sure that conflicts did not become politicised. A former official described the 
role of the DICA in the following terms:
"Dès cette époque, probablement au contact des groupes 
internationaux, nous étions très conscients de la nécessité de ne pas 
malmener les diverses personnalités, d'autant qu'il y avait aussi des 
intérêts privés. Nous avons donc veillé à ne pas provoquer de 
conflits ou, en tout cas, à ne pas les laisser se pérenniser. Car nous 
savions que si ces conflits devenaient trop violents, ils risqueraient 
d'être arbitrés par le pouvoir politique. Très proches des sociétés 
elles-mêmes, nous pensions comme on peut le penser encore 
aujourd'hui, que toute interférence politique était nuisible dans ce 
domaine. En d'autres termes, nous avions le souci de régler ces 
affaires en famille."^
The UGP's attempts to expand
The leaders of the UGP had rapidly to find outlets for the oil produced by the state 
exploration companies and, simultaneously, to learn about the refining-distribution 
profession on the Job. Consequently, they went about the task in a somewhat 
disorganised fashion, buying up whatever they could find. In the area of 
distribution, by 1962, their acquisitions amounted to seven or eight small companies 
representing about 8.5% of the market. Unfortunately, these companies had only 
local distribution networks, not in large urban centres but in rural areas. Moreover, 
in attempting to expand, they encountered all kinds of administrative regulations 
regarding the location of petrol stations. They also discovered that the structure of 
the oil market hardly favoured UGP's expansion. Saharan oil was rich in petrol, 
gasoil and domestic fuel but poor in heavy fuel, and it was the consumption of the 
latter which would triple in the years ahead.
62
In the area of refining, the situation was similar. The only refineries available for 
takeover were old and poorly situated, so that two years after the UGP's creation, 
they amounted only to 4% of the refining market. The solution was for the UGP to 
have its own refineries, located not on the coast next to large ports, according to the 
established view, but inland, close to important centres of oil consumption, that is, 
large cities, power stations and petrochemical complexes. This would reduce 
transport costs and ensure useful outlets. This reasoning explained the choice of 
refineries at Gargenville, Grandpuits - Paris region - and Feyzin - near Lyon - built 
in the 1960s. The refinery at Feyzin, completed in 1966 and one of the largest in 
Europe to operate according to the steam-cracking process, became the motivating 
force of the company created through UGP's merger with La Mure Union, an old- 
established refining-distribution company near Grenoble. Since La Mure had 
contacts with the chemical industry of the Rhône-Alpes region, this association 
allowed the UGP to expand into the important area of petrochemicals.^
The Leblond decrees
Although the state companies' efforts to expand their refining-distribution sector 
were partially successful, the above-mentioned obstacles prevented them from 
developing as much as they wished. Furthermore, the sources of the UGP's crude 
oil supplies, for the most part, the Sahara, imposed some lack of flexibility on the 
company.
According to Babinet:
"Constituée pour écouler le brut franc, essentiellement celui du 
Sahara, un brut léger - I'UGP manque de souplesse. Elle ne peut, 
comme d'autres compagnies, se livrer au véritable commerce 
international du pétrole, jouer sur les différentes qualités des bruts, 
mettre à profit tout ce système d'échange, poumon d'un raffinage bien 
équilibré."®®
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In fact, the leaders of the UGP felt entitled to the same privilege as the CFP, a 25% 
share of the market. However, conscious of the opposition from several quarters, 
they would have been content with a 15% share. It was this percentage which Paul 
Moch proposed in discussions with leaders of the Union des Chambres Syndicales 
de l'Industrie du Pétrole (UCSIP) in 1962. The reply, however, was negative.
Knowing the support they enjoyed at the DICA, it was to this department that the 
leaders of the UGP next appealed. The director of the DICA, Maurice Leblond, was 
committed to the expansion of the UGP, but was not prepared to arouse the hostility 
of the Majors and the CFP. The presence on the French market of Shell and BP, 
important European companies, complicated the matter, since an attempt to cut 
their share would provoke the wrath of the European Commission. Leblond, again 
making use of the 1928 law and its system of autorisations spéciales, proposed 
increasing the UGP's import quota - which determined companies' share of the 
market - and reducing that of other companies. His proposal involved raising the 
quantity of imported oil for all groups, but increasing the volume allowed to French 
and European companies more than that to American companies. Leblond took 
advantage of the renewal date for licences in 1963 and executed his decision in 
what appeared to many to be a very authoritarian fashion. The decrees of February 
1963 renewing the A13* licences fixed the share of French companies at 61.3% - 
as against 49.6% previously - and reduced the foreign groups’ share to 38.7% - as 
against 50.4%. In this way the UGP was given a 14.5% share of the market.®®
The decision provoked a furore in many circles; in the press, at the Assemblée 
Nationale, in London and Brussels where the Hallstein Commission recommended 
to France; "the same treatment for all companies and a general increase of import 
quotas for crude oil and oil products."®^ The international companies appealed to 
the Conseil d'Etat requesting it to ask the European Court in Luxembourg whether 
the Leblond decrees were an infringement of Article 37 of the Treaty of Rome,
Import licences valid for 13 years.
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which obliges member states to reduce their monopolies. The affair went no further, 
as the Majors' case contained a small defect, namely that Article 37 requires only 
EC member states to "adjust state monopolies progressively".
The atmosphere was nevertheless intolerable. Prime Minister Pompidou could not 
allow it to continue. The state oil companies had everything to lose from the bad 
feelings which existed between them and the Majors, especially at a time when the 
progress of events in Algeria created a very real possibility of their having to leave 
the franc zone and set up in Canada, the USA or Nigeria. On four occasions, from 
Autumn 1963 to Summer 1964, Pompidou received the chairmen of the foreign 
companies at Matignon to reassure them of the importance he attached to their 
presence in France.®® They also received an official letter stressing France's 
interest in cooperation with the international groups, but also clarifying how the 
1928 law should be interpreted. The gestures of reconciliation continued. 
Inaugurating two refineries near Strasbourg in October 1963, in which the UGP, the 
CFP and the international groups were associated, Pompidou stressed the 
importance of solidarity among European oil companies;
"Les producteurs, raffineurs et distributeurs qui exercent leur activité 
en France doivent chacun avoir la possibilité de développer leurs 
activités dans un esprit de concurrence loyale, avec pour seule limite 
le respect de l'intérêt général."®®
Other acts of reconciliation were that Esso was allowed to construct a refinery at 
Fos-sur-Mer while Shell, BP and Esso were allowed to build a pipeline for finished 
products linking the Mediterranean and the Rhone. In addition, Esso's application 
to explore in the Gulf of Gascony, previously blocked by the DICA, was authorised.
In return, the state oil companies were allowed to associate with the Majors in 
exploration of the North Sea, although their initial request in 1961 had met with a 
humiliating refusal. The final mark of reconciliation between the UGP and Majors 
was UGP's acceptance as a member of UCSIP.
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The last stage in the battle against the Majors was the abrupt dismissal, in the 
summer of 1964, of the director of the DICA, Maurice Leblond. Although he had 
done no more than execute government directives by publishing the decrees, 
someone had to pay for the controversy created.
The state oil companies' early development of downstream branches of the industry 
reveals the effectiveness of the government-company partnership. The pursuit of 
common objectives by government and the state-owned oil companies was a 
successful formula in overcoming a range of tough obstacles. It should be noted 
that the climate of the early 1960s was also favourable to this nationalistic approach 
to industrial policy. De Gaulle's ambition to turn France into a major economic and 
industrial power entailed strengthening certain firms in order to give them a better 
chance to do battle in the international market. The firms chosen, or "national 
champions", as they were called, were those whose activities were strategic for 
national independence/' It is therefore no surprise that the top managers of the 
young state oil sector, committed to the survival and growth of an oil industry under 
French control, should have been able to obtain the support they needed from those 
sections of government responsible for the industry. This support could not be 
limitless, however, since there were other oil companies operating in France, whose 
contribution government valued, and whose hostility would be harmful to the French 
national companies outside France. Hence the double role which government had 
to play in increasing the state oil sectors's share of the domestic market, while 
simultaneously granting opportunities to the international companies to expand 
within France.
T he B irth of A  G roup
The determination to create an industrial group capable of defending itself in the 
international arena and a strongly dirigiste approach adopted by government 
supervisors responsible for the oil industry are again obvious in the next stage of 
the state oil companies' growth, namely their reorganisation and partial 
amalgamation towards the totally integrated status they achieved in the mid-1970s.
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It was André Giraud who replaced Maurice Leblond as director of DICA in 
December 1964. He had not been involved in the running of the state oil 
companies, so could adopt a more objective view than his predecessors, Pierre 
Guillaumat and Jean Blancard, who had combined the directorship of the DICA with 
responsibilities within the BRP. Giraud was struck by a number of weaknesses in 
the state oil companies. First, the future of France's oil relations with Algeria was 
uncertain. It was therefore important that the state-owned companies establish 
themselves outside the franc zone. To this end, it was essential that they should not 
be seen in conflict with the international oil groups. Second, the multitude of 
subsidiaries created by the BRP and RAP and the tendency of a number of them 
towards autonomy^ meant that there were numerous decision-making centres and 
a consequent inefficiency regarding the circulation of money and distribution of 
manpower. Third, the use of private capital should be better controlled because, 
until then, not only had the results of private investment been uneven, but its 
intervention could hinder policies decided by government. In Giraud's view, the 
state oil companies should be reorganised in order to achieve greater unity of 
control and more efficient use of finance and manpower. This implied the merging 
of the BRP and RAP to form an integrated group which would be capable of 
defending itself in the highly competitive world oil industry.
On the basis of Giraud's observations of the workings of the state companies, new 
aspects of a national oil policy would emerge which would strengthen the position 
of the future group. Firstly, the CFP and national producers would occupy 50% of 
the French market and, abroad, a share of the market equivalent to that of the 
foreign companies in France. Secondly, in order to give the national producers the 
solid base they needed on the French market, foreign oil companies should not 
expand as fast as the market but only half as fast. Thirdly, French companies 
should control sources of crude oil equivalent to the totality of national needs. 
Fourthly, every oil company should keep a nine-month stock of oil - previously three 
months^^.
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How the merger should be carried out was Giraud's next task and for this he needed 
Pierre Guillaumat because, in his view, "lui seul aura l'autorité suffisante pour se 
faire entendre et obéir des différents barons de la RAF et du BRR."^^ Guillaumat 
surrounded himself with trusted colleagues, Blancard, Giraud and Moch, together 
with chosen executives of the younger generation, Raymond Lévy, Pierre 
Desprairies and Jean Méo, the presiding director of the DICA, Michel Vaillaud and 
his deputy, Georges Dominjon.
Internal structure
In June 1965 the stucture of the newly integrated group had been outlined in a 
report drafted by the above-mentioned top managers and government officials. It 
was given the name Entreprise de Recherche et d'Activités Pétrolières (ERAP). The 
dominant features which emerge from the report concern the managerial structure 
of the new group, the legal and financial organisation and the role of private 
capital/®
The top management structure reflected the need to maintain unity in an 
organisation characterised by its differences and dominated by personalities. At the 
top of the pyramid, a conseil d'administration, on which representatives of the 
supervisory ministries of Industry and Finance would have a seat and also one from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Alongside, a comité spécial, would bring together 
the chairmen of the BRP, RAP and UGP with the autorités de tutelle but would meet 
more often than the conseil d'administration. Finally there would be a comité 
directeur, consisting of the chairmen of the three companies. They would have the 
essential powers of approval of budgets and programmes, movement of assets, 
regulations governing staff and the financing of new projects. In the view of the 
authors of the report, the triumvirate was necessary so that decisions of the group 
would be seen to be the result of a common way of thinking. This would create the
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indispensable esprit du groupe.
As regards the legal and financial organisation, the main objective was to ensure 
maximum mobility of finance. This implied, on the one hand, frequent merging of 
firms to facilitate the allocation of finance to certain sectors, and on the other, 
reduction in the number of subsidiaries by country. Finally, the authors underlined 
the necessity to regularise the flow of money within the group by fixing prices for the 
buying and selling of crude oil, the import and export of finished products and the 
sale of raw materials to petrochemical sectors.
The role of the SNPA
The use of private capital focused mainly on the SNPA and its future.^ ® Should it 
be merged or remain independent? The authors of the report, aware of the SNPA's 
wealth and its strong tendency towards autonomy, chose a mid-way solution. The 
single group, formed out of the BRP and RAP, would hold the public shareholding 
in the SNPA but the SNPA itself could exercise certain activities alone, for example, 
the exploitation of the gas field at Lacq. The SNPA would also serve to bring 
private capital into the group. It was quite clear that the top management intended 
to make full use of the SNPA's wealth. They calculated that "a substantial part of 
the SNPA's available funds would contribute to the development of new exploration 
zones or to sectors whose activity would increase further, namely refining and 
distribution".^^
The total merger of the three companies v/as therefore to be avoided. The SNPA 
shares were star performers and it seems that just the news of the BRP-RAP merger 
was enough to make their price fall several points. Another factor, perhaps less 
well known, underlay the avoidance of a total merger:
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"Elle (la SNPA) avait un cash-flow important, alors que la RAF et le 
BRP étaient subventionnés par le Fonds de Soutien aux 
Hydrocarbures. Or on avait bien l'intention de tirer le plus possible 
sur cette pompe à finance non pas tellement pour l'exploration comme 
ç'avait été le cas précédemment mais pour créer les réseaux de 
raffinage-distribution nécessaires à l'intégration. En laissant la SNPA 
de côté, on se donnait donc le moyen de justifier une demande d'aide 
à l'Etat, tout en ayant cependant la volonté bien arrêtée d'éteindre 
celle-ci un jour."^ ®
A first step was nevertheless made towards this partial merger of ERAP and the 
SNPA: the appointment of a common chairman to ensure the coordination of 
policies. Who other than Pierre Guillaumat could fit the post, having played such 
an important part in the early days of the group and whose authority was generally 
respected among national producers? Another more tactical reason for the choice 
of Pierre Guillaumat was the DICA's determination that one of their "own men", that 
is, an Ingénieur au Corps des Mines should be appointed to the job.^ ®
The importance of preserving the profitability of the SNPA is revealed in the note 
which the Minister of Industry received from Georges Pompidou on the day of 
Guillaumat's appointment, November 21st, 1965:
"La politique de la SNPA me paraît devoir avant tout respecter la 
stucture mixte de la société et maintenir sa politique de rentabilité 
fondée sur un équilibre convenable de ses activités entre la 
recherche, la production, le traitement et la transformation des 
hydrocarbures. Cette action devra naturellement être coordonnée 
avec celle du groupe des producteurs nationaux, tout en laissant à la 
SNPA une grande autonomie dans le choix des terrains de 
recherche."®®
The guiding principles of the merger: better circulation of finance, resources and 
manpower, a common chairman and a degree of autonomy for the SNPA, were 
endorsed by government and ERAP came into existence in December 1965. Novel 
aspects of the new organisation were the use of the term groupe for the first time
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in French law and the creation of an établissement public through the suppression 
of two others of the same type.®  ^ In addition, the decree instituting the new 
organisation specified that the chairman must belong to the top civil service. "Both 
the head of the DICA and Guillaumat wanted to avoid the danger of a political 
appointment."®^
The practical execution of the merger was Guillaumat's immediate task, and 
according to his wishes, Jean Blancard and Paul Moch were appointed 
vice-chairmen. Blancard was given responsibility for exploration-production and 
Moch for refining-distribution. In addition each vice-chairman was to be assisted 
by a deputy, Jean Meo for Paul Moch and Raymond Lévy for Jean Blancard. 
Although certain aspects of the merger posed problems, such as the unpopularity 
of methods used by R.Lévy to combine work teams and protests from the RAP's 
unions that the new structure was a form of denationalisation, even opponents of 
the restructuring admitted years later that it was a success.
A further symbol of fusion of the state oil companies materialised a year later, on 
27th April 1967. This was the official launching of the trade name "E lf, finally 
decided upon after nearly six years of deliberations! From now on the state oil 
group would be a visible and recognised rival to the big international oil 
companies.®®
The state oil companies' expansion reveals many aspects of close collaboration 
between government and industry. First, ministry officials responsible for the oil 
industry ensured, by means of legislation, that national oil was sold. Second, they 
participated in the creation and development of a refining and distribution sector 
and in securing for it a substantial share of the domestic market. Finally, they 
worked together in the important merger of upstream and downstream activities. In 
order that the integration of activities should succeed, the top management of the 
new group, with the full consent of government, intended making use of substantial
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amounts of private capital by means of the SNPA. Thus, although an établissement 
public in name and, by definition, 100% state owned, ERAP was gradually acquiring 
the character of a mixed economy company.
It should also be noted that the personalities involved in the expansion of the state 
group, both in the Ministry of Industry and top management of the companies, had 
similar ambitions for the development of a powerful state oil sector. The fact that 
they occupied high-ranking posts in the administration and companies meant that 
they could impose their wishes, it is also apparent that they largely belonged to the 
Corps of Mining Engineers {Corps des Mines) in which Pierre Guillaumat was 
patron. Being in addition one of the founding fathers of the BRP and close advisor 
to de Gaulle, his influence on French energy policy was enormous. As Feigenbaum 
suggests in his explanation of why France needed a second oil company, when a 
"national champion" already existed, namely the CFP;
"It was a foregone conclusion that the high-ranking posts in the new 
petroleum company would go to members of this corps (Corps des 
Mines) which had already established a monopoly on positions in the 
petroleum sector. The establishment and continuing life of two state 
oil companies therefore provided important advantages to certain 
elites.""
T he F ranco -A lgerian  O il  C risis
The state oil companies were expanding not only in France. The 1960s were also 
years of rapid expansion outside the franc zone, in Canada, Nigeria and the North 
Sea. One of the factors which determined this expansion was the accession to 
independence of French possessions during the 1950s and early 1960s. While this 
process was peaceable in the case of most states, the Franco-Algerian war, which 
culminated in Algerian independence in 1962, was a bitter conflict and posed 
problems for the group which dragged on for nine years.
Neither de Gaulle nor the top management of the state oil companies had any 
illusions about the future of French oil assets in Algeria. The fact that the state
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companies were beginning to move outside the franc zone from 1959 was, in itself, 
a sign that their top management foresaw what was coming well before the signing 
of the Evian agreements of March 1962, which marked the end of the Algerian war 
and heralded Algerian independence. Péan and Séréni summarise their attitude 
in the following terms:
"En prévision de l'orage inéluctable on retire autant d'argent que 
possible d'Algérie et on va le faire fructifier ailleurs, au Canada, au 
Moyen-Orient, en Afrique noire...En somme, on compte sur l'Algérie 
pour financer le désengagement algérien des pétroliers d'Etat et 
reconstituer ailleurs l'équivalent de l'Algérie."®®
Franco-Algerian relations prior to the 1965 agreements
Before 1962 the exploitation of Algerian oil had been governed by the Sahara Oil 
Code, promulgated in 1958, and which established a regime distinctly favourable 
to the French oil companies operating there. According to Jean-Marie Chevalier, 
the tax system laid down in the Code was much more generous to the producing 
companies than agreements signed in Venezuela or Iran at the same time.®® In fact 
Chevalier points out that this was the actual intention of the legislators who, in their 
preamble to the Sahara Code, state that,
"la Métropole qui vise essentiellement à assurer la sécurité du 
ravitaillement de la zone franc entend marquer ici son 
désintéressement à l'égard des ressources fiscales procurées par 
l'exploitation pétrolière du Sahara."®^
There is further evidence of the value which France attached to Saharan oil. During 
the Algerian war the French government made several attempts to separate the 
Sahara départements from Northern Algeria. This was strongly opposed by the 
Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and it was not until 1961 that the French 
government recognised that the départements actually belonged to Algeria. In 
addition, although the Evian agreements modified the Sahara Oil Code to the extent 
that Algeria,
"succédera à l'Etat français dans ses droits, ses prérogatives et ses
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obligations de puissance concédante au Sahara pour l'application de 
la législation minière et pétrolière",®®
it is significant that, a few weeks before the signing of the agreements, the Code 
was amended by a series of decrees which considerably reduced the rights and 
prerogatives of the power granting concessions and extended the tax and financial 
advantages in favour of companies which held these privileges.
Consequently, at the time of independence, French oil companies operating in 
Algeria enjoyed far greater advantages than companies in other oil-producing 
countries. They had complete control of their production costs and of the price at 
which they sold Algerian crude to their subsidiaries in France, whereas the Algerian 
government had no means of controlling these two factors influencing tax to be 
levied on companies. Sales in France of Saharan oil were organised through the 
Société pour la Valorisation des Pétroles (SOVAP)®® according to the system of 
devoir national, that is, refiners in France were obliged to obtain part of their 
supplies from the "franc crude"®® available. When they did not produce any 
themselves, they purchased it from SOVAP at a considerably higher price than on 
the international market. The organisation of Franco-Algerian relations therefore 
allowed French companies, established in Algeria, to transfer considerable profits 
to France in order to develop their refining and distribution network and finance 
prospection in other countries.®^
The vital document of the Evian agreements relating to cooperation in oil, the 
Déclaration de principes sur la coopération pour la mise en valeur des richesses du 
sous-sol saharien made provision for the establishment of a technical organisation 
to develop the wealth lying under the Sahara.®  ^ This Organisme Saharien{OS) was 
a council consisting of equal numbers of French and Algerians. On the French 
side, council members were all top civil servants, well acquainted with oil 
regulations and allies of the state oil companies. On the Algerian side, members 
were young, without real experience of oil questions and lacking clear policies, yet 
determined that Algeria should have an independent oil industry and that its
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development should be based on the exploitation of Saharan resources. Although 
relations were cordial, as the months passed, disillusionment set in among the 
Algerian members. In their opinion the Sahara Oil Code was an anachronism, a 
vestige of colonial domination and an obstacle to the rapid, ambitious, economic 
development they were pursuing. According to one of Babinet's Algerian sources: 
"Le code saharien? II laissait le pétrole rigoureusement entre les mains des 
sociétés concessionnaires."^
As for the OS, its very nature was ambiguous. Was it an instrument of cooperation 
or a means of protecting the interests of the oil companies? It had been created to 
"promote the rational development of the wealth lying under the Sahara", yet it did 
not initiate exploration and its role in reality was purely consultative.
Mistrust and misunderstanding deepened on both sides. This was not surprising, 
given that the objectives of the different negotiating groups were hardly 
reconcilable. The Algerians, inheritors of the rights of the puissance concédante, 
were resolved to base their industrialisation on the rapid exploitation of their raw 
materials and ensure as high taxes as possible. The French government wanted 
to keep taxes low and to contribute to the expansion of French companies, but 
within the context of de Gaulle's plan of cooperation with the Third World. The oil 
companies were still very dependent on Saharan resources but without illusions 
about how much longer they would last and simultaneously preparing to find 
replacements.®'*
As early as November 1963, the Algerians requested the revision of the Evian 
agreements. Their demands included: a majority share in all French oil companies 
operating in Algeria; higher taxes; state to state cooperation in oil exploration; 
specific aid towards Algerian industrialisation in return for the possibility offered to 
France to exploit Algerian oil; a share in the profits of all upstream and downstream 
branches of the industry; the control of gas from the moment of its extraction.
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The French negotiators prepared their line of attack on the basis of these demands, 
while simultaneously keeping an eye on the fundamental interests of France. 
These were: security of national supplies through control of production; oil products 
payable in French francs; the maintaining of a regime which allowed a suitable 
return on capital invested; the financing of exploration abroad to guarantee 
diversification of supplies. The more precise objectives of the French negotiators 
were, on the one hand, to maintain the regime decided in the Evian agreements to 
the benefit of French oil companies, on the other, to find ways of associating Algeria 
in the exploitation of their hydrocarbon resources without modifying taxes.®®
The Wormser Agreements
Actual talks did not begin until May 1964 under the leadership, on the French side, 
of Olivier Wormser, director of economic and financial affairs at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The atmosphere was extremely tense, due to the fact that the 
Algerians were starting proceedings against the French for their refusal to support 
the construction of a new pipe-line. Negotiations dragged on for six months with 
each side reiterating its demands. It was not until the leader of the Algerian 
delegation was replaced, in November, by Belaid Abdesslam, chairman of the 
Société Nationale pour le Transport et la Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures 
(SONATRACH)®® that the Algerian attitude softened. Olivier Wormser, in his turn, 
made concessions by recognising that Algeria should have control of its own gas 
resources.
Although agreements were reached in January 1965, the texts were not signed until 
July. They were profoundly innovatory regarding the relations between companies 
and producing countries. While France obtained the guarantee that concessions 
to companies would be maintained, that is, the possibility of acquiring large supplies 
of hydrocarbons payable in francs and the right to sell gas at a profit, the French 
negotiators had yielded on some major points. They were higher taxes for French 
companies and the agreement to pursue the exploration and exploitation of oil and 
gas through ASCOOP (Association coopérative), a joint subsidiary owned in equal
76
shares by SONATRACH and ERAP. French negotiators also agreed a special 
regime for the exploitation of gas, by which Algeria could buy from the 
concessionary companies the amounts of gas it needed at cost price. In addition, 
France consented to considerable financial support for the industrial development 
of Algeria over a period of five years.^^ On the Algerian side the Wormser 
agreements were welcomed as a victory for cooperation. The benefits for Algeria 
were in fact considerable: higher revenues from the exploitation of its oil and gas 
and direct participation in their exploration and production.
The Franco-Algerian crisis of 1971
The feelings of victory created by the agreements were nevertheless shortlived. 
The organisation, established to relaunch Franco-Algerian cooperation in oil 
activities (ASCOOP), became the centre of conflicts. This association, owned jointly 
by ERAP and SONATRACH, had inherited all Saharan mining shares previously 
held by the French state companies. Yet France was the operator in the majority 
of exploration activities and thus bore the greater part of the cost. Severe disputes 
arose because the Algerians criticised the French for the inadequacy of their 
exploration budgets, whereas the French considered that they had respected their 
financial commitments and were not going beyond them. For the French, the 
chances of finding important new oilfields in the Sahara were very slim.®®
Franco-Algerian relations did not improve. At the beginning of 1968 a new set of 
grievances were levelled at the French. These focused especially on the price at 
which oil and gas were exploited by the French subsidiaries. They were aimed 
especially at strengthening the Algerian position in preparation for the 1969 revision 
of the reference price for crude oil, agreed in the Wormser Plan. Disagreements 
worsened throughout the year. In 1969 the French state oil group was deprived of 
a strong supporter in the person of de Gaulle. He left the political stage in April, to 
be replaced by Georges Pompidou, a less staunch ally and whose relations with 
Pierre Guillaumat were not especially cordial. On the Algerian side, there was fresh 
criticism of the ASCOOP budget. In addition, the Algerians were requesting a
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revision of the price of 2.08$ per barrel, agreed in the Wormser Plan for their oil. 
They considered the price uncompetitive after the closure of the Suez Canal in 
1967. This event had raised the freight price of Middle East oil, which had to travel 
to Europe via the Cape.®®
The signs of the forthcoming crisis forced ERAP's leaders to seek support and 
instructions from the French government. In Guillaumat's view, it was the 
government's role to arbitrate when there were major difficulties between 
organisations, which were each defending their state's interests. The problem was 
that ERAP, a state-owned enterprise, was seen by the Algerians as inseparable 
from the French state, whereas in the French government's view, the distinction was 
clear. Moreover, the top management of ERAP and certain officials at the Quai 
d'Orsay took the view that oil prices should not be the only subject of negotiations, 
but should form part of a complete revision of Franco-Algerian economic relations. 
An ERAP memorandum states:
"le gouvernement doit avoir arrêté ses options sur l'avenir à long 
terme de l'ensemble des relations économiques franco-algériennes 
et des engagements français dans ce pays."^°^
Price revision talks, which had begun in the Autumn of 1969, had hardly progressed 
eight months later. In July 1970 the Algerians, anxious about tax arrears 
accumulated over a year and a half, unilaterally raised the price of their oil from 
2.08$ to 2.85$ per barrel.'®^
Paris agreed to reopen negotiations in a much wider context, cultural, economic and 
social, provided that Algeria delayed imposing new prices. Algeria agreed and 
negotiations opened on October 5th 1970, but coincided with the beginning of the 
oil crisis. Therefore, when France agreed the new prices in November, the 
Algerians demanded a higher price in line with world rates. Negotiations were 
suspended and Paris resorted to delaying tactics, wishing to await the outcome of 
the Tripoli and Teheran agreements. In the meantime, the French negotiators had
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changed and it was the Minister of Industry himself, François-Xavier Ortoli, who now 
headed the French delegation. His line of approach, supported by Matignon and 
the Elysée, was to bring to an end negotiations which threatened to jeopardise all 
projects aimed at renewing Franco-Algerian cooperation. At the request of the 
Algerian Foreign Minister, Ortoli agreed payment by the French oil companies of 
675 million francs in tax arrears for 1969-1970.^*”
Not surprisingly, Guillaumat contested the payment but was forced to conform to the 
government's decision. He and the top management of ERAP realised that the 
nationalisation of French oil assets in Algeria was imminent. They felt betrayed by 
their major shareholder, as revealed in Guillaumat's letter to Ortoli of 5th February 
1971:
"Ouvertement c'est nous surtout que les Algériens attaquent: 
l'énormité de nos réinvestissements depuis 5 ans, la qualité de mes 
équipes et les résultats qu'elles ont obtenus comparés à ceux des 
autres Français, Russes ou Algériens, me donnent bonne conscience 
et je vois bien que l'ERAP est maintenant attaquée parce que son 
patron, la France, a la philosophie moins dure et que recevant 80% 
de sa production des ses oeuvres algériennes, l'ERAP est le meilleur 
captif. Eh bien! Allons-nous en!^°^
The takeover by SONATRACH of a majority share (51 %) in French companies 
operating in Algeria and the nationalisation of pipelines and natural gas resources 
was announced by President Boumedienne on 24th February 1971. Although the 
Algerian government agreed to compensate the French companies to the tune of 
550 million francs, they also raised the price of oil to 3.60$ per barrel and 
demanded that tax arrears be settled by 6th May. ERAP and CFP suspended their 
collections of crude oil from Algeria on 19th April and the rift was finalised. The 
CFP was to remain an important purchaser of Algerian crude, so had to settle its 
accounts. Guillaumat, on the other hand, refused to give any money to the 
Algerians. He preferred to pay his debts by forfeiting the nationalisation 
co m p e n sa tio n .It was at this point that ERAP left Algeria and concentrated its 
efforts on other former French territories and beyond.
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The Franco-Algerian crisis was a sad episode, not only in relations between the two 
states, but between the highest authority in government and the state oil group. A 
change of leadership in 1969 meant the departure of de Gaulle, who had always 
been supportive of the state oil companies. His successor, Georges Pompidou, did 
not particularly favour the state-owned group, being of the opinion that public 
money should not be spent when the private sector was ready to invest. There was 
also disagreement between the top management of ERAP and government over 
policy. The 1965 agreements had been concluded between two states and related 
to a much wider context than purely oil production. Political, commercial, diplomatic 
and strategic interests had to be taken into consideration. Inevitably the top 
management of ERAP felt that government was not looking after its interests. There 
was a further conflict of views between Pompidou and the state oil group's top 
management. Pompidou was of the opinion that the French companies should have 
established closer ties with Algeria, in such a way that the economies of the two 
were interdependent. However, ERAP's plan, since 1962, had been to invest as 
little money as possible in a country from which, sooner or later, they knew they 
would be evicted.
Commentators underline different reasons why the efforts to establish new oil 
relations between France and Algeria failed: intransigence on the part of the top 
management of ERAP, whereas in the case of the French government, it was 
indecision, lack of a long term view or failure to understand the strength of Algerian 
determ ination.Both Philippe Simonnot and Harvey B. Feigenbaum stress the fact 
that the existence of a state oil group should have put the French government at an 
advantage, insofar as the BRP had been created precisely because government 
wished to be able to influence oil policy.^ ®® Yet the progress of events in 
Franco-Algerian oil relations show considerable amibiguity about who was 
influencing whom or, as Simonnot put it: "Qui décide la politique pétrolière de la 
France et qui obéit?"^°®
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Internationalisation
The main reason which drove the state oil companies to increase their exploration 
efforts overseas, both in and outside the franc zone, was their possible eviction from 
Algeria after its accession to independence and the consequent need to find new 
sources of crude oil. The need turned into a fight for survival, however, after the 
departure from Algeria became a reality in 1971. What criteria guided the state oil 
companies' choice of zones to explore? Before the intractable difficulties with 
Algeria began, the regions chosen were those where hydrocarbons were plentiful 
and easily accessible, that is to say, the Middle East. The Franco-Algerian crisis 
of 1971, however, convinced the top management of ERAP of the necessity of 
exploring in areas which were also politically safe, such as West Africa, Canada 
and the North Sea. It was in these regions, but especially the Gulf of Guinea in 
West Africa, that the group concentrated its efforts after 1971. We should add that, 
benefitting from France's diplomatic ties with former colonies, ERAP was already 
obtaining substantial supplies from this region in the late 1960s. We shall examine 
first the development of the group's oil relations with certin West African states and 
then their less successful ventures in Iran and Irak.
Gabon
Of the three states in the Gulf of Guinea which contributed to the group's survival 
after its departure from Algeria in 1971, Gabon has been and remains the most 
productive in crude oil. In 1975 the group's production from the Gulf of Guinea 
amounted to 12 million tonnes of which Gabon produced half.^^°
A series of discoveries in the 1950s by the Société des Pétroles d'Afrique 
Equatoriale Française (SPAEF), a subsidiary of the BRP, convinced Jean Blancard, 
who had taken over directorship of the BRP and DICA in 1951, that substantial 
investments should be made in Gabon. These resulted in further discoveries in the 
early 1960s. As Péan and Séréni remark: "Dès lors les sceptiques se taisent. Le
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Ill 11Gabon est, à l'évidence, une vraie province pétrolière.
In spite of the high costs involved In exploiting Gabonese oil fields compared with 
those of the Middle East, the majority being off-shore, the Algerian oil crisis forced 
the group to increase their investments there. Between 1972 and 1975 the 
investments of ELF-SPAFE^^^ (Société des Pétroles d'Afrique Equatoriale) more 
than doubled, while Gabon itself benefited during the same period from the dramatic 
rise in world oil prices. Income from oil rose from 40 billion francs CFA^^  ^in 1973 
to 203 billion in 1975.
Relations between the Gabonese President, Albert Bernard Bongo, and ELF were 
complex. While ELF ensured more than half the Gabonese state budget, Gabon 
provided almost half ELF's resources in crude oil. In the words of Babinet;
"Bongo a parfaitement saisi les moyens de tirer parti de l'imbrication 
des intérêts français et gabonais: si à plus d'un titre le Gabon ne peut 
se permettre de relâcher ses liens avec Paris, sa position 
d'élément-clé de la politique française en Afrique lui laisse en 
revanche une marge de manoeuvre certaine.
The close interdependence of French and Gabonese interests was the reason why 
the Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre Espionnage (SDECE) and 
the French army maintained a presence in Gabon. The protection of French 
interests implied essentially those of ELF.^ ^® Further proof of the complicity which 
existed between ELF and Gabon was that Gabon, although a member of OPEC 
from 1973, did not apply the full oil tax recommended by the organisation, only 73% 
instead of 85%.^ ^® Another aspect of this fiscalité douce was a formula devised by 
two of ELF's directors, by which oil income could subsidise Gabonese industrial 
development. ELF GABON would be exempt from paying a proportion of corporate 
tax on condition that the money be reinvested in government approved projects.
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Nigeria
Hopes of finding oil in another state of the Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria, materialised due 
to the efforts of the Société Africaine de Recherches et d'Activités Pétrolières 
(SAFRAP), a joint subsidiary of the BRP and RAP, created in 1961.” ^
It was after Nigeria gained its independence in 1960 and BP and Shell were obliged 
to hand back oil permits, that the Nigerian government invited foreign companies 
to apply for licenses. SAFRAP obtained a 3000m^ area in the delta of the Niger and 
discovered oil there in 1964. Unfortunately for the French state group there was 
hardly time to benefit from the Obaji oil field. War broke out in 1966 between the 
Muslim north which represented the majority, and the I bos, the dominant tribe of the 
southern Biafran province where the Obaji field was situated.SAFRAP, being a 
French state subsidiary, had to accommodate different parties. De Gaulle and the 
French government openly supported the Biafrans and even secretly sent a 
mercenary force to help the I bos, yet French interests in Nigeria also had to be 
protected. The top executive of SAFRAP working on the spot had to resist 
demands from Paris to side openly with Biafra and refute rumours in Lagos 
accusing France of supporting the mercenary force. In addition, the top 
management of ERAP in Paris had to deal with repeated demands for financial aid 
from the Biafrans, in return for exploration permits in their province once the conflict 
was over. With the surrender of Biafra in 1970, SAFRAP was forced to pay the 
penalty of France's support of the I bos; a rise in oil taxes, the loss of a certain 
number of permits and the handing over of an increased share of its capital to the 
Nigerian national oil company. The subsidiary was nevertheless compensated in 
the years to come by the discovery of important reserves of gas. In 1974 SAFRAP 
became ELF NIGERIA and by 1977 its yield in crude oil amounted to roughly half 
that of the group's Gabonese production.^^®
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Congo
Elf Congo was created in 1969 by separation from SPAFE which had found the 
small oilfield of Pointe Indienne in 1957, one of the first of the BRP's discoveries in 
black Africa. An important off-shore field was discovered in 1969 at Pointe Noire, 
followed by a succession of others in the early 1970s.
The Congolese had high hopes of rivalling their neighbour, Gabon, in oil production. 
This was not to be so. Extraction of oil in the Congo was difficult and costly, yet the 
government wanted rapid increases in production. In addition, the Congo raised its 
price of crude oil in line with the Geneva agreements of 1972. For ERAP, however, 
the Congo was a marginal producer and Guillaumat refused to satisfy their 
demands particularly in the area of oil taxes.
The first oil shock of 1973 made the Congolese oil fields seem more attractive to 
ERAP. Yet simultaneously, the growing power of the oil-producing states 
encouraged the Congolese to reiterate their demands for rapid oil production and 
launch an ambitious programme of industrial developments based on oil income. 
Production was precarious, however, the regime of Marien N'Gouabi was more 
radically revolutionary, and Guillaumat, backed by the Elysée, less keen to support 
a politically unstable state which imposed increasingly high taxes. During renewed 
negotiations with Paris in 1977, N'Gouabi was assassinated, and it was under Albin 
Chalandon's chairmanship that they were concluded. The Congolese and African 
leaders found him a more amenable negotiator than Guillaumat and it was largely 
due to his efforts that, in 1981, the group was able to obtain a quarter of its crude 
oil from the Congo.
Cameroon
The Cameroon was the last state to join the important producers of the Gulf of 
Guinea. Although exploration began there in the 1950s, the local subsidiary of the 
BRP, Société de Recherches et d'Exploitation des Pétroles du Cameroun
84
(SEREPCA), made only modest discoveries in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It 
was not until SEREPCA joined with Shell in carrying out a geological analysis of the 
Cameroon by entirely new methods that discoveries increased from 1975. The 
President of the Cameroon, Ahmed Ahidjo, was, however, extremely distrustful of 
the destablilising effects of an oil boom, as well as being a very shrewd negotiator. 
Without joining OPEC, he succeeded in obtaining very favourable terms for the 
exploitation of Cameroon oil and gas resources. For ELF ERAP the Cameroon was 
one of those rare states which was simultaneously "low risk" politically, but had 
important hydrocarbon reserves. In the mid-1980s the group's production in 
Cameroon amounted to roughly half that of Gabon.
The Middle East
The French state oil companies ventures in the Middle East, which began in the 
1960s, were not as successful as those in West Africa. The reasons were varied: 
the unstable nature of political regimes in both Iran and Iraq, the group's modest 
size compared with that of the Majors, already well established there, and the 
reluctance of the French government to give its full support to the relatively young 
state oil sector when it was also supporting the CFP The CFP had a long-standing 
relationship with the Middle East through the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), in 
which it owned a 23.75% share with four of the Majors, Esso, BP, Shell and Mobil 
as associates.
Iran
It was shortly after Algerian independence, bringing the prospect of the French state 
companies' possible eviction from Algeria, that the top management decided, in 
1963, to make a large investment in Iran. Iran had enormous reserves of oil which, 
according to the companies' calculations, might replace Algerian oil, should the 
Evian agreements be broken. This was one of the national producers' first ventures 
outside the franc zone and certainly the most costly.
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Anxious to obtain exploration permits, ERAP was at this time proposing more 
advantageous terms than the Majors to producing countries. These contrats 
d'agence, as they were called, were inspired by Enrico Mattei, director of the Italian 
oil champion. Ente Nazionale d'ldrocarburi (ENI). They involved leaving the control 
of operations to the producing country, while the foreign company provided 
financial, commercial and technical services. According to J-M. Chevalier, this 
strategy was in line with "de Gaulle's vision of the state-owned oil company, which 
should provide an opportunity to cooperate with the producing c o u n t r i e s " . I n  
specific terms, the 1965 Iranian contract included a 50% tax on the reference price 
of oil, an advance by ERAP to cover exploration expenses, association in equal 
shares with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), and the price of an "entry 
ticket."
The Farsi Petroleum Company (association of ERAP, SNPA and NIOC) established 
for the purpose, was granted extensive zones to prospect, yet its first exploration 
attempts were unsuccessful. Having lost nothing, the Iranians were not unduly 
worried and offered ERAP further contracts. They found the French state oil group 
less greedy than the Majors, being themselves in urgent need of foreign exchange 
for their extensive industrialisation programme. This required increased oil 
production in a very short space of time. The Iranians naturally advertised the 
favourable terms they had secured from ERAP, which momentarily provoked 
complaints from the international companies, who were critical of France for its 
demagogic attitude towards the developing countries. In reality, the international 
companies coveted the exploration zones offered to the French companies. The 
affair soon died down, however, because Guillaumat in no way wished to arouse the 
hostility of the international companies, particularly since ERAP suffered by 
comparison with the size and influence of Shell or Esso.^ ^®
Having made no major discovery by mid-1968, ERAP formed a mini-consortium, the 
European Group of Oil Companies (EGOCO), in which they joined with the Italian 
Azienda Nationale Generale Italiani (AGIR), Petrofina (Belgium), Hispanoil (Spain),
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OMV (Austria) and the SNPA. The consortium signed a œntrat d'agence with NIOC 
in 1969 and were given an extensive zone to explore. Over the next three years, 
both ERAP and EGOCO made a number of major discoveries, including the 
important gas field of Kangan in 1973. The exploitation of gas is very different from 
that of oil, since profits are calculated over the long term. Unless there are 
established openings there is no point in developing a gas field. Consumption in 
Iran was modest at the time and nothing had been developed for the export of gas, 
for example, pipelines, liquefaction factories, or fleets of methane carriers. What 
is more, for the affair to succeed, ERAP and its associates would have to make 
further investments over a period of possibly ten years. NIOC, on the other hand, 
was reluctant to make a large financial commitment to the project, but grew more 
demanding with regard to the foreign group's contribution. Late in 1973, the top 
management of ERAP tried in vain to obtain an agreement with NIOC on an 
acceptable regime for the exploitation of gas. Two years later, since there had been 
no progress in negotiations, a reassessment of ERAP's investments was necessary 
and the group's disengagement from Iran seemed imminent. The actual document 
of disengagement was signed in 1976 and, although it was agreed that the group 
should be reimbursed its investments, ERAP did not fully recoup these until 1985.^ ^®
Iraq
ERAP's fortunes in Iraq were equally mixed. As in the case of Iran, it was the 
possibility of the state oil group's eviction from Algeria which prompted Guillaumat's 
request to de Gaulle to begin negotiations with Iraq in 1967. The early 1960s had 
not been a very propitious time for foreign oil companies in Iraq. Under the regime 
of General Kassem, 99.5% of the IPC's mining rights had been expropriated and the 
Majors had retorted by freezing production. After the Arab-lsraeli conflict of 1967, 
however, during which France had remained neutral, its popularity was high in the 
Middle East. As well as ERAP, the top management of the CFP, who had not 
agreed entirely with the policy of the Majors in Iraq, but was nevertheless a partner 
in the consortium, also wanted to make fresh approaches to Iraq in order to reopen
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talks concerning the expropriation of the IPC's mining rights. The CFP was strongly 
supported by the DICA, since the company's production in Iraq was vital for French 
supplies.^ ^^
The scheme devised by the delegation, headed by André Giraud, director of the 
DICA, who set out for Bagdad in the autumn of 1967, had two major aims: first to 
reopen negotiations between the IPC and Iraqi government, and, second, to obtain 
new exploration zones for French companies. The outcome of negotiations and of 
ERAP's somewhat aggressive attitude was that the state-owned group signed a 
œntrat d'agence vMh the Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC). In reality, the contract 
was signed four days before the arrival of the delegation in Bagdad, doubtless to 
the embarrassment of its leaders, although Giraud admitted years later that 
"Guillaumat's position was understandable: he could see the Algerian crisis coming 
and his group deprived of resources".
Cooperation between France and Iraq was marked by an exchange of visits 
between de Gaulle and General Aref, the Iraqi head of state, who was received with 
great pomp in Paris in February 1968.^ ^® It was cooperation not just in the domain 
of oil. From this moment oil became the currency in a long and fruitful trade in 
French arms to Iraq. As Péan and Séréni mention, the link between arms and oil 
was not official:
"La liaison s'est imposée de manière pragmatique. Au fur et à mesure 
que leurs recettes pétrolières augmentaient, les Etats producteurs, 
pour les protéger furent tentés d'augmenter leur puissance donc 
d'acheter des armes puis des systèmes entiers de défense."^ ®®
The authors explain how, by the end of the 1960s, France had completed its 
programme of modernisation in the weapons industry. Supply outweighed demand, 
and it became necessary to export, in order to reduce production costs and to 
safeguard employment. Thus, by the end of the 1970s, France was doubly 
dependent on Iraq and Saudi Arabia "these two countries which provide us with two- 
thirds of our oil and are the main clients of our weapons indust ry" .What  is more,
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in the context of the state oil group, there was a further close link between arms and 
oil, because, in April 1968, Jean Blancard was appointed délégué à l'armement by 
de Gaulle. Although, according to Péan and Séréni, there was no conscious motive 
behind the appointment, "it would contribute later on to plans in the inextricably 
linked areas of diplomacy and petroleum".
To return to the ERAP-INOC contract of 1967, although the 10,000 square kilometre 
zone, which the state oil group had been granted, seemed promising, its problems 
in Iraq were only just beginning. In the year following the contract, the Iraqi 
leadership changed, bringing political upheaval and ERAP was forced to establish 
contracts with a new set of personalities. The ERAP-INOC contract was severely 
criticised as outmoded by certain groups. With the mounting tension of OPEC 
meetings in Teheran at the beginning of 1971, leading to a projected increase in oil 
taxes for ERAP, relations between the French state oil group and the Iraqi 
authorities could only deteriorate. Even the discovery of the Buzurgan oil field 
between 1970 and 1971 did nothing to improve the situation.
After the visit of Saddam-Hussein, vice-chairman of the Conseil de Commandement 
of the Iraqi revolution, to Paris in 1973, Franco-lraqi relations improved somewhat. 
Both the CFP and ERAP were allowed to acquire large quantities of crude oil and 
Iraq's relations with the IPC were normalised. Guillaumat, however, wanted to limit 
the risks of ERAP in Iraq. Having delegated its role of general entrepreneur to a 
subsidiary, ELF IRAQ, he then sold 40% of its mining rights to the Japan Iraq 
Petroleum Company and, in 1978, withdrew definitively from Iraq.^^
ERAP's attempts to establish itself outside French territory show that a wide variety 
of factors can affect a major company's fortunes in its efforts to internationalise. 
Changes in the political regime of the host state can destroy years of effort, as 
shown by ERAP's ventures into Iraq. National foreign policy can considerably 
enhance the prosperity of a state-owned subsidiary abroad. Foreign policy can also 
run counter to its interests, as shown by the French government's involvement with
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the I bo tribe during the Biafran war. Outside national territory the state-owned 
company must be more competitive. To obtain exploration zones in the Middle 
East, where the Majors were well established, ERAP had to offer Iran and Iraq more 
advantageous terms than their powerful rivals. Internationalisation may mean an 
end to the support the state-owned company enjoys at home. Unless there is a 
close and long-term interdependence of interests between the home and host state, 
as between France and Gabon, the state-owned subsidiary abroad will be treated 
and have to behave like any private company. For a major oil group, such as 
ERAP, this implied a constant weighing up of the financial, technical and political 
risks and making choices on purely commercial terms.
Generally speaking, however, the state-owned oil group's efforts to extend its 
international activities paid off. It is to the credit of ERAP's top management that, 
four years after the departure from Algeria, they had reconstituted their reserves of 
crude oil and returned to the level of production they had achieved before the 
Algerian crisis, that is 22.5 million tonnes of crude in 1975. Thus, in many ways, the 
Algerian crisis benefited ERAP, since it forced the group to internationalise rapidly. 
Its spectacular recovery also gave it a different image in the eyes of government. 
Even Giscard d'Estaing is supposed to have reacted favourably to ERAP's 
achievement. In the words of one of Babinet's sources: "Lorsqu'il a vu que nous 
n'avions pas crevé de l'affaire algérienne, il a commencé à nous considérer d'un 
autre oeil."^ ^®
T he C risis in Refining  and  D iversifications
The oil crisis, which began on 10th October 1973 radically upset the structures of 
the world oil market. On 14th October, the six producing states of the Persian Gulf 
unilaterally raised the price of their crude oil by 70% and, on 17th October, the 
representatives of five big oil companies, BP, Shell, Exxon, Socal, Atlantic Richfield, 
broke off relations with OPEC ministers. From now on the producing states would 
make their own decisions, fix prices which would serve as a base for tax and reduce
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production. The decision taken on 22nd December to double the posted price of 
oil meant that, in less than a year, oil prices had quadrupled. A further rise in 
September 1974 brought oil company profits down by 0.2$ per barrel. The energy 
policy of Western countries, based until then on cheap oil, was suddenly under 
debate.
As far as France was concerned, the effect was a rise in inflation, an upsetting of 
the trade balance and a slowing down in growth. Obsessed by the need for secure 
supplies of oil, and convinced that demand would grow, the Director General of 
Industry and Director of the DICA encouraged the CFP and ELF to increase their 
purchase of crude oil and conclude long-term contracts with Saudi Arabia. In 
addition, they introduced energy-saving legislation, which included the fixing of 
prices of oil products on the domestic market without reference to international 
p r i c e s . I n  the refining sector generally, since consumption actually decreased by 
4.3% from 1974, these measures resulted in serious overcapacity, from which the 
French refining industry took a long time to recover.
The crisis in refining
For ELF ERAP there were very specific difficulties. The group's refining sector 
suffered more than most companies from this rise in crude oil prices and fall in the 
price of finished products. On account of the Algerian crisis, the group lacked 
resources in crude oil to feed its refineries and, therefore, had to buy considerable 
quantities on the international market at the new high price. In addition, ELF's 
refining industry was less competitive than that of rival oil companies. Even ten 
years after the creation of the UGP, various weaknesses in the company's 
organisation had not been remedied. Refineries were old and badly situated and 
equipment obsolescent. As regards ELF's distribution network, it was only modestly 
efficient. The state companies were late-comers to the market at a time when the 
best-situated service stations had been acquired by other companies.^^
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The purchase of Antar was an example of how ELF ERAP unforeseeably burdened 
itself with refineries at the wrong time. Antar was a well-established private oil 
company, created in 1928 to distribute oil from the small oilfield of Pechelbronn in 
Alsace. It had expanded into refining in the mid-1950s, and held 10% of the French 
distribution market, with a network of well-situated service stations throughout the 
whole of France. Its weaknesses were that it had no international outlets, no crude 
oil resources of its own, and had not modernised its refineries. A takeover by ERAP 
was therefore welcomed by Antafs shareholders. Moreover, the state oil 
companies, from the early 1960s, had considered buying shares in Antar. 
Therefore, when Antar*s major shareholders, Worms and Rothschild, decided to sell 
their shares in the firm to a foreign oil company in 1968, Guillaumat expressed an 
interest. He considered that Antar*s activities would complement those of ERAP. 
The takeover by ERAP of SOCANTAR, Antar"s holding company, was finalised in 
March 1970, and resulted in the following redistribution of shareholders: ERAP 
40%, the French State 10%, Caltex 20%, CFP 24%, Pechelbronn 5%. 
Unfortunately, the timing of the takeover, on the eve of the Algerian nationalisations 
and oil crisis, could not have been worse. Both events drastically reduced the 
group's crude oil supplies. In addition, Antar's weaknesses aggravated the already 
precarious state of ERAP's refining sector.
Diversification into Petrochemicals
The petrochemicals industry was also affected by the oil crisis. Serious 
overcapacity resulted from a rise in the price of raw materials, running parallel with 
a fall in the growth rate. In addition, government's fixing of the price of finished 
products prevented firms from building up their profits.
Among the state oil companies, it was the SNPA which was the main actor in the 
area of chemicals. Managing as it did the gas field at Lacq, it had at its disposal the 
by-products of natural gas and sulphur. With the arrival of Saharan crude at the 
beginning of the 1960s, and the state companies' large scale move into refining, the
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SNPA became a petrochemical centre and associated with a number of important 
firms in the Lyon region, for example, Ugine and ProgiL
By the end of the 1960s, however, in spite of the enthusiasm of certain SNPA 
executives, the firm's chemical activities amounted to no more than about six 
factories. For these executives there was an urgent need to diversify, in order to 
take advantage of the growing number of outlets and the invention of new materials. 
In addition, the industry had to acquire an international dimension. Yet the 
enormous sums of money involved were daunting. Furthermore, there was little 
likelihood of a newcomer, such as the SNPA, becoming associated with the large 
chemical groups, such as Rhône-Poulenc, Péchiney, CDF-Chimie, or of government 
intervening in its favour.
The only possible association was with the Compagnie Française de Raffinage 
(CFR) which, at the time, was seeking to expand its chemical activities. Negotiated 
during 1968 by Pierre Guillaumat and Victor de Metz, chairman of the CFP, without 
the intervention of the supervisory ministries, the amalgamation was concluded in 
the course of 1971. It was planned that ATO (contraction of Aquitaine and Total*) 
should bring together the activities of the two firms in petrochemicals, plastics and 
later packaging and building materials. According to the agreement, the main 
objective of the new joint company was "to make chemicals into a distinct activity, 
not simply a downstream activity from oil refining". In addition, there would be strict 
parity between the two firms in the areas of decision-making, finance, the sharing 
of information, the use of raw materials and research programmes.^^
Collaboration actually proved more difficult than expected, because of the basic 
differences of view of the two groups. The SNPA had ambitious plans for moving
The Compagnie Française des Pétroles (CFP) trades under the name of 
Total
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into the sector of fine chemicals, setting up installations abroad and creating a 
distinct chemicals branch, not just petrochemical activities as an extension of 
refining. The CFR, on the other hand, was more cautious and gave priority to 
petrochemicals as the logical downstream activity from refining.
In spite of these differences, and the fact that the equal status of the two firms 
tended to paralyse decision-making, the new company progressed well initially. 
However, a combination of factors, not least the oil crisis, created a new problem: 
the French market became saturated with petrochemical products at a time when 
economic growth was declining. From 1976, ATO's turnover in plastics regressed 
by 35%. Responsibility for the state of affairs has been largely attributed to 
government, "qui n'a pas su ou voulu arbitrer, obliger les grands groupes à se 
mettre d'accord pour rationaliser leur pétrochimie, qui a donc suivi un cours 
passablement anarchique".
Diversification into pharmaceuticals
It was the first oil shock and the increasing financial burden of the refining and 
petrochemical sectors which drove ERAP-SNPA to expand into pharmaceuticals 
and cosmetics. There were other factors also. The creation of ATO had relieved 
the SNPA of investments in petrochemicals over three years. The firm was 
therefore seeking non-oil sectors which might attract its considerable cash-flow. In 
addition, the staff at Lacq, which the SNPA managed, were concerned about the 
decline of the gas field, the region's main employer and due to be exhausted by 
1990. They made public protests, to which the SNPA finally reacted at the 
beginning of the 1970s, by creating the Bureau de Développement de rAdour, a 
non-profit-making association bringing together the SNPA and Chambers of 
Commerce of Tarbes and Pau. The aim of the association was to grant loans to 
local firms to encourage them to create jobs. Pharmaceuticals were the chosen 
activity, because they did not demand heavy investment, but did require a large 
labour force. In addition, involvement in pharmaceuticals conformed to the group's
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policy, expressed In the 1973 Annual Report, to diversify beyond refining and 
petrochemicals, areas which the oil-producing countries themselves would soon 
seek to develop on their own territory. Furthermore, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics 
were not affected by oil crises.
The reaction of the authorities was mixed. While the director of the DICA, Michel 
Vaillaud, showed understanding of the group's need to invest "beyond oil", the 
Ministry of Finance did not look favourably on the group's departure from its original 
vocation. The former financial director of the SNPA and later deputy financial 
director of Elf Aquitaine, Jacques Pavard, outlined the opposition of different 
groups:
"(Auprès) du Plan et des Finances Valéry Giscard d'Estaing était 
ministre de la Direction du Budget qui disait, "Si la SNPA a trop 
d'argent, elle n'a qu'à le reverser à sa société-mére", de la Direction 
de la Pharmacie qui redoutait une levée de boucliers de ses 
assujettis, des milieux parlementaires, enfin, de la Direction des 
Hydrocarbures et de l'ERAP .
The oil shock of 1973 radically changed the view of certain sections of government 
and convinced them of the state oil group's need to diversify their investments. A 
further consideration was the threat presented by foreign firms who, in the 1970s, 
were rapidly buying up French pharmaceutical and cosmetic companies. It seems 
that the rate of take-over by foreign firms was 50% in pharmaceuticals, and between 
30% and 70% in cosmetics.
There were two main reasons for this development. First, foreign firms could often 
set themselves up in France more quickly by acquiring French firms than by 
creating a subsidiary. Second, since the price of medicines in France was fixed 
according to the price of raw materials, and foreign firms were able to import the 
latter into France in a fairly uncontrolled manner, the foreign companies could make 
larger profits than French companies.
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Therefore, in 1973, under the chairmanship of René Sautier, development director 
of the SNPA, the Omnium Financier Aquitaine pour l'Hygiène et la Santé (SANOFI) 
was created in the form of a holding company, which acquired completely or bought 
shares in firms experiencing difficulties. In addition to pharmaceutical firms and 
laboratories, SANOFI also took over or bought substantial shares in several large 
perfume companies from 1974 onwards, for example, Yves Rocher, Roger et Gallet, 
Stendhal. In addition to these, SANOFI, as part of the Société Nationale Elf 
Aquitaine (SNEA), moved, in the 1980s, into additives and aromas for the food 
industry, veterinary products and, more recently, biotechnologies.^^
Although the oil crisis weakened ERAP's refining sector, it acted as a stimulus to the 
group's move to diversify its range of products. As with all forms of company 
expansion, mergers, takeovers and the purchase of shares in other firms were the 
means employed. It should be noted that there was little government intervention 
in these transactions, as shown by the creation of ATO. In fact, diversification took 
the state-owned group into areas not normally associated with the public sector, 
and unrelated to its original mission. After the oil crisis, this move had the full 
approval of government, especially since it meant fewer demands on the public 
purse. Therefore, as with the internationalisation of the state group's activities, the 
diversification of its products also meant that it was less subject to government 
supervision.
T owards L iberalism
The early 1970s brought a series of power struggles and ideological conflicts 
involving the top management of ERAP, the President of the Republic, ministers 
and grands corps, and resulted in some radical changes in relations between the 
state oil group and government. Traditionally the energy sector was the domain of 
the Corps des Mines. Furthermore, the protectionist nature of the 1928 legislation 
made oil one area where the Ministry of Finance, stronghold of the Enarques*,
Graduates of the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA)
96
could not impose its policy. According to Péan and Séréni:
"Une lutte farouche et sourde oppose énarques et corpsards. Les 
premiers ont pénétré en force dans de nombreuses citadelles durant 
la décennie. L'énergie leur résiste. Le pétrole, les carburants, 
l'atome leur échappent."^ '*®
The Bodourian affair or affaire de Marseille and the findings of the Schwartz report 
provided a convenient pretext for increasing the power of the Ministry of Finance 
over the oil sector and liberalising its policies. Both scandals were related, insofar 
as they revealed not only the malpractices of the oil companies, but raised 
questions about the mechanism for sharing out public markets - the real cartel - as 
it related to the 1928 laws and quota system.
According to one of the government commissioners on the board of ELF ERAP: 
"Fondamentalement tout le système reposait sur l'organisation du marché, 
c'est-à-dire une sorte d'entente officielle."^^^
The Bodourian affair
The affair brought to light the tactics of the eight biggest oil companies operating 
in France - Elf, Total, Esso, Shell, BP, Mobil, Petrofina, Antar - and particularly their 
method of sharing out among themselves the most lucrative contracts in order to 
eliminate small, independent distribution companies who were attempting to enter 
the market by offering substantial reductions. In 1970 Shell obtained from the 
Mairie de Marseille a contract for 12000m® of domestic fuel, although Combustibles 
et Carburants de France (CCF), a subsidiary of Sagip, had offered it to them at 50 
centimes per hectolitre less. Gaston Defferre, mayor of Marseille, was given this 
information by the Head of CCF. CCF's supplier called a meeting of the eight and 
recommended the removal of Sagip from the bidding table. Unknown to all present, 
the director of Sagip, Bodourian, obtained minutes of this m e e t i n g . I n  spite of 
various attempts to keep the matter secret, Bodourian brought a case in June 1971 
on the grounds of "collusion with a view to raising prices, obstruction to the freedom
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of bidding and refusal to sell". In July, Giscard d'Estaing ordered an enquiry by the 
Direction Générale du Commerce Intérieur et des Prix, which submitted a report 
overwhelming in its indictment of the oil market. According to the report, all the 
main oil products were subject, at every stage in the marketing process, to collusion 
among the distributing firms, especially the eight most important companies: Shell, 
Total, Esso, BP, Elf, Antar, Mobil, Petrofina. The entire market was "rigged".
The Bodourian affair marked a change in the system of fixing oil prices. Prices had 
been proposed by the profession and approved by the DICA. In June 1973 the 
Ministry of Finance took over responsibility for fixing oil prices from the Ministry of 
Industry. In future the DICA would propose prices and the Direction des Prix would 
make final decisions. This meant that from now on the oil companies would be 
under the thumb of the Ministry of Finance. They would no longer be the ones who 
dictated the price of oil products.
In general Giscard d'Estaing was distrustful of the oil companies. As Minister of 
Finance, according to Péan and Séréni, "He never missed an opportunity to show 
his preference for the CFP and only with reluctance opened the purse strings for 
ERAP".^“  In 1971 a grant of 400 billion francs, requested by Guillaumat, was 
refused and the Ponds de Soutien aux Hydrocarbures (FSH) reduced to 200 million 
francs, as against 250 million in 1970. As already mentioned, Giscard d'Estaing 
was opposed to the creation of the UGP. Moreover, at the end of 1971, at a critical 
time for ERAP, he actually campaigned for a single oil group composed of the CFP 
and ERAP. What is more, the top management of the state oil company was 
convinced that the enquiry leading to the Schwartz report was "a plot set up by 
Giscard d'Estaing".
The Schwartz report
The oil crisis of 1973 had profoundly disturbed public opinion. Not only had the oil- 
producing countries benefited, but also the large oil companies, who were
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suspected of being in league with OPEC. A number of enquiries were demanded 
in the USA and, in France, Georges Marchais, General Secretary of the Communist 
Party, asked the Assemblée Nationale to set up a commission which would,
"examiner les conditions commerciales, financières et fiscales dans 
lesquelles les sociétés pétrolières opérant en France approvisionnent 
le marché français et y assurent la distribution des différents produits 
pétroliers et sur leurs rapports avec rEtat."^“
Julien Schwartz, UDR deputy for Lorraine, became the main inspiration behind the 
report, and the findings caused a scandal when they appeared in Le Monde of 
November 1974.^“  Accusations appeared under four main headings:
1. The oil companies pay virtually no taxes
It was revealed that ERAP and the CFP, like the large international 
companies, used loopholes in the different allowances to which they were 
entitled (depletion allowance, price fluctuation allowance, consolidated 
profits system) to avoid paying taxes.
The companies falsify information concerning access prices for crude oil
The companies were alleged to refer to theoretical prices, published by 
OPEC, in order to obtain permission to raise oil prices for the consumer. 
However, it was revealed that the real price paid to oil-producing countries 
varied considerably from state to state. According to M.Chenevrier, 
chairman of BP France, the average price was $9.42 per barrel, but the 
rapporteur considered it to be $8.64, which represented a difference of 20m 
dollars per month.
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3. Anticompetitive practices
This accusation concerned the practice of tables by which the big oil 
companies, ERAP and the CFP included, agreed among themselves how the 
market should be divided up, so as to squeeze out small companies, and 
how prices should be fixed. The full irony of this practice was that some 
important public sector companies, notably Air France and CDF, who 
depended on the oil companies for their supplies, were forced to pay 
unnecessarily high prices. The ambiguous nature of the relations between 
ERAP and the administration was pointed out. ERAP had been created 
precisely because government wished to be able to influence oil policy, for 
it was acknowledged that the CFP behaved like a private company. 
Guillaumat reinforced this point to the commission:
"son groupe était entré dans l'Union des Chambres Sydicales de 
l'Industrie du Pétrole (UCSIP) car (l'Etat voulait) faire en sorte que 
cette union cessât de représenter uniquement la voix des trusts ayant 
des filiales en France."
However, it seems, according to the rapporteur, that, as soon as ERAP 
became a member of UCSIP, it adopted the same anticompetitive practices 
as other oil companies.
4. The ambiguity in relations between the administration and oil companies
This accusation was a kind of synthesis of the previous three, namely that, 
instead of supervising the oil sector, officials at the DICA actually colluded 
with and protected the interests of the state oil companies. This relationship 
had been facilitated by the fact that there had always been a movement from 
top posts in the Ministry of Industry to management posts in public and 
private companies. Certain names were mentioned, for example, Pierre 
Guillaumat, who, throughout his career, moved back and forth between the 
top administration and ministerial posts, to the directorship of different public
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corporations: BRP, ERAP, CEA, EOF. Jean Blancard was another example. 
Michel Vaillaud, particularly, was targeted for having signed agreements, 
while he was director of the DICA, that subsidies of 120,000F in 1971 and 
80,000F in 1972 should be given to a private subsidiary of Schlumberger. 
When he left the administration in 1973, it was to Schlumberger that Vaillaud 
was appointed. In other words, if private interests were protected by the 
body established to protect public interest, how was public interest defined? 
And how was oil policy decided? To quote Simonnot: "On peut se
demander où est l'Etat. Est-il à la Direction des Carburants ou à la 
Délégation Générale à l'Energie ou est-il à la tète d'Elf-Erap?"^^
For the first time the foundations of French oil policy were openly discussed, with 
the following questions being asked:- Is the 1928 legislation still of any use? What 
is the price of this legislation? Are the advantages enjoyed by the two French oil 
companies justified? In the opinion of the Minister of Industry, Michel d'Ornano, 
whose liberal views corresponded closely with those of Giscard d'Estaing, the 1928 
legislation was superfluous, since the oil crisis was over and prices were coming 
down. Why, according to the President and his Minister of Industry, should the 
state oil sector be excluded from the wave of liberalism surging through France?
In the wake of the scandal produced by the Schwartz report, Michel d'Ornano put 
Maurice Lauré, chairman of the Société Générale at the head of a commission of 
enquiry into the supplying of oil products to the French market. The commission's 
task was: "to determine whether the laws which regulated the French oil market 
allowed the sector to function in the national interest".^ ®®
The Lauré Commission asked the American consultant, Arthur D Little, to compare 
the German and French systems of supply. The results were not as conclusive as 
originally thought. In both countries, over a long period, petrol prices for motorists 
fluctuated in much the same way. However, heavy fuel used in industry was clearly
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more expensive in France, and the Commission recommended that price controls 
be lifted. Within the Commission itself opinions were divided. Liberal and dirigiste 
elements could not reach a conclusion and the findings were eventually left 
unpublished. When the Conseil restreint sur l'énergie announced its intentions in 
April 1976, they reflected this same divergence of opinion present in government 
circles. Simultaneously liberal and dirigiste in its intention, the Conseil proposed 
lifting controls on the import and price of heavy fuel oil and naphta and increasing 
the French companies share of the petrol market. Behind these proposals was the 
attempt to redress the balance between the Majors and national companies 
regarding the sale of petrol. Since the Majors enjoyed the lion's share of the petrol 
market, considerably more lucrative than that of heavy fuel oil and other oil 
products, the national companies felt disadvantaged and had demanded that a 
balance be achieved.
The laws governing the French oil industry were being questioned, not only in 
government circles and in the public at large, but also in Brussels. Indeed the 1928 
legislation was a contradiction of the Treaty of Rome, which laid down the free trade 
of products within the Community. For a long time Brussels had been demanding 
the abolition of this legislation, and especially the removal of quotas on oil products 
coming from EEC countries. The last dispensation granted by the Commission 
expired on 31st March 1976. The French were thus obliged to remove quotas on 
naphta and heavy fuel oil.^^
As far as the state oil group was concerned, the lifting of restrictions on oil products 
only aggravated difficulties brought on by the oil crisis. Problems in the refining and 
petrochemicals sectors were acute. In addition, the cost of investments was rising 
steadily. The exploitation of the Frigg oil field in the North Sea was especially 
burdensome. Guillaumat was obliged to arbitrate, on the basis of their profitability, 
among the different projects which the group should pursue. Permits in Canada, 
Côte d'Ivoire, Columbia and a 25% share in the group's German refinery at Spire
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had to be sold off. Furthermore, no effective support was forthcoming from the 
French authorities, so Guillaumat, in association with four European oil companies 
(Veba, ENI, Petrofina, CFP), protested strongly to Brussels about the extent to 
which they were disadvantaged by comparison with the Majors. Unlike the Majors, 
the five companies were especially handicapped by their lack of access to the 
cheapest source of oil from Saudi Arabia. Their main objective was to obtain 
permission to increase prices, in order to swell their autofinancing profits. Their 
letter of July 1976 to the European Commission therefore contained five demands; 
transparency in the market for finished products; government intervention to 
balance the supply and demand of refined products; the pooling of investments in 
distribution; a reduction in the number of sales outlets and a ban on advertising; aid 
to exploration by means of loans at reduced rates and tax incentives.
Brussels was vague in its reply and hardly supportive of the European companies’ 
demands. There was no question of freezing refining capacity at its current level, 
nor of limiting imports. In fact, the Commission again began its protests in 
December 1977, determined to oblige the French government to abandon all 
restrictions on the free trade of petrol.^ ®®
Guillaumat was obliged to admit that dirigisme was becoming a thing of the past. 
The logical solution to ERAP's difficulties was to bring in private capital, by merging 
with the group's highly prosperous subsidiary, the SNPA. The merger would mean 
not only a clearly pronounced diversification of ERAP's activities, geographically as 
well as at the product level, but also the introduction of a very different mentality. 
Péan and Séréni point out what a radical change in direction the merger 
represented for the state oil group:
"Avec son argent tiré pour l'essentiel du gaz de Lacq et 
accessoirement de son implantation au Canada, la SNPA apporte à 
sa maison mère un état d'esprit et une logique très différente. De 
toutes les filiales du BRP puis de l'ERAP, Aquitaine est depuis sa 
naissance la plus liée au privé, la moins pénétrée de l'esprit de 
mission nationale. A la SNPA, on n'est pas là pour trouver du pétrole
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mais pour gagner de l'argent. On y raisonne plus en industriel et en 
chimiste qu'en pétrolier. Sa mentalité "capitaliste" va rapidement 
contaminer le nouveau groupe Elf Aquitaine".
It was not only the merger between ERAP and the SNPA, which marked the 
culminating point in the liberalisation of the state oil group, but also the appointment 
of AI bin Chalandon as successor to Pierre Guillaumat, due to retire on 5th August 
1977. A convinced liberal, Chalandon had the support of Giscard d'Estaing and 
prime minister, Jacques Chirac. Guillaumat, however, and the top management of 
ERAP were very much opposed to their choice. Chalandon was not a member of 
the Corps des Mines, nor an haut fonctionnaire, having resigned from the Inspection 
des Finances in 1955. This last point contravened the conditions for appointment 
which specified that the chairman of ERAP must be an haut fonctionnaire. So 
strong was the presidential support for Chalandon, however, that the décrêt 
constitutif of ERAP was modified to allow the appointment. According to Péan and 
Séréni: "l'arrivée de Chalandon s'inscrit dans la volonté de libéraliser le secteur 
pétrolier. Et donc de redéfinir sa mission".
This section has shown how a combination of factors contributed towards 
liberalising the policies of the state oil sector in the first half of the 1970s. In broad 
terms, these were the influence of France's President, world events producing a 
dramatic change in the conditions in which the state oil group obtained its oil 
supplies, and supranational pressures.
It is hardly surprising that a liberal-minded president, Giscard d'Estaing, opposed 
to public sector firms, should be reluctant to support the state oil group. In fact he 
went further. With his blessing, enquiries made by parliament into the practices of 
the oil companies, showing that ERAP's behaviour was anything but exemplary, 
were then used to bring the state oil group into disrepute. Moreover, the revelations 
of collusion between the DICA and ERAP served as a pretext to increase the control 
of the rival Ministry of Finance over the state oil group. What is more, Giscard 
d'Estaing's choice of Albin Chalandon, as successor to Pierre Guillaumat, radically 
changed the character and role of the state company.
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World events, especially the oil crisis, also affected the state oil sector and 
aggravated the difficulties ERAP faced as a result of the departure from Algeria. In 
the main, these were higher exploration costs and a drop in demand for oil products, 
leading to overcapacity in the refining and petrochemicals sectors. If the group was 
to survive, its top management would have to react decisively. Thus the merger 
was planned with ERAP's rich subsidiary, the SNPA, more diversified than its 
mother company and with a large private shareholding.
Difficulties which the French state group faced as a result of the world oil crisis were 
also affecting European oil companies. It was therefore to be expected that the 
European Commission should intensify its demands for the removal of protectionist 
legislation in France, which adversely affected the sale of oil products imported into 
France from other EEC countries. In this way, a combination of international and 
domestic factors contributed towards liberalising the French state-owned oil group.
C onclusion
The progression from statism towards liberalism in the French oil sector was a 
gradual process, although the pace quickened after the oil crisis of 1973. While the 
inter-war years were characterised by some strong government initiatives to create 
an integrated oil industry under French control, the authorities also hesitated 
between a free market system and a state monopoly. In the immediate post-war 
period, it was the necessity of reconstruction, coupled with the Gaul list vision of 
regaining France's position as a world power, which produced a strong consensus 
in government that the nation should have an integrated oil industry under state 
control, on which it could rely for secure supplies of oil and gas. Two main 
strategies were chosen to achieve this objective; the policy of pétrole franc and the 
creation of a state-owned refining and distribution sector. The legislation of 1928 
and close collaboration with government enabled the upstream and downstream 
sectors of the industry to develop. Close collaboration with government in the mid- 
1960s also brought about a strengthening of the industry, through the concentration
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of its somewhat fragmented parts and the unofficial use of private capital. The 
creation of ERAP also conformed with national industrial policy, which aimed to 
create strong industrial groups, capable of competing in world markets. The policy 
to develop and protect a strong state oil sector which had been consistently pursued 
for nearly thirty years, was broken, however, by ERAP's departure from Algeria and 
the oil crisis. From then onwards, government oil policy was less clear. While the 
state oil group was able to find new sources of crude oil supply through rapid 
internationalisation, the downstream sectors of the industry suffered from the drop 
in demand for energy and oil products. Moreover, a new French President, Valéry 
Giscard d'Estaing, opposed to public sector firms, meant less support than hitherto. 
What is more, he appointed a like-minded chairman, Albin Chalandon, who gave 
the state oil group a more commercial orientation. In addition, the difficulties of all 
oil companies operating in Europe meant that Brussels also insisted on the removal 
of protectionist policies. Created originally for the specific purpose of providing 
France with secure supplies of oil, ERAP was becoming a diversified industrial 
group, whose top management had to choose each project on the basis of its 
profitability. It was an evolution of which the highest authorities in government 
approved, since it would mean fewer demands on the state budget.
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CHAPTER 2
CONFLICT AND COLLABORATION:
THE INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES OF COMPANY POLICY-MAKING
During the decade 1976-1986 company policy-making for the Société Nationale Elf 
Aquitaine (SNEA) was a complex affair. The problems stemmed from the two-fold 
nature of the company. On the one hand, being a largely state-owned group, its 
policies were expected to conform to broad government objectives. On the other, 
its nature as one of France’s major, diversified, industrial groups with important 
international concerns meant that it wished to behave like any large private 
multinational.
Furthermore, the decade 1976-1986 marked a turning-point in the government- 
company partnership. 1976 was the year of the first denationalisation of the 
Entreprise de Recherches et d’Activités Pétrolières (ERAP), établissement public, 
when it merged with its rich, privately-oriented subsidiary, the Société Nationale des 
Pétroles d’Aquitaine, creating the Société Nationale Elf Aquitaine (SNEA). In this 
way, ERAP’s top management, backed by their supervisory ministers, aimed to 
make good the soaring costs of their group’s exploration activities and losses of its 
refining sector. 1986 marked the first official, partial privatisation of the SNEA, 
motivated by the Chirac government’s decision to reduce its debts and budget 
deficit and by Elf’s need to increase its own financial resources through access to 
capital markets. 1986 was also the year of the Single European Act which 
relaunched European integration in preparation for the Single Market of 1993. The 
trends apparent throughout the decade were: successive governments’ gradual 
disengagement from their commitment to the state oil sector, the increasing market 
orientation of the Elf group and the firm rather than government assuming the role 
of senior partner.
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Our approach will show that policy-making for the SNEA took place at and between 
two levels; the government and the company level. At the level of government, 
there were a number of institutions involved in policy-making for energy and, more 
specifically in our case, for oil. It was these bodies which set the broad objectives 
within which the company operated. In addition, since the Elf group was largely 
state-owned and therefore an instrument of government policy, there were certain 
established structures and powers enabling government officials to intervene in and 
control company affairs. We shall show that these structures were used by 
government both to limit company action and to cooperate with the firm's top 
managers. Although it appears that company action was restricted by a host of 
institutional arrangements and that the legal framework treated the company as if 
it had to be watched, governments did not manage state-owned firms. On the 
contrary, they depended on them. A major company's expertise, its capacity to 
create wealth, and the similar background of both government and company top 
personnel were factors which in practice gave a state-owned company the freedom 
to determine its own policies. Moreover, the divisions within and between 
government institutions and the international character of our case-study were 
further factors which enabled it to exploit its creator, the state.
The chapter is divided into three sections. Section I considers how government 
affected the oil industry by examining the role played by the different government 
institutions responsible for energy policy. This section also underlines the impact 
of external events on French oil policy and on the policy process at government 
level. Section II analyses certain structures and powers emanating from the 
institutional framework which enabled government to control company affairs. 
Although these controlling mechanisms were also aimed at information-sharing and 
collaboration, they could be applied if necessary. The government's intention was, 
after all, to use a state-owned company to solve national problems. Section III 
focuses on the practices of company policy-making. While government officials 
could at times prevail over the firm's top managers, the latter, in their turn, had 
effective means for determining their own policies.
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G overnment and Industry: the  F ramew ork  of  Public  Po licy -making
Oil forms just a part of French energy supplies, so factors, such as the quantities 
needed for the future, the price at which oil is bought and sold, the provision of 
refineries and distribution points may be coordinated with similar objectives for other 
sources of energy. During the decade with which we are concerned (1976-1986), 
the task of coordination in such a strategic area as energy was in the hands of 
certain powerful government institutions: President and Prime Minister, Ministries 
of Industry and Finance, the Planning Commission and the large energy 
corporations acting as informants to government. Other institutions played a more 
intermittent consultative or investigative role: Parliament, the Cour des Comptes 
and the Conseil d'Etat\ We shall show that it was the broad economic and political 
decisions of these institutions which shaped the choices available to France's state 
oil sector.
French oil policy was not static. France always depended heavily on imported oil, 
so events in the oil-producing countries had a dramatic influence on national energy 
policy. In fact, one of the most striking features of French energy policy was the 
switch from cheap to expensive oil in the early 1970s, as a result of the oil crisis^. 
In examining the role of institutions concerned with defining objectives for energy 
supplies, we shall show the impact of this event on government actors.
At the highest level, responsibility lay with the President of the Republic. Although 
he rarely intervened, his influence was potentially very powerful. Successive 
presidents of the Fifth Republic have considerably strengthened the functions of the 
presidency, making the person who holds the office the effective head of the 
executive^. It is the President who appoints the Prime Minister and, at his proposal, 
all the other ministers. Moreover, heads of public sector companies figure among 
the many key appointments which the President makes. Although appointed by the 
Council of Ministers, they are in practice the President's choice. The President's 
power of patronage can thus be used to place his own supporters in positions of
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influence and reward the faithful. In this way, the President can influence the 
development of government institutions.
Another feature of the Fifth Republic is the growth of the presidential domain. The 
first four presidents added further spheres of decision-making to those traditionally 
attributed to the presidency^. With regard to energy policy, successive presidents 
differently affected the fortunes of the state oil sector. For de Gaulle, secure 
supplies of oil formed part of his vision to turn France into a vigorous, independent 
economy with firms capable of confronting international competition. He therefore 
gave his support to the policy of oil exploration on French territory or exploration 
that could be paid for in French francs and to the growth of an integrated state- 
owned oil group. With the nationalisation of Elf Erap's Algerian assets in 1971 and 
the collapse of the policy of pétrole franc, however, the group was forced to behave 
like any other multinational. These developments were reinforced by the accession 
to the presidency of Giscard d'Estaing, ideologically opposed to state-owned 
companies. It was in line with the more liberal policies he advocated that he 
approved the ERAP/SNPA merger of 1976 which gave the group a more private and 
diversified orientation. The Mitterrand presidency influenced the character and 
development of the Elf group in a different fashion. The nationalisation programme 
and restructuring of industry between 1981 and 1983 were inspired by the 
President's concern about the de-industrialisation of France and his ambition to use 
the state sector in renovating the economy. We shall explain in Chapter 5 how, in 
the restructuring process. Elf s chemical branch was chosen to impart an impetus 
to other French chemical firms.
Although the intervention of the Prime Minister, who is theoretically responsible for 
the management of government affairs, is limited to "problems of daily life," as 
principal executive officer of the President, one of his main roles is to exercise a 
general influence in the implementation of presidential policies®. A case in point 
was Raymond Barre who was specifically appointed by Giscard d'Estaing in order
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to liberalise the economy. In accordance with the President's broad guide-lines, 
Prime Minister Barre began to free price controls on many oil products in order to 
make the oil companies more efficient®. Moreover, as head of the administration, 
the Prime Minister is responsible for its smooth running so has an important function 
as arbitrator in conflicts. This role is revealed in events surrounding Elfs 
diversifications in 1979-1980, discussed in Chapter 5 (see pp. 237-239). In 
addition, according to the 1958 Constitution, the Prime Minister has the power to 
propose the dismissal of ministers and top-ranking civil servants. This power was 
used by Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy in 1983 in not renewing Albin Chalandon's 
term of office as chairman of the SNEA. The animosity which existed between 
Chalandon and successive ministers of industry was well known. A former company 
secretary of the SNEA gave the reasons why Chalandon's mandat \n q s  terminated.
"II (le Premier Ministre) avait été excédé de l'attitude arrogante et 
méprisante de Chalandon vis-à-vis du ministre (de l’Industrie) car 
Chalandon ne voulait connaître que le Président de la République et 
le ministre disait: 'C'est mon métier de ministre, c'est moi qui 
représente l'Etat'".^
The Ministry of Industry was the chief supervisory ministry of the energy companies, 
their technical tutelle and responsible for the elaboration of sectoral policies. 
Between 1976 and 1986 the interests of the oil sector were supervised through the 
Direction des Hydrocarbures (DHYCA), a division of the Direction de l'Energie et des 
Matières Premières, one of the key departments of the Ministry of Industry. In the 
words of Feigenbaum,
"the DHYCA serves as a conduit of policy imperatives to industry and 
as a repository of technical advice to government".®
It was here that import licences, new refineries and distribution points were decided. 
There was consultation with DHYCA officials regarding diversification projects and 
exploration in France and abroad. National oil companies had to submit their long­
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term plans to the DHYCA as well as information on short-term management. The 
Ministry’s contact with the oil industry was continuous. Its representative, the 
Directeur des Hydrocarbures, had a seat on the board of national companies 
(ERAP, SNEA, CFP) and regular meetings with top management on the subject of 
prices and long-range policy.®
In Chapter 1 we showed how successive heads of the Direction des Carburants 
(DICA), predecessor of the DHYCA, were committed to the protection and 
expansion of the state oil group. Inspired by de Gaulle's ambition that France 
should be independent in energy supplies, DICA officials, beginning with Pierre 
Guillaumat, adopted a policy of concentration on a single supplier (Algeria). Then, 
armed with the licence and quota system of the 1928 laws, they acquired for the 
State oil group a substantial share of the processing and distribution markets. 
While de Gaulle’s influence was strong or perpetuated by DICA officials who shared 
his view of France, the state oil sector developed at the expense of foreign oil 
companies. This policy of protection collapsed however, with the departure of de 
Gaulle, the nationalisation of French oil assets in Algeria, the world oil crisis and the 
accession to power of more liberally-minded presidents*. The quota system and the 
50% share of the market reserved for national companies were gradually abolished 
and prices progressively freed. From then onwards, financial factors played as 
important a part as technical factors in the life of the state oil group, increasing the 
influence of the Ministry of Finance over its activities.
The Ministry of Finance, responsible for the nation’s finances, occupies a dominant 
place in economic policy-making. Its two main centres of power are the Treasury 
and Budget Divisions. The Treasury is in charge of France’s monetary policy, the
The appointment of Industry Minister, René Monory, in 1977 was a 
manifestation of the economic liberalism of Giscard d’Estaing and Prime 
Minister Barre. Monory dismantled much of the oil sector’s protectionist 
legislation.
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management of public receipts and payments, public borrowing and the loan of 
public funds for public and private investment. The Budget prepares the annual 
state budget on the basis of estimates received from the ministries and supervises 
its implementation. Since the guiding principle of the Ministry of Finance is a 
balanced budget, or that public expenditure must not increase faster than the 
national product, the prolonged recession has tended to strengthen the hands of the 
finance officials at the expense of spending ministries. Analyses of the steps in the 
preparation of the budget reveal the preeminence of the Ministry of Finance. 
Spending ministries are put on the defensive in the tough negotiations which take 
place between them and the Budget Division.
The state oil sector was one which successive Ministers of Finance refused to 
subsidise from the mid-1970s. On the contrary, they used the wealth of state- 
owned oil firms to reduce public expenditure. For example, as shown in Chapter 6, 
(see pp. 246-251), the ERAP/SNPA merger of 1976, allowing private capital to 
assist an ailing établissement public, was strongly supported by the Finance 
Ministry. Not only would this merger relieve the Treasury of contributing to costly 
oil exploration in new zones, but also of making good the losses of the state oil 
group's refining sector. The principle of cutting public expenditure was also obvious 
throughout the 1980s in the economic policies of both Socialist and neo-Gaullist 
governments.^^ By means of nationalising and restructuring certain large industrial 
groups in 1981-83, the Socialists aimed to make rich public sector firms, such as the 
SNEA, pay for the losses of poorer ones, such as Péchiney. Moreover, the chief 
motive behind the Chirac government's privatisation programme of 1986, in which 
it sold 11 % of the state's share in Elf, was to use money from the sale of state 
holdings to pay off government debts.
The Ministry of Finance also influenced public firms' major decisions to the extent 
that one of its departments, the Office of Prices and Competition, was the agency 
responsible for industrial prices. In the context of the state oil sector, responsibility
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for the pricing of oil products was transferred from the Ministry of Industry to the 
Ministry of Finance in 1973 in the wake of the affaire de Marseille (see Chapter 1, 
pp. 96-98). In the words of Péan and Séréni:
"En juin la Rue de Rivoli reprend à la Rue de Grenelle un instrument 
déterminant de la politique pétrolière. La Direction des Carburants 
proposera des prix, la Direction des Prix décidera en dernier ressort.
Les pétroliers sont désormais continuellement dans le collimateur 
des énarques. Ils ne feront plus la loi."^^
From then onwards, the state oil group became a victim of the Ministry of Finance's 
price index considerations.
With successive governments' commitment to less dirigisme and pressure from the 
European Community from the mid-1970s, however, restrictions on oil prices were 
gradually lifted. In 1976 restrictions on heavy fuel oil and naphta were relaxed as 
part of a general lifting of restrictions on industrial prices, and between 1980 and 
1986 price controls on diesel, domestic fuel and petrol were freed.
The state oil group's relations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also evolved. 
While de Gaulle, who took the initiative in international affairs, was in power, oil 
policy was a part of foreign policy. We noted in Chapter 1 that the top management 
of ERAP, aware of the risks posed to its assets in the newly independent Algeria, 
sought fresh production zones from the mid-1960s. The state-to-state contracts 
which they established with Iran, Iraq and West Africa owed much to French foreign 
policy and the Quai d’Orsay had a vital role to play in negotiations. Between 1976 
and 1986, however, contracts were determined purely on commercial grounds and 
the Ministry's role was no more than consultative. According to a top-ranking 
official, the group always enjoyed considerable autonomy in the area of foreign 
affairs:
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"On n'a pas tellement le sentiment que le Quai d'Orsay a toujours été 
sur le dos de cette maison. Il l'était parfois mais ç'a été raffirmé à 
maintes reprises publiquement que le groupe était libre d'aller dans 
n'importe quel pays." "^*
Effective contacts between the group and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were 
nevertheless important. To this end, the Quai d'Orsay always had a representative 
on the corporate board of the SNEA. Moreover, according to the above-mentioned 
SNEA official, Pierre Guillaumat considered it essential to have an effective contact 
at the Quai d'Orsay who could explain the company's point of view.
The Planning Commission is another institution whose influence has declined since 
the decades after World War II. It was created as a centre of public and private 
collaboration to coordinate investments, avoid overproduction and resolve conflicts 
in the formulation of long-term policy, but studies of the planning process show that 
it had little effect on energy policy from the early 1960s onwards. First, there were 
conflicts inherent in the planning process. In the energy sector, for example, the 
formulation of long-term policy was necessary because of the high cost of 
investments, yet the forecasting of how supply and demand would evolve over the 
next ten years was virtually impossible. In addition, the planning process involved 
finding a consensus between the impartial long-sighted planners and powerful 
political and economic groups who were pursuing short-term considerations in their 
own interests. There were also factors specific to energy which contributed to the 
demise of planning. For example, in the Fourth and Fifth Plans, 1960-1970, there 
were important discrepancies between forecasts and outcomes. This resulted from 
underestimated targets in oil consumption and overestimates in coal. The 
discrepancy was caused by the failure to assess underlying trends, in particular, the 
modernisation of industry by means of cheap oil. It demonstrated, moreover, that 
it was pressures originating outside the Plan and not targets fixed by the planners 
which were important. A further area in which the planning process was seen to fail 
was that, in the Sixth Plan, recommendations emanating from the Energy 
Commission reflected the balance of power of institutions represented on the
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Commission, in particular the weak positions of the coal and gas industries, by 
comparison with the strong nuclear lobby.
In preparation for the Seventh Plan, 1975-80, Giscard d'Estaing created the Conseil 
Central de Planification in 1974 to improve the means by which government could 
intervene in the elaboration of the Plan. The Conseil, consisting of President, Prime 
Minister, Minister of Finance, Minister of Employment, Planning Commissioner and 
other competent ministers met each month at the Elysée. In reality, for the Seventh 
Plan, proposals came from the industries, on the basis of which a coherent energy 
balance was worked out by the Délégation Générale à l'Energie (DGE) and the 
Direction des Carburants. These departments then fixed objectives identical to 
those issuing from the Conseil Central de Planification, in that they showed an 
enormous nuclear target, the process could be described as collusion between 
Electricité de France and the DGE. As a result, there was widespread scepticism 
among many of those involved vis-à-vis the planning process which was seen as 
arbitrary and illogical.
There were other factors which contributed to the decline of planning. Since the 
mid-1960s companies had made their own plans. Moreover, oil companies, exposed 
by their very nature to keen international competition, were obliged to make plans 
which differed substantially from the national plan. Oil companies were also 
notoriously averse to revealing their strategies in public, yet the open discussion of 
objectives was one of the chief requirements of the planning process.^® In spite of 
the importance attached to the Plan by President Mitterrand, a former vice-chairman 
of ERAP confirmed that indicative planning had little effect on the SNEA's 
development:
"L'expérience prouve que la définition d'une stratégie dans un 
document est quelque chose de très difficile, tout simplement parce 
que plongé dans la concurrence internationale un groupe hésite 
beaucoup à exprimer sa stratégie. D'autre part, il ne souhaite pas 
non plus la figer puisque par pragmatisme on peut avoir plusieurs 
stratégies. Il y en a un qui réussit et d'autres échouent. Par
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conséquent, on s’adapte en permanence.. . Comme, en plus, des 
centaines de personnes participent à son élaboration, on est à peu 
près sûr qu'on ne peut rien y mettre de sérieux."^^
The extent to which Parliament can affect public policy has also weakened during 
the Fifth Republic. Parliament's chief means of intervention is in its examination of 
the annual budget. This work is carried out by rapporteurs, members of the Finance 
Committee of the National Assembly. The budget for the coming year is contained 
in the proposed Finance Law, showing forecast expenditures for each ministry and 
is submitted to the Finance Committee in early September.^® For reasons both 
constitutional and extra-constitutional the financial powers of Parliament have been 
severely curtailed. For example, in the budget debate the authority of parliament 
is restricted to making changes which will increase public revenue or decrease 
public expenditure. In addition, the government is prepared to yield only a tiny 
fraction of the budget (0.05%) to deputies seeking to please their electorate. 
Furthermore, the government can and does alter details of expenditure after the 
budget has been voted.
Nevertheless, Parliament does have the right to investigate the affairs of public 
corporations through its ad hoc committees. More precisely, the rapporteurs, 
assisted by the Cour des Comptes, can follow the use of money, make 
investigations and see any documents relevant to the budgetary control of ministries 
and public enterprises attached to ministries.^® The Schwartz report of 1974 (See 
Chapter 1, pp. 98-101), revealing the malpractices of the state oil companies, was 
the result of one such ad hoc committee. Wright notes, however, that Parliament's 
prerogative as 'exposer of scandals' was only rarely and timidly used.^^
In addition to Parliament, there are two other important bodies which keep an eye 
on the activities of public sector companies. The Commission de Vérification des 
Comptes des Entreprises Publiques, attached to the Cour des Comptes, audits the 
accounts of public sector companies under its jurisdiction and reports on the
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efficiency with which they are managed. The reports are then sent to the 
supervisory ministries, to the companies concerned and to Parliament. Lucas notes 
that;
"As public enterprise is increasingly required to incorporate political 
guidelines into its decision-making, for example, to reduce 
unemployment, to conserve foreign exchange, and a host of other 
conditions, so its activities open themselves to criticisms from the 
Commission. The Commission's responsibilities for control conflict 
with controls imposed by other institutions."^^
The Conseil d'Etat supervises the French system of administrative courts. Here 
complaints of procedural maladministration are heard and ruled upon. Its role was 
particularly important in the allocation of import licences (A3 and A10 
authorisations). The DHYCA decisions on the quantities of crude oil, which it 
allowed each company to import, were subject to appeal before the Conseil d ’Etat. 
Any cartel where prices were fixed created an incentive for participants to jockey for 
the maximum possible share in order to maximise profits. Thus charges of 
discrimination in the allocation of quotas were not uncommon. In this context the 
Conseil d'Etat provided machinery for arbitration of disputes among cartel 
partners.^3
Last but not least, the top managers of the energy companies are essential 
participants in public policy-making. While the broad policies of government 
institutions influence the choices available to public sector companies, we shall see, 
in the next two sections of this chapter, that the mechanisms allowing government 
officials to intervene in the activities of state-owned firms enabled company leaders, 
in their turn, to influence public policy. Insofar as a major industrial group is a 
repository of up-to-date technical and financial expertise, top managers, as 
informants of government, are in a very powerful position.
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This review of the institutions concerned in the formulation of oil policy reveals two 
important and related strands; public policy-making is a complex affair because of 
the number of actors involved; French oil policy, as well as the process by which 
that policy was formulated, underwent a profound evolution in the 1970s and 1980s.
In all areas of public industrial policy-making a proliferation of institutions is 
involved. We have seen that decision-makers vary considerably in the influence 
they can exert. Moreover, each has a particular function which invariably conflicts 
with that of another actor. There are in French public policy-making traditional 
areas of conflict: the President aims to appoint his own supporters; sections of 
parliament oppose the executive; the Ministry of Finance resists the demands of 
spending ministries, while its pursuit of short-term goals clashes with the long-term 
aims of the economic planners; international events constrain national decision­
makers; public enterprises must cooperate with government, but have also been 
obliged since the late 1970s to become progressively more independent of the 
authorities.
As regards French oil policy, the dramatic change in the world oil scene after 1973 
simultaneously transformed the balance of power between government decision­
makers and deepened the divisions between them. While de Gaulle was in office, 
his vision to restore France to its position as a world power gave a certain 
coherence to industrial policy and there was a consensus between President, 
ministries and planners that a French state oil industry should be supported and 
developed. De Gaulle's departure coincided with the loss of French oil company 
assets in Algeria and the world oil crisis. From then onwards, institutions originally 
supportive of the state oil group (President, Prime Minister, minister of Finance) 
emphasised the need for companies to be more self-reliant and competitive. High 
crude oil prices on the international market posed serious difficulties for the French 
state group's refining sector and the necessity to be cost-effective increased the 
influence of the Ministry of Finance in the decision-making process. Moreover, the
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decision of successive governments to develop other sources of energy, which were 
not exposed to political instability abroad, set the various sectors of energy against 
one another. For example, from the mid-1970s nuclear energy was supported at 
the expense of oil. As a result, from then onwards, a government policy for oil 
became less coherent and decisive. Furthermore, from the beginning of the 1980s, 
public sector firms were being made to serve purposes for which they were not 
originally created. Consequently, tensions between company leaders, and 
supervisory ministers became more acute. A later development was that the trends 
towards greater internationalisation, deregulation and privatisation from the mid- 
1980s meant that government institutions had less influence in the policies of the 
state oil group.
Ma ch in er y  for  G overnment C o ntro l
During the decade with which we are concerned, the state was the major 
shareholder in the SNEA, and as such it watched over what the company was 
doing. Consequently there were certain established mechanisms by which 
governments could intervene, if necessary, in the activities of this public sector firm. 
Lucas emphasized the point that it was the a priori controls which were the most 
important.^^ These were the power of appointment, the presence of civil servants 
at many levels of the enterprise and the authorisation of financing measures. The 
present section examines these structures within the context of the SNEA. It 
focuses on the President's power to appoint and dismiss company chairmen, the 
rights and duties of the government commissioners and the role of the holding 
company. Entreprise de Recherche et d'Activités Pétrolières (ERAP), responsible 
for the SNEA's financial health. In examining these established structures, we shall 
also attempt to clarify the nature of government control.
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The Power to Appoint and Revoke Appointments
We have already shown that the President's influence over the state oil sector was 
significant. Through his power to appoint to the chairmanship of public sector 
companies the President, in the words of Lucas, "tries to ensure that the man of his 
choice takes the enterprise in the direction he requires".^® Should conflicts arise, 
the revoking of an appointment is as effective a weapon as the power to appoint. 
As J. Hayward points out with a quotation from Giscard d'Estaing,
"The power to appoint is virtually the only influence that one can have 
over the policy of these enterprises as the justification for shortening 
the chairman managing director's term of office to three years''.^®
A review of the three chairmen of Elf over the decade with which we are concerned 
(1976-1986) shows how the President's power of patronage was applied. In 1977 
Pierre Guillaumat retired from the chairmanship of the SNEA. He had been 
principal advisor to de Gaulle on energy and had directed the formation and growth 
of France's state oil sector for almost thirty years. As stated in Chapter 1, (see p. 
50), he was not only a family friend of de Gaulle but, like de Gaulle, believed in the 
strategic importance of oil. Moreover, he belonged to a group of like-minded men 
in the post-war period who aimed to make France into a vigorous, independent 
economy and restore it to its position as a world power. A 'national oil policy which 
implied the creation and development of an integrated oil industry under French 
control was a prerequisite for turning France into a major industrial power. 
Appointed Director of the DICA by de Gaulle in 1945, Guillaumat also took charge 
of the BRP, the government agency created by himself and close collaborators in 
order to implement a 'national oil policy'. The great structural developments in the 
state oil industry were engineered by Guillaumat or by men whom he had placed in 
key positions while de Gaulle was in power. For example, the creation of a 'national 
champion', ERAP, in 1966 by merging the state oil sector's upstream and 
downstream activities, was initiated by André Giraud in his position as Director of 
the DICA.
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After the departure of de Gaulle and collapse of the policy of pétrole franc, ERAP 
had to survive in a more liberal and less supportive environment. Nevertheless, 
before his retirement, Guillaumat ensured the future prosperity of the group by 
overseeing the merger between ERAP and its privately oriented subsidiary, the 
SNPA.
The appointment of Albin Chalandon, Guillaumat's successor to the chairmanship 
of Elf in 1977, also demonstrates that the person chosen to head a public sector 
group had to be sympathetic to the views of the President. Giscard d'Estaing 
acceded to the presidency in 1974. As a liberal, he was opposed to public sector 
companies and, not only planned a merger between Elf and the CFP^ ,^ but fully 
approved the partial privatisation of ERAP in 1977.^® Like Giscard d'Estaing, 
Chalandon was an Inspecteur des Finances, although he had resigned from the top 
civil service in 1955. His strong aversion to all kinds of state intervention in 
economic life and his former career in banking and business fitted him well for 
instilling into the state oil group a more market orientation. We explain in Chapter 
6 (see pp. 251-258) how his chairmanship considerably reinforced its market image.
Another version of the circumstances in which Chalandon was appointed to the 
chairmanship of Elf was that he had been promised the post by Jacques Chirac.^® 
This was in return for running the secretariat of the UDR from 1974 until Chirac took 
it over in 1976, after resigning from the premiership. During the presidential 
campaign of 1974, Chalandon had also shown himself a strong supporter of Giscard 
d'Estaing in the second round. When Chalandon applied for the chairmanship of 
Elf, Chirac therefore strongly supported him and Giscard d'Estaing would not go 
against the promise made by his former prime minister. Actually Chirac and Giscard 
d'Estaing imposed Chalandon on the Elf group against the wishes of Guillaumat and 
the Corps des Mines clan. They went as far as to change the constitution of Elf 
(which stated that the chairman had to be a top civil servant) to ensure Chalandon's 
appointment. As already mentioned, Chalandon had resigned from the Inspection
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des Finances in 1955.
The President's power of patronage also enables him to revoke appointments. 
According to a top executive In the oil sector, the criteria for maintaining and 
terminating the chairmanship of a public sector company were as follows:
"La doctrine, c'est que ie gouvernement nomme un patron 
responsable et au fond, il lui laisse une très large autonomie et il le 
conserve s'il fait bien son métier. S'il y a un heurt sur une question 
politique grave, si l'Etat considère que le refus de la part du président 
est contraire à la politique, à ce moment-là il ne le renouvelle pas 
comme président, il met fin à ses fonctions."^
This situation actually occurred during the chairmanship of Chalandon. His two 
terms of office between 1977 and 1983 were an ongoing series of protests against 
administrative procedures and quarrels with successive Ministers of Industry. The 
climax of Chalandon's defiance towards government officials in authority over him 
was reached during the chemical restructurings of 1983 when he refused to comply 
with Industry Minister Fabius' instructions to pay compensation to the CFP.^  ^ The 
non-renewal of Chalandon's mandat was the only solution to the saga of conflict 
between himself and the top administration throughout his chairmanship of the 
SNEA.
Michael Pecqueur, appointed successor to Chalandon, was altogether a very 
different personality with a different style of management. An ingénieur dès Mines, 
he had made his career at the Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique. Having assisted 
André Giraud when he was Administrateur Général Délégué of the CE A, he then 
succeeded him in this position in 1978. In addition, he had served on the board of 
EOF, he had co-managed Framatome and succeeded Georges Besse as chairman 
of Cogema. His close links with André Giraud and membership of the same grand 
corps may have contributed to his appointment. In any case, the appointment of a 
chairman whose background resembled that of many of the SNEA's top executives, 
past and present, was motivated by the desire to restore stability to a group which
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hâd experienced considerable turmoil under Chalandon. According to Babinet,
"...en désignant Michel Pecqueur, le gouvernement dote Elf d’un 
grand commis dans la pure tradition des fondateurs du groupe. 
Apolitique, technicien, respectueux de la tutelle étatique mais 
parfaitement capable de faire prévaloir ses propres vues..."^^
This summary of how the President's power of patronage works, shows that the 
Chairmanship of a public sector company, such as the SNEA, was a highly coveted 
position, and used by the President as a reward for loyal service in the top 
administration or for political support or both. While the chairman was allowed 
considerable managerial autonomy, it was important that his policies not only 
ensured the company's prosperity but also conformed to national policy, as 
determined by the chief supervisory ministry. If there were severe conflicts, as 
shown in the case of Chalandon, the Prime Minister who is responsible for the day- 
to-day management of government may, with the approval of the President, use his 
powers of dismissal. In this way, the power to appoint heads of state-owned 
companies and revoke appointments was an effective instrument at the disposal of 
the President. It served to ensure the prosperity of the company, the compatibility 
of its goals with those of the government and, last but not least, it reinforced the 
influence of the President.
Presence of Civil Servants in the Organisation
Civil servants are present at several levels of French public sector companies. In 
general their role is to allow a transfer of information and ideas between the 
company and government departments and facilitate mutual understanding. There 
are three main structures allowing for their infiltration of the company.First,  by 
means of a system of détachement there are opportunities for civil servants to be 
seconded into nationalised industry. Second, a certain number of state 
representatives, recommended by the ministries, have a seat on the corporate
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board* of state-owned companies. Their number is fixed by law and proportionate 
to the state's participation in the capital of the company. Third, the most important 
presence is that of two Government Commissioners, representatives of the 
ministries of Industry and Finance who have a seat on the board as well as wider 
powers within the company.
In the context of the SNEA it is worth looking in detail at the function and powers of 
these two officials. Between 1976 and 1986 the industry Minister's representative 
was the Directeur des Hydrocarbures, that is the person responsible within the 
Ministry for the sector to which the SNEA belonged. According to Feigenbaum, the 
duty of the official was
"To exercise control of particular as opposed to general activities of 
the companies, such as individual investments or diversification 
decisions. The commissioner is the State's representative on the 
corporate board ostensibly to ensure that company policy decisions 
will not transgress larger state objectives."^
He had right of veto and, in consultation with his minister, he could block decisions 
of the company. He was in permanent contact with the top management of the 
group and had a droit de regard on the three or four top appointments. He reported 
to and advised the Directeur Général de L'Energie and Minister of Industry and 
acted on their behalf. The Chef de la Mission de Contrôle, or state auditor, was the 
permanent representative of the Minister of Finance. He was in charge of 
supervising the economic and financial activity of the group. The state auditor 
examined the budget before it was presented to the corporate board and had right 
of veto over decisions. Although his functions covered responsibility for the SNEA,
On the basis of reports submitted by the Director General, the corporate 
board defines the general policy of the company taking into account 
guidelines given by the public authorities. The board approves the 
annual report of the organisation, the accounts, the balance sheet of the 
past year and proposed budget for the following year.
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CFP and IFF, he was physically present at the head office of the SNEA. This official 
described his day-to-day responsibilities as follows:
"II est en permanence dans les bureaux de l'entreprise. Il est 
physiquement installé dans la tour Elf. Il reçoit les procès-verbaux de 
sociétés, les comptes-rendus, il participe à de nombreuses réunions 
de conseils d'administration de société. Il reçoit le budget."^
Although the government commissioners, acting on behalf of their respective 
supervisory ministers, had right of veto over decisions of the group, they rarely 
exercised this power. According to one top-ranking official,
"II vaut mieux que ce soit la diplomatie qui fonctionnne plutôt que la 
guerre. Par conséquent l'Etat ne se sert pas couramment ni du droit 
de véto qu'il a sur les décisions du groupe ni de son pouvoir 
d'actionnaire pour l'exprimer dans l'assemblée générale de façon 
violente."^
Feigenbaum remarked, however, that the rarity with which the power of veto was 
used could be deceiving. This was because the formal decision of a commissioner, 
acting on instructions of his respective minister, only took place after a considerable 
period of informal bargaining, through which the interests and opinions of various 
supervisory agencies were taken into accoun t .T h is  point was confirmed by a 
former top civil servant:
"Toutes les choses sérieuses se passent dans la coulisse. Elles ne 
se passent pas à la table du conseil.
The structures enabling the infiltration of the company by civil servants were 
controlling mechanisms insofar as they allowed government departments to have 
knowledge of company activities. We have seen that the corporate board had an 
impressive list of duties. However, decisions taken in this forum were those for 
which approval would have been sought from one or other of the supervisory 
ministries. It was therefore the unofficial negotiations taking place between
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representatives of the supervisory ministries and top management, prior to meetings 
of the board, which determined whether company proposals were finally blocked or 
accepted.
Provision and Authorisation of Financing Measures
In Section I we referred to the all-pervading influence of the Ministry of Finance in 
economic policy-making. This section will show more specifically its influence in 
public sector firms. First, between 1976 and 1986 the Finance Ministry not only 
directed how these firms spent public money but also watched closely how they 
used their own. Second, in the context of our case-study, one particular structure 
within the Elf group, namely the holding company, ERAP, illustrated clearly how 
important the financial health of state-owned firms was to government.
Let us look initially at the variety of ways in which public sector firms financed their 
investments. They could use their own resources, borrow on the national and 
international markets, benefit from allocations of capital from the state, and receive 
state loans at a reduced rate of interest. As Lucas pointed out, all means required 
the authorisation of the Ministry of Finance.^® The Ministry thus controlled access 
by state enterprises to national and international financial markets. Furthermore, 
state payments to state enterprises, whether in the form of allocations of capital or 
loans and advances from the Fonds de Développement Economique et Social 
(FDES)*, were part of the budget of the Ministry of Finance. The Council of the 
FDES had responsibility for examining the investment programme of public sector 
firms and any investments financed by or with the help of the state. As a result, this 
body exercised great power over state enterprises. Its approval was required even 
when the investment programme was self-financed. The Council was dominated
The FDES is an arm of the Ministry of Finance. It supports national 
investment projects and has a vital coordinating role in economic policy 
(See Jack Hayward, op.cit., p. 187)
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by the Ministry of Finance. The Minister presided and membership included the 
Directors of the Budget and Treasury amongst others.
The investment programmes of the SNEA were self-financed from the mid-1970s. 
However, the Ministry of Finance exerted a strong controlling influence on its 
financing measures through the holding company, ERAP, as we shall show in the 
following analysis of its functions.
The state was the major shareholder in the SNEA, owning 56% of its capital in 
1986.* The state's share was held and managed by ERAP, an établissement public 
(100% state-owned). As we explained in Chapter 1, ERAP was formed in 1965 out 
of a merger of two établissements publics, the Bureau de Recherches du Pétrole 
(BRP) and the Régie Autonome des Pétroles (RAP). Ail the BRP's subsidiaries 
were preserved, of which the most important was the Société Nationale des 
Pétroles d'Aquitaine (SNPA). A second restructuring was achieved In 1976 when 
the assets of ERAP and the SNPA were merged, resulting In the newly named 
Société Nationale Elf Aquitaine (SNEA). ERAP was retained as an établissement 
public with responsibility for managing the state's 67% share in the capital of the 
SNEA. This situation obtained until 1986 when, under the Chirac government's 
privatisation programme, ERAP sold off 11% of the state's share in the SNEA, 
bringing it down to 56% (See Chapter 6, p. 263).
ERAP was a small entity of five to six people. The chairman, vice-chairman and 
administrators were all appointed by government. ERAP had its own corporate 
board where the directors of the Budget and Treasury Divisions had a seat, along 
with the two Government Commissioners of the SNEA, Directeur des Hydrocarbures 
and chef de la Mission de Contrôle des Entreprises Pétrolières. These same top 
civil servants, together with the chairman and vice-chairman of ERAP, also
53% in 1992 and privatised in 1994
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composed its œmité spécial. This small committee examined all strategic decisions 
of the SNEA along with the company's budget, accounts and future plans. It was 
originally created by Pierre Guillaumat, when he was head of the initial holding 
company, the BRP, and intended to involve in the life of that institution people of 
influence at the Ministry of Finance.^®
Questioned on the role of ERAP in 1986, the chairman insisted that it did not have 
a directive function vis-à-vis the SNEA."*^  Rather it was concerned, as major 
shareholder, with the SNEA's financial health, with its plans for the future, with the 
compatibility of its diversification projects with long-term strategies of the group as 
a whole and its ability to manage them financially. For this reason, ERAP appointed 
administrators to the board of the SNEA,on whom they could rely.
Although ERAP's chairman denied the controlling aspect of his company, its above- 
mentioned role shows that it was nevertheless a government watchdog. This is 
borne out by events surrounding the SNEA in 1979-80.^^ Until this time the 
chairman of the SNEA and ERAP was the same person. However, as already 
mentioned, under the chairmanship of Albin Chalandon, relations between the 
group's top management and the administration deteriorated for a variety of 
reasons. The conflict was intensified at the end of the 1970s because of broader 
national problems which the government was attempting to solve; high inflation, 
high public expenditure and an excessive dependence on state funds by certain 
strategic industries. Since the SNEA had accumulated enormous wealth as a result 
of the second oil crisis, there was concern in government circles about how these 
resources were being used. The fact that Chalandon headed both the holding 
company and its main subsidiary only obscured matters. As a result, on the advice 
of Industry Minister Giraud, Prime Minister Raymond Barre appointed a new 
chairman and vice-chairman to manage ERAP, while leaving Chalandon and his 
vice-chairman in their original functions. According to a former vice-chairman of 
ERAP,
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"Les dirigeants d'Elf Aquitaine ont été déchargés de leurs 
responsabilités parce que le gouvernement a préféré nommer au sein 
de l'ERAP des personnes plus proches de lui qui puissent mieux 
surveiller l'évolution de ce qui se passait à Elf Aquitaine.
ERAP also played a public relations role with regard to the authorities, ensuring that 
the government representatives on its corporate board had a clear understanding 
of the group's different activities and development. In their turn government 
officials could inform ERAP's leaders of ministerial reaction to their plans. Thus 
ERAP acted as a buffer between company top management and government. 
According to ERAP's 
chairman in 1986,
"L'expérience montre que quelle que soit l'étiquette du gouvernement, 
si des tiraillements se produisent entre le groupe et les représentants 
de l'Etat, ces derniers se tourneront vers leur ministre et le différend 
ira jusqu'en réunion interministérielle, c'est logique. Avec l'ERAP cet 
inconvénient est écarté; la présence à son conseil de représentants 
de la haute administration permet de préparer les décisions, de mieux 
discuter des problèmes dans une enceinte où les dirigeants de 
l'entreprise peuvent s'exprimer, ce qui ne serait évidemment pas le 
cas en réunion interministérielle."^
This review of the functions of ERAP shows that it was a protective organisation 
with regard to both the company and government. The Elf group and government 
benefited from its existence in many respects. Having first-hand knowledge of the 
group's activities and future plans, officials of the Ministry of Finance on ERAP's 
board could support company leaders in ventures which seemed promising in order 
to protect or possibly raise the major shareholder's dividends. The reverse was also 
true, as we show in Chapter 5, where ERAP's top management supported 
opposition from the Industry Minister and Prime Minister to Chalandon's risky 
diversification projects. Certain diversified activities were in loss-making sectors, 
and their recovery would not only be costly to the group, but depended on specialist 
markets which Elfs managers lacked. Another example of ERAP's controlling 
influence on the SNEA's financial operations was the condition of exchanging 
subsidiaries which it imposed on the purchase of Texas Gulf in 1987 (See Chapter
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6, pp.253-254). These illustrations show that in protecting the SNEA against the 
ambitions of its top management, ERAP's leaders were also protecting their own 
interests as major shareholder.
The structures enabling the government to intervene in company policy-making 
clarify to some extent the nature of government control in a public sector company 
between 1976 and 1986. The President's power to appoint and revoke 
appointments ensured that the person appointed to the chairmanship was a 
competent manager whose objectives for the company were consistent with those 
of government. Should he fail or serious conflicts arise, the President could use his 
power to change the chairman when his three-year term of office came up for 
renewal. The official role of top civil servants from the supervisory ministries at 
different levels of the group was to ensure that company plans did not transgress 
broad state objectives. To this end, information sharing about government and 
company goals facilitated understanding on each side. At the level of the holding 
company, we noted that the role of the Finance Ministry directors who sat on 
ERAP's board was to ensure that the SNEA acted in a way most favourable to its 
major shareholder, yet these officials also had broad responsibilities and could 
make their knowledge of the company contribute to solving national problems. Here 
lies the ambiguity and inherent danger of this two-way contact between government 
officials and company leaders. We shall show in the next section that it had 
disadvantages and benefits for both sides. In general, all these controlling 
mechanisms aimed to blend company strategies into broad government objectives. 
However, the fact that company leaders had constantly to give an account of 
themselves to government officials with authority to intervene in the activities of the 
firm was, in Lucas' words, a 'chronic irritant'."^
T he P ractice  of G overnm ental C o ntro l
The mechanisms enabling governments to intervene in the activities of a public 
sector company can have negative as well as positive effects for the firm. In this
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context Section III will highlight two questions. First, in what circumstances were the 
mechanisms for government control, analysed in the previous section, applied in 
practice? Second, while governments could and did use their powers to limit the 
ambitions of a state-owned company, what factors underpinned the company's 
exploitation of its government link?
A Case of Conflict
The blocking by Prime Minister Raymond Barre of the Kerr Magee purchase in 1980 
was an occasion when one of the supervisory ministers used his power of veto.^ 
The episode shows that the reasons for strong government intervention in industrial 
affairs are often blurred by the variety of problems which must be addressed in 
decision-making. It also reveals that questions of political importance to 
government can outweigh sectoral issues.
Setting up a subsidiary in the United States was one of Chalandon's main ambitions 
when he took up the presidency of Elf in 1977. The advantage of the US was that 
profits could be repatriated in France. In 1979 the rise in oil prices, fall in the dollar 
and anti-trust laws introduced by the Carter administration brought the subject back 
onto the agenda. Industry Minister, André Giraud, agreed in principle to Elf 
extending its interests to the United States. After long discussions as to the 
respective qualities of about twenty selected companies, the choice fell on Kerr 
Magee, an oil and diversified mining company. Listed 128th among American 
companies by Fortune, Kerr Magee satisfied all the criteria, being in the top rank for 
its oil and gas reserves, turnover and profits. While several members of the SNEA's 
executive committee opposed the purchase, Chalandon and one of his two vice- 
chairmen strongly favoured it. The supervisory ministers also agreed in principle 
but laid down certain conditions; the cost should be limited to 1 bn dollars; Kerr 
Magee's uranium reserves should be transferred to the Compagnie Générale des
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Matières Nucléaires (Cogema)*; the takeover should be carried out in a friendly 
fashion without intervention of the American government, who might be concerned 
about the transfer outside the United States of an important uranium producer.
During negotiations, although Chalandon remained in contact with the President's 
advisers at the Elysée, André Giraud, for his part, had difficulty obtaining precise 
information from the SNEA's top management. The aspect of secrecy was in fact 
deliberate since, according to Chalandon,
"Aucune chance de l'obtenir si les administrations de tutelle étaient 
informées. Si en effet le projet était éventé, l'action Kerr Magee 
flamberait en Bourse."'*^
Finally, news of the takeover was leaked on Wall Street, unexpectedly bringing 
forward the date of the transaction by a week. On the day fixed for the takeover, 
April 24th 1980, Chalandon informed the Directeur des Hydrocarbures, Jean-Pierre 
Capron, of its imminence, stressing that he had received authorisation from the 
Elysée. However, such permission had not been given, according to Giraud and 
Capron. On instructions from the Industry Minister, the Directeur des 
Hydrocarbures called a meeting of the comité spécial of ERAP,
"Pour obliger les dirigeants du groupe à rendre compte pour faire 
annuler l'opération."^
Finally, in the evening of April 24th, on the advice of Giraud, Raymond Barre vetoed 
the takeover. Added to Giraud's earlier refusal to allow the SNEA to diversify into 
food-processing, this veto only fuelled Chalandon's antagonism towards his Minister
Private subsidiary of the Commissariat à l ’Energie Atomique created in 
1975. Its purposes were to facilitate the management of the CEA’s 
industrial activities on a commercial basis, to provide the State with an 
instrument for ensuring all the stages in the provision of nuclear fuel and 
to permit France to enter into international markets both for the purchase 
of raw materials and the sale of products.
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of Industry. As we explain in Chapter 5, the outcome was a public war of words 
between Chalandon and Giraud throughout 1980. Yet as far as Giraud was 
concerned, it was the serious lack of information about Kerr Magee which obliged 
him to oppose the takeover. Recalling with irritation the episode, he is quoted as 
saying:
"Peut-on me citer un exemple au monde d'une société qui fasse une 
acquisition de 3,5 milliards de dollars sans en avoir jamais parlé à son 
conseil d'administration ni même à un seul de ses administrateurs.
Eh bien non, je suis bien tranquille, on ne pourra pas en citer une 
autre.
Yet there were other issues at stake behind the veto. Elections were to take place 
a year from then. The Barre government had become progressively unpopular 
owing to the Prime Minister's austerity programme. To make a huge investment in 
the United States at a time when large numbers of workers were being laid off in 
strategic industries in France would only have increased the wrath of the unions 
and brought the government and President into further disrepute. Other factors 
contributing to the veto were possibly corps rivalry and the animosity which existed 
between Chalandon and Giraud. According to a former vice-chairman of ERAP,
"Le ministre de l'Industrie n'était peut-être pas fâché qu'une crise se 
produise car elle pouvait fournir l'occasion de démontrer l'erreur 
commise par les dirigeants de la SNEA."®°
The Kerr Magee episode reveals much about company policy-making for a public 
sector firm and the reasons behind a government's veto of company plans. The 
process is complex because the different actors involved have opposing concerns, 
which must be taken into account during negotiations. Furthermore, the process is 
slow and circumstances change. Agreement in principle at the outset does not 
necessarily mean agreement in practice. Moreover, should an operation fail, the 
stated reasons for failure are not necessarily the true reasons. In the episode 
discussed it was, according to Giraud, the lack of information which forced him to 
block the purchase. Yet evidence from other sources suggests that a whole variety
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of factors may have contributed to the veto. The animosity between Chalandon and 
Giraud had its roots in corps rivalry, in their conflicting perceptions of the role of the 
SNEA and in the very different personalities of the two men. The approaching 
presidential elections and the Barre government's concern about its declining 
popularity, heightened by fears of social unrest, were also factors which contributed 
to the veto. In addition, since the takeover concerned a foreign company, the 
potentially hostile reaction of a foreign government (and the United States 
government at that!) was a further factor which obliged the French officials 
responsible to tread warily. Therefore, although the blocking of the Kerr Magee 
purchase appeared to be due to a veto on the part of the Minister of Industry, 
because he had not been fully informed, issues of political, economic, social and 
diplomatic importance for the government were equally and possibly more 
influential.
Collusive Practices and Shared interests
We have demonstrated that between 1976 and 1986 the official role of government 
commissioners from the Industry and Finance ministries was to ensure that 
company strategies did not transgress broader state objectives. This section will 
show, however, that these state 'supervisors’ actually depended on company top 
managers and positively supported their interests.
With regard to the state auditor, Feigenbaum points to an essential ambiguity in the 
functions of this official. In the context of the SNEA, the state auditor not only had 
an intimate knowledge of the company's financial activities but was physically 
present at Elfs headquarters. Feigenbaum states that after a certain time in post 
these officials behaved as if they were,
"representatives of the enterprise, having a tendency to take on the
defence rather than act as true controllers"^^
He quotes a particular contrôleur ^ /^ho described his functions as follows:
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"we participate at the level of financial authorisations...we have a 
function of advice, of counsel and of information. The important thing 
is that the enterprise should be economically profitable".^
The attitude of this government commissioner is borne out in Chapters 5 and 6, 
devoted respectively to the SNEA's diversification strategies and to its progressively 
private orientation. It will be demonstrated in these chapters, that from the mid- 
1970s, governments were not only less generous towards public sector firms, but 
anxious to use their wealth in the service of a range of broad state objectives, for 
example, to reduce public expenditure, to boost budgetary receipts, to facilitate the 
restructuring of industry and to create jobs. The company's objective to maximise 
its profits therefore converged with those of the Treasury. Consequently, it is no 
surprise that Ministry of Finance representatives defended state-owned firms in their 
profit-making ambitions.
As for the government commissioner from the Ministry of Industry, the Directeur des 
Hydrocarbures, it is a well-known fact that he supported the French oil industry for 
a variety of reasons. First of all, this official was relatively young, upwardly mobile 
and completing his training, as a new recruit to the prestigious Corps de Mines, in 
the top echelons of the Industry Ministry. In discussions with company directors 
who had perhaps been with their firm for 15-20 years, this young official would not 
only be a less skilled negotiator but dependent on them for specialised information. 
This point was reinforced by a former company secretary of the SNEA:
"II reste que quand une boîte a une continuité qu'elle sait à peu près 
ce qu'elle veut, qu'elle se trouve en face d'un Etat dont les hommes 
changent tout le temps et la rotation des fonctionnaires s'est 
beaucoup accélérée parce que les gens sont pressés, on est dans 
une situation bien meilleure pour discuter que quiconque.
Secondly, according to the system of pantouflage or move by members of the 
grands corps from the top administration to posts in a public or private sector firm, 
this young official would be seeking a more lucrative post, possibly in an oil 
company. It was therefore likely that he would show deference to company leaders 
and be loath to alienate a prospective employer.
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A third reason why the Directeur des Hydrocarbures gave way to the wishes of the 
top management concerns the status of the chairman. We have already shown that 
the person appointed to the chairmanship of a public sector company must have the 
support of the President of the Republic. In addition to enjoying presidential 
support, past chairmen of Elf also attained ministerial status or an equivalent 
position. Pierre Guillaumat was de Gaulle's Ministre des Armées, Albin Chalandon 
was Pompidou's Ministre de l ’Equipement and Michel Pecqueur was head of the 
CEA, a state institution of equivalent prestige to that of the SNEA. The influence 
which the chairman wields in government circles is a powerful advantage. This 
point was made by H-R. de Bodinat and M. Chambaud. Although their study dates 
from the Guillaumat era, their observations were still relevant between 1976 and 
1986;
"Le président actuel de Elf, Monsieur Guillaumat, a la même formation 
que le directeur de la DICA mais il est plus âgé que lui, a été ministre 
et dispose d'appuis importants dans l'administration. Il est donc 
capable dans certaines circonstances d'imposer sa volonté aux 
pouvoirs publics. Il est fort probable qu'un conflit entre la DICA et le 
président de ELF se solderait à l'avantage de ce dernier".^
Good relations between the chairman and government commissioner were 
nevertheless all important. According to a top official in the oil industry,
"Le Directeur des Hydrocarbures peut dire au Président d'Elf 'Je ne 
suis pas d'accord...Si vous passez outre ce que je vous interdis, j'en 
garderai le souvenir' Le Président d'Elf réfléchit. Il est nommé par le 
govemement. Il va avoir besoin du gouvernement pour un permis en 
France, pour la modernisaton d'une raffinerie, pour une vérification de 
pollution et c'est le Directeur des Hydrocarbures qui les donne. On 
ne peut pas déclarer la guerre quand on est Président d'Elf à la 
Direction des Hydrocarbures."®®
The relationship between government and industry was therefore not always one 
of 'supervisor' and 'supervised', as the institutional framework may lead us to 
believe. Nor was it constantly conflictual. The process of deciding company policy 
was mostly one of interdependence, collaboration and ensuring that the objectives
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of both sides converged. Moreover, on account of the firm's monopoly of expertise 
and status of company chairman, top managers were the main actors in initiating 
policy and government officials tended to play a junior role. The implication was 
that company leaders could exploit their superior position, a point which we 
highlight in the next section.
Internationalisation and the Weakening of Government Control
As we show in Chapter 4, the oil industry by its nature is international. Moreover, 
oil companies have a multiplicity of sources of production throughout the world, a 
variety of products and markets and they are also capital intensive. These 
characteristics made a large integrated oil firm the multinational par excellence.^ 
The SNEA was no exception. In fact, during the decade with which we are 
concerned, 1976-1986, at least 50% of its turnover was realised outside France. 
The international ambitions of a public sector firm not only increased government's 
dependence on company top managers, but weakened government's ability to 
control them.
We have already shown in Chapter 1 that in its early years, the state-owned oil 
sector expanded rapidly in order to associate and compete with the international oil 
firms, already well-established on French territory and beyond, integration, 
diversification, increased internationalisation, européanisation and partial 
privatisation were all stages which contributed to making the SNEA a multinationale 
comme les autres. This development also resulted in the decentralisation of 
decision-making and in making supervision by national government less stringent. 
For example, foreign subsidiaries of nationalised companies had always been 
immune from investigation by the Cour des Comptes^^ What is more, the Ministry 
of Finance always favoured the internationalisation of firms, because they could use 
foreign branches to borrow abroad and thus minimise the effect of the loan on the 
French balance of payments.^®
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However, outside national territory the situation for a public sector company, such 
as the SNEA, was highly competitive. In order to establish itself in a foreign state 
with a view to setting up a subsidiary, acquiring exploration permits or entering into 
joint ventures, it had to offer the same terms as any private company. Moreover, it 
had to comply with the legislation of that state regarding, for example, the payment 
of taxes or the employment of a percentage of foreign nationals. These constraints, 
however, could be used by the company to minimise the effect of legislation at 
home. As Feigenbaum pointed out,
"Corporations can use the differences in various national bodies of 
legislation to minimise the impact of any one government's legislation.
This ... aside from the global rationalisation of resources is the chief 
attraction of the multinational form of organisation."®®
An international company such as the SNEA therefore enjoyed greater freedom vis- 
à-vis supervisory ministries at home than a company whose activities were more 
domestic. This freedom was understandable, since all our examples point to the 
fact that government officials were dependent on companies for information and 
initiatives. They themselves had no policy for specific sectors. This point was 
confirmed by many officials interviewed at the SNEA. For example, describing the 
dilemma created by the nationalisation of the French state oil companies' assets in 
Algeria in 1971, a high-ranking SNEA official remarked,
"Nous pourrions vous montrer des documents où Guillaumat disait, 'Il 
faut une politique, c'est à l'Etat d'avoir une politique, moi, je suis une 
entreprise, je défends mon entreprise...' Guillaumat avait une thèse, 
il la défendait et les politiques n'ont jamais répondu...."®®
A similar point was made by another official regarding Elfs diversifications into 
chemicals;
"Elf voulait devenir véritablement chimiste. Les pouvoirs publics ne 
sont pas intervenus. Ils se sont tenus au courant mais il n'y a pas eu 
de directives parce que l'Etat n'avait pas de politique chimique . Ils 
étaient peut-être contents de voir les gens qui avaient de l'argent 
s'intéresser à la chimie"®^
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This lack of government policy for specific sectors therefore gave company top 
managers considerable autonomy to pursue their own plans for the firm, because 
they could exploit divisions within government in order to get their way. The 
opposition between the Ministries of Industry and Finance is well known. Within the 
Finance Ministry itself, its different departments have opposing concerns. There 
can even be divisions between the highest authorities in government. Were not the 
philosophies of the liberal Giscard d'Estaing and those of André Giraud, his dirigiste 
Minister of Industry, opposed? For example, it was with the knowledge that he 
could rely on Giscard d'Estaing's support in giving the SNEA a more commercial 
orientation, in spite of opposition from his supervisory minister, that Chalandon 
pursued an ambitious diversification programme. This lack of government policy for 
specific sectors therefore gave company top managers considerable autonomy to 
pursue their own plans for the company.
This analysis of how government controls worked in practice shows that the reasons 
for strong government intervention were extremely complex, but political issues, 
such as the threat of losing an election, could outweigh other considerations. Yet 
obstructionist tactics on the part of government were rare. Most of the time the 
relationship between supervisory ministries and a state-owned company, such as 
the SNEA, was one of collusion. Moreover, the firm's monopoly of expertise and 
government’s lack of policy enabled company top managers to exploit divisions 
within government to get their way.
It must not be forgotten that between 1976 and 1986 the ability of French 
governments to intervene in the affairs of companies was further reduced by 
France’s closer integration into Europe. In Section I we mentioned how successive 
governments’ need to reduce public expenditure from the late 1970s and early 
1980s, together with pressure from the European Commission, led to the gradual 
freeing of price controls on oil products and the dismantling of the 1928 legislation. 
The latter had always contravened Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. Thus 
in the 1980s, the French authorities were forced to distribute refining licences to
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European companies*, for example, Italian AGIP and Belgian FINA, and 
supermarkets gained permission to sell petrol at reduced prices. The freeing of all 
oil prices was completed by the Chirac government in 1986 as part of its programme 
to liberalise the economy. What remained of the 1928 legislation was to disappear 
from 1993.®^  A further step in European integration was the Single European Act 
of 1986. It had the effect of accelerating changes in competition policy in 
preparation for the Single Market of 1993. Although the Treaty of Rome removed 
tariff barriers, non-tariff obstacles persisted, for example, differences in technical 
norms, taxation systems, nationalistic preferences in the attribution of public 
procurement contracts. The aim of the SEA was the removal of these by 1993. In 
this way a range of measures, national, international and European, contributed to 
reinforcing the market and weakened the power of French governments to use their 
public companies as instruments of economic policy.
C onclusion
During the decade with which we are concerned, 1976-1986, we have distinguished 
two levels of policy-making in which government and state-owned companies 
participate. In the context of our case-study they were in fact so closely interwoven 
that commentators refer to the opacity of the decision-making process in the oil 
sector.®® At the level of public policy-making, government institutions were 
responsible for defining broad objectives for the economy. Public sector companies 
were expected not only to operate within the framework laid down by the authorities 
but, as instruments of government, to advance national policies. Consequently, 
these firms were carefully watched by means of structures allowing government 
officials to be involved in their affairs. We have seen that these controlling 
mechanisms served several purposes. Officially they ensured that company plans 
conformed to broad national objectives, yet they also served to inform government
Previously it had been the French oil firms and French subsidiaries of 
international companies, Mobil, Esso, Shell, BP, which benefited from the 
1928 laws.
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about a firm's strategies. The multi-facetted role of government officials created, as 
we have seen, many ambiguities. Governments, however, did not run public sector 
companies. They appointed competent managers for that task. At the level of 
company policy-making, public sector firms of the market sector came to be 
managed from the mid-1970s increasingly along the same lines as private firms. In 
other words, they were obliged to become more self-reliant and independent of 
government. Moreover, this trend was encouraged by successive governments who 
wanted the best of all worlds: that state-owned companies be self-sufficient, that 
they generate profits and that they advance government policies. It is no surprise 
that conflicts arose. While company policy-making was mostly a collaborative 
process, governments could, in certain conditions, obstruct the ambitions of 
company top managers. We have seen, however, that a major company’s expertise 
and the status of its leaders put it in a powerful negotiating position. In their turn, 
company leaders could exploit government’s dependence on them and pursue their 
own plans for the company.
Those with all the powers did not therefore make all the decisions. One of the 
reasons for this ambiguous state of affairs was that institutions and departments 
within them had conflicting functions. Besides, ministers and company chairmen 
changed and could have opposing ambitions. Furthermore, our case-study is an 
oil company and international by nature. Unforeseen political events beyond 
national boundaries and the decisions of foreign governments and supranational 
authorities impinged on policy-making at home. It would be impossible for any 
government to conceive a coherent sectoral policy for an industry exposed to so 
many variables. It is inevitable therefore that governments should have allowed a 
state-owned company of the size and stature of our case-study increasingly more 
freedom to pursue its own policies. Apart from an interlude of strong government 
intervention to restructure industry in 1982-83, French governments over the last 
twenty years have chosen to disengage themselves progressively from the time- 
consuming and costly activity of involvement in the affairs of France’s major 
industrial group.
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CHAPTER 3 
MANAGERS AND TECHNOCRATS? THE ROLE OF THE CORPS DES MINES
Chapter 2 focused on the institutional links of the Société Nationale Elf Aquitaine 
(SNEA). It highlighted the collaborative relationship between sections of 
government and company top management in the policy-making process. Chapter 
III will explore in greater depth the nature of this collaboration by looking at who 
company top managers were. It is divided into two main sections: the first analyses 
the eligibility of a certain type of French top manager for key posts; the second is 
a case-study of the Corps des Mines, which sets recent evidence against the claims 
of the technocratic myth and discusses the consequences.
A striking feature of France is that the leaders of large companies are frequently 
former top civil servants or, in the case of the SNEA, sometimes even former 
ministers. They form part of the technocratic or techno-bureaucratic elite. That is, 
they have occupied key posts in the top administration, where they have been 
responsible for advising on and executing government policy. They then use the 
prestige and contacts acquired as a springboard into strategic positions in other 
sectors, for example public, semi-public or private corporations.
T he T e c h n o -B ureaucratic Elite
How do they come to occupy the heights of power? Many argue, not least the 
techno-bureaucrats themselves, that they are the legitimate holders of power. Their 
legitimacy derives from several factors. First, they are a state-created elite: trained 
by the state to serve the state. Second, their positions are based on a meritocratic 
ideal. Third, the elite encourage a certain myth regarding their expertise. We must 
nevertheless be wary of this model. The elitist system produces diversity as well 
as uniformity. As several SNEA officials interviewed for this study pointed out, 
within any group people differ in their ambitions and perform with varying degrees 
of competence.^ Furthermore, we must address the question of whether a state-
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centred elite is appropriate for the current world of market competition and 
privatisation and the problem of adaptation which this poses.
A state-created elite
There is a long tradition in France by which the state takes responsibility for training 
its leaders. Training involves admission to and graduation from one of France's 
elitist grandes écoles. Whereas certain grandes écoles existed under the ancien 
régime (Ecole des Mines, Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées), or were created by the 
Convention (Ecole Normale Supérieure, Ecole Polytechnique), Napoleon 
recognised their usefulness in his plan for a centralised education system. The 
training of professional groups - teachers, army officers, road and mining engineers 
- served Napoleon's objectives of political stability, social cohesion and fulfilling a 
utilitarian role in society.^ Moreover, a century and a half later, these same 
objectives inspired the creation in 1945 of another grande école, the Ecole 
Nationale d'Administration (ENA). Founded in order to recruit to the highest 
echelons of government administration, ENA's mission was to teach future top civil 
servants "le sens de l'état".^
The state went further than training. It organised a complex system which links 
professional training to the corps in which the diplômés exercise their profession. 
The corps correspond to functions within ministries and each has a specific 
technical role, for example, the Gourdes Comptes has the task of checking public 
accounts. Although there are as many as 900 corps, the most prestigious are the 
grands corps. They are divided into two rival camps, administrative and technical, 
according to the grande école from which their members graduate. The ENA, which 
provides a legal, diplomatic and economic training, feeds the grands corps 
administratifs. The Ecole Polytechnique and its principal extensions, the Ecole des 
Mines and the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées, specialising as they do in applied 
sciences and engineering, are the main channels of recruitment to the grands corps 
techniques.^ As the term "elite" implies, the technical and administrative grands
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corps form an exclusive group, restricted in number because they have been 
selected as the most competent. Furthermore, as we explain below, regarding the 
elite's capacity to circulate between sectors, on the basis of their specialist skills, 
they also claim a general competence.
The meritocratic ideal
The concept by which only the most intellectually capable have the right to key 
posts in society is related to an egalitarian or democratic ideal. In the spirit of 
republicanism, the right to lead should be determined by merit rather than 
predetermined by privileges of birth or wealth. Capacities proven and made 
manifest by examination have an irrefutable prestige, which is the raison d'être of 
the grandes écoles. According to one of Suleiman's sources,
"The grandes écoles, where one entered by competitive examination, 
which became more and more difficult, established within the powerful 
but fluid divisions of birth and of fortune, a new social category, 
defined at once by its small size and by its merit".®
The nature of the training offered by the grandes écoles has always been elitist in 
nature. The selection procedure begins at an early stage, since only the most 
capable candidates at secondary level are allowed to enter the classes 
préparatoires, which prepare pupils for the entrance examination. Then it is only 
those with the highest score in the entrance examination who are accepted by the 
grandes écoles, which in turn have a hierarchy among themselves, the most 
prestigious having the right to the best candidates. The numbers entering grandes 
écoles each year are very limited, especially when compared with the numbers 
entering universities. At the next level the elitist philosophy applies again, since the 
best students graduating from the best grandes écoles will have a choice of grands 
corps. Since there is a hierarchy among grandes écoles, there is also a hierarchy 
among grands corps. It therefore follows that the best students will choose certain
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corps. The reputation of the most illustrious grands corps thus derives from the fact 
that the best students from the most prestigious grandes éco/es join them.®
The technocratic myth
Scholars highlight a number of general characteristics which account for the 
influence of the techno-bureaucratic elite: their "imperialism", their enjoyment of 
untold privileges, their mutual solidarity, their commitment to progress and efficiency 
and their ability to decide the policy of whole sectors. Let us look in greater detail 
at the constituents of the technocratic myth.
The raison d'être of the grands corps is to obtain and preserve key posts for their 
members or, as Suleiman observes, "imperialism is the key to corps strategies".^ 
Although the original role of the grands corps was to work in state service, posts 
in government administration ceased to enjoy the prestige they once held. 
Consequently, the majority of corps members moved out of the civil service 
functions originally assigned to particular corps into more lucrative positions 
frequently unrelated to their training. However, rivalry for prestigious posts among 
different grands corps is such that each strives to protect its distinguishing features 
or specialism - for example, civil engineering projects for the Corps des Ponts et 
Chaussées, industrial security for the Corps des Mines - at the same time as it 
attempts to colonise other sectors. This mobility is possible because the grands 
corps cultivate the quality which Thoenig has termed "polyvalency".® It consists in 
treading a delicate path between a general and a specialised or "technical" 
competence. The technocrat's skill has been defined as follows:
"The technocrat fixes the goals and the means of the technicians' 
work. He is in a position to effect a synthesis of the results obtained, 
to choose between different options and to define the priorities. Nine 
times out of ten he is incapable of taking the place of any of the 
technicians whose skill he relies on".®
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Membership of a grand corps brings many advantages. As a result of the fiercely 
competitive process, which graduates of the grandes écoles have undergone, a 
bond of mutual respect and solidarity is created and positively encouraged among 
corps members. Moreover, they derive substantial privileges from their membership 
of the corps: the offer of prestigious posts and career mobility thanks to the corps' 
"employment agency", high salaries, bonuses and security of employment.’® In its 
turn, however, the corps expects to benefit from the gains of individual members, 
who are morally obliged to pass on to others advantages they acquire. Individual 
members are, in fact, so well supported by their corps that they are allegedly 
protected from the consequence of their actions.
Possibly the most prized benefit of corps membership is the network of valuable 
contacts. It is this capacité relationnelle^^ which makes individual corps members 
so sought after by big employers. According to Thoenig,
"Pour une banque "s'offrir" un inspecteur des Finances, c'est acheter 
à travers lui tout le carnet de relations dont il bénéficie au ministère 
des Finances".’^
The organisation which employs a Corps member therefore benefits as much from 
his indispensable contacts in government and other sectors as from his innate 
ability and acquired expertise. Large institutions depend on these contacts for the 
efficient running of affairs, a factor which bestows on the corps member 
considerable autonomy.’® Therefore, paradoxically, although the corps member is 
working for an organisation, he enjoys considerable independence from its 
pressures through his allegiance to a "higher" authority.
Owing to the grands corps' imperialistic tendancies and the fact that organisations 
themselves strive to employ corps members, it follows that certain corps have 
gained a monopoly over certain key positions. In fact, whole sectors have become 
strongholds of certain corps. For example, many top executive posts in the 
Ministère de l'Equipement are the preserve of the Corps des Ponts et Chaussées.^^
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What are the results of this appropriation by the grands corps of key positions? 
Networks are created within and between the sectors of politics, government and 
industry, in which the grands corps occupy decision-making posts. Since members 
share a common training and experience, they communicate easily, and 
consequently contribute to good relations between the sectors. According to many 
commentators, their cohesion and belief in progress and efficiency were responsible 
for France's "economic miracle" in the post-war period.^® The less beneficial effect 
of the grand corps' monopoly over key posts is that these are denied to executives 
who do not belong to the corps and who may be more effective and energetic 
colleagues. In fact the grands corps are seen to act as a kind of m a f i a . A  further 
consequence of the corps* monopoly over key posts in government and large 
organisations is that they shape policy for whole sectors of the economy. This is 
because they have established themselves as the "experts" in the fields they have 
colonised. What is more, because of their allegiance to their corps d'origine, it is 
alleged that they formulate the policies of "their" sectors or respond to government 
policies with a view to advancing the interests of their own corps.
T he Corps  des M ines
To what extent is the technocratic myth borne out by reality? A case-study of the 
grand corps technique to which many of Elf s leaders belong will attempt to provide 
an answer.
The elite Corps of Mining Engineers is the official corps of the Ministry of Industry. 
In 1986 the Corps consisted of 468 ingénieurs. Each year about 15 new members 
join, recruited for the most part from the Ecole Polytechnique (top ten candidates, 
otherwise known as la voie royale) but also from the Ecole Normale Supérieure (two 
or three) and the Ecole des Mines de Paris (one or two). All follow a three-year 
training course at the Ecole des Mines de Paris and it is this select group who 
annually swell the ranks of the Corps.^^
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The establishment of a separate administrative department for mines and an Ecole 
des Mines can be traced back to 1769. However, it was the Committee of Public 
Safety during the Revolution which consolidated the work of the ancien régime by 
creating an Agence and Corps des Mines in 1794 and specifying their 
responsibilities. These duties were incorporated into the loi minière of 1810 
establishing the framework of the state's action in the mining sector.^® Three main 
areas were attributed to the Administration and Corps des Mines:
"L'arbitrage, notamment par la définition des concessions, le contrôle 
pour la sécurité dans les usines comme pour la préservation des 
ressources du sol et du sous-sol; le progrès technique et le 
développement économique enfin, selon les termes même des 
rapporteurs de la loi "par les conseils donnés sans imposer de lois, 
sans exercer aucune contrainte sur la direction des travaux".^®
It should be noted that the training of the ingénieurs des Mines, recognised as a 
responsibility of the Corps even by the Committee of Public Safety, also became 
one of the chief preoccupations of the Administration des Mines.
A diversified elite
The functions and activities of the Corps des Mines have diversified considerably 
since its beginnings. To survive it had to adapt to economic change: reduce its 
presence in traditional areas and move into more advanced sectors.
As industry developed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, so did the 
activities of the ingénieurs des Mines. First, their official duty to ensure that security 
regulations were observed in the mines was extended to the use of all kinds of 
machinery. The Arrondissements Minéralogiques remain one of the official tasks 
of the Corps and consist today of making safety checks on heavy lorries. This task 
ensures a permanent source of income to the Corps.^  ^ Second, a certain number 
of ingénieurs began to leave state service to take up positions in industrial firms. 
They owned no part of the capital of these companies but gained power within the
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organisation, because they were appointed to posts of responsibility and thus 
contributed to directing the firm's policy. Initially, they moved into coal and metallic 
mining companies, but their growing importance at the beginning of the twentieth 
century is chiefly linked to their spreading into other sectors: steel, chemicals, 
electricity generating companies.^^
It is suggested that the ingénieurs' influence within corporations was related less to 
their technical training than to their administrative experience. Their function as 
mining inspectors had acquainted them not only with social legislation but with the 
organisation, management and financing of firms. Consequently the ingénieurs had 
over other civil servants the advantage of sound scientific and technical knowledge 
and over other engineers the advantage of understanding the running of 
corporations.^^
Research conducted by Friedberg and Desjeux in the early 1970s, together with an 
examination of the Annuaires du Corps des Mines for the years 1980-1986, show 
that trends apparent in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries continued 
into the mid-1980s.^^ Although trained for public service with the purpose of 
representing state authority in the mining industry, the majority of ingénieurs 
abandoned traditional areas and moved into more prestigious or dynamic sectors. 
In 1986 the ingénieurs occupied posts of responsibility in several very influential 
areas of French society: the top civil service, teaching and research, public and 
private sector companies. In all categories they showed a preference for the 
industrial sector, whether at the Ministry of Industry, in teaching posts at the Ecole 
des Mines and research centres attached to vital industries, for example, 
Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique (CEA), Institut Français du Pétrole (IFP), or in 
top management posts in public and private sector corporations. An analysis of the 
positions occupied by the ingénieurs within these categories confirm the above- 
mentioned trend towards a generalisation of their expertise (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2, 
pp. 294 and 295).
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The Top Administration
As far as the top administration was concerned, the ingénieurs were concentrated 
particularly in the Ministry of Industry and were to be found in all departments, in the 
post of director, assistant director or departmental director. These departments 
were the Direction de i'Energie et des Matières Premières (concerned with the 
different sources of energy), the Direction Générale de ('industrie (representing the 
various branches of industry), and the Direction de la Qualité et de la Sécurité 
Industrielle (responsible not only for industrial security but also for nuclear 
installations). The ingénieurs were also to be found in regional departments of 
industry, where they occupied the post of director or had special responsibility for 
industrial development, environment, nuclear questions, energy or the management 
of mineral resources. In 1986 about one fifth (30 out of 153) of those in 
administrative posts were to be found in other ministries. Environment, Research 
and Technology, Justice, Posts and Telecommunications, Agriculture, Urban 
Planning and as many as six in the Prime Minister's cabinet office.^®
As regards the distribution of ingénieurs in the different administrative departments, 
Friedberg and Desjeux' research reveals important tendencies which persisted into 
the 1980s. It is obvious that the traditional functions of the Corps (Gestion des 
mines and Arrondissements minéralogiques*) decreased in relative importance, 
while the ingénieurs maintained their presence in the central administration of the 
Ministry of Industry and reinforced it in ministerial cabinets and other ministries. As 
far as administrative posts were concerned, therefore, evidence showed that the 
Corps des Mines had a deliberate policy to keep hold of the routine jobs, while 
simultaneously spreading its influence by a diversification of its functions, with an 
emphasis upon those with access to power (see Table 3.3, p. 296).
This is one of the official tasks of the Corps des Mines and consists of 
making security checks on heavy lorries
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Public or parapubllc sector
A further table compiled by Friedberg and Desjeux shows the distribution of 
ingénieurs des Mines in the public or parapublic sector which covers, in the first 
category, teaching and research and, in the second, managerial functions in public 
companies. The figures reveal the reversal in importance of the two categories 
between 1949 and 1970. That is, while managerial functions in public companies 
absorbed two-thirds of ingénieurs in 1949, this proportion had fallen to 43% by 
1970. On the other hand, teaching and research had grown in importance. This 
trend was still obvious in 1986. The figures also show that, as regards management 
posts in public companies, there was a decline in the number of ingénieurs in 
traditional areas, for example, mining, while their presence was reinforced in the 
more advanced sectors - oil and nuclear. Moreover, the trend was apparent at two 
levels, both in the management of firms and in industrial research connected to 
these two areas. One can conclude that the ingénieurs readily abandoned sectors 
in decline to the benefit of more advanced areas and increased the importance they 
attached to research and innovation (see Table 3.4, p. 297).
A further trend mentioned by the authors, and borne out by a study of the 
Annuaires, was the steady increase in the number of ingénieurs des Mines in the 
banking and insurance sector and in activities on the periphery of industry, for 
example, management consultancy and engineering firms. These were areas not 
traditionally colonised by the Corps, yet an examination of the Annuaires over a 
seven-year period 1980-1986 shows that there was a 20%-30% increase in the 
number of ingénieurs in these sectors (see Table 3.5, p. 298).
The implications of this diversification of the ingénieurs du Corps des Mines in the 
administrative and industrial sectors were that the Corps was no longer identified 
with a single sector but with specific tasks. According to two directors of the Ecole
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des Mines, these tasks were: industrial policy of the state; strategy of large 
enterprises; technical and economic innovation.^®
Not only did these areas underline how far the Corps des Mines had moved from 
its original function, but also the diverse and constantly changing nature of the tasks 
it had appropriated. How the Corps was perceived by the outside world also 
confirmed its non-identification with a specific activity. In attempting to define the 
Corps des Mines, an official at the SNEA said:
"II n'y a pas de profession particulière exercée - on ne sait pas bien 
ce que c'est".^^
Rather than a weakness, this lack of specialisation was, paradoxically, a sign of 
strength. It constituted the Corps' ability to adapt and survive. The evolving nature 
of the above-mentioned tasks required the creation of constantly changing forms of 
expertise. In Thoenig's view, this capacity to diversify is the very hallmark of the 
Corps des Mines' prestige.
"Les ingénieurs des Mines sont le plus grand des Grands Corps 
techniques parce qu'ils s'occupent de beaucoup d'autres choses mais 
pratiquement plus guère des mines".^®
Self-management
In addition to their adaptability, what other features explain the Corps des Mines' 
capacity to occupy a wide variety of prestigious positions?
"Leurs carrières sont gérées de façon interne", said an official at the Compagnie 
Française des Pétroles (CFP).^® The internai organisation of the ingénieurs'irammg 
and careers was confirmed by a member of the Conseil des Mines as follows:
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"Nous jouons le rôle de service du personnel pour les ingénieurs des 
Mines. Depuis 1976 ce sont les mêmes personnes qui assurent la 
gestion du personnel et la formation des ingénieurs. . .  les ingénieurs 
sont nommés comme tous les hauts-fonctionnaires par le Président 
de la République sur notre rapport et ensuite c'est nous qui jouons le 
rôle de service du personnel pour la carrière, les possibilités d'emploi 
. . .  et puis tous les actes administratifs, les mutations, les 
avancements, les promotions, c'est nous qui nous en occupons ..
Evidence shows that the Conseil des Mines' control of training and careers was 
closely integrated into Corps strategies for spreading and maintaining its influence.
Training and post-training
Even prior to the 1970s, training had been modified in line with the greater 
diversification of the ingénieurs' activities. It had been simultaneously widened and 
personalised. New areas such as management, recherche orientée and optional 
courses had been introduced and greater importance attached to business 
placements.^^ In the late 1980s these developments had been taken further in order 
to make the course more concrete, personally adapted and relevant to future 
careers. According to a top manager (Corps des Mines) at the SNEA,
"o'est un menu à la carte... c'est plutôt fait soit pour les responsables 
d'administration polyvalents, soit des experts scientifiques sérieux de 
pointe, soit des capitaines d'industrie".^^
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The small number of students (16-17 per year) made close supervision and 
knowledge of individuals possible. For example, according to their interests and 
intended career, students had a choice of training placement in an industrial or 
commercial organisation. This could be in banking, as a commercial attaché in a 
foreign embassy or in an industrial laboratory. Students were also expected to 
undertake authentic pieces of research required by companies or administrative 
departments. For example, according to a young ingénieur, who joined the Corps 
des Mines In 1981 and occupied in 1986 a post of responsibility at the DHYCA, 
students were given projects to research which could not normally be carried out 
within the existing structures of companies. Two examples given were:
1. "la façon dont on fait les comptes en commerce extérieur".
2. "les pannes, problème industriel bien connu mais qui n'est jamais traité en 
tant que tel ou très rarement parce que ce n'est pas traitable dans le cadre 
des structures habituelles des enterprises".^^
It emerges from these developments that in the late 1980s the training course at the 
Ecole des Mines was similar to what one normally associates with the programme 
of a business school. Indeed, the Boole des Mines had established excellent 
relations with business organisations and industry and received substantial 
research grants from companies. (It seems that two-thirds of the Boole's revenue 
came from industry.) In the opinion of Suleiman, when one considered the influence 
of the Boole des Mines and the posts occupied by its former students, it was 
probably the most successful business school in France.^
A further point which emerged is that the training course for the majority was 
general rather than highly specialised. According to the young ingénieur quoted 
above:
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"Les grandes écoles formaient les généralistes, ne formaient pas les 
spécialistes . . .  X* forme des scientifiques assez généralistes et 
après à l'Ecole des Mines on peut se spécialiser dans un certain 
domaine mais la majorité ne le fait pas".
Apart from those who decide to devote themselves to research - about 25% of each 
promotion - specialisation would run counter to the wide variety of posts which the 
ingénieurs fill after training:
"Les ingénieurs-élèves occupent des postes extrêmement diversifiés 
qui font appel à des techniques variables, il est hors de question 
d'apprendre tout à tous les élèves et comme la répartition des postes 
se fait vraiment à la sortie, il est hors de question de faire une pré- 
spécialisation".^
The grand corps' attachment to a general competence is underlined by Suleiman, 
who highlights the contradiction between the generally accepted view that members 
of grands corps have received a specialised training and the fact that they succeed 
in carrying out a diversity of functions in society, as shown by the posts occupied 
by members of the Corps des Mines. If too narrow, specialisation would actually 
prevent members of the grands corps from being able to move easily from one 
sector to another.
Professional training implies a social as well as a practical and intellectual 
dimension. Interaction between members of the Corps during their initial training 
course and throughout their career is ensured by the Ecole des Mines. Esprit de 
corps or solidarity is a vital element in the corps' policy to reinforce links between 
members and forge new ones. According to the young ingénieur quoted above, 
solidarity is encouraged through the Amicale and a variety of social occasions:
" I lya une Amicale qui fonctionne bien, qui fait même des groupes de 
réflexion. Il y a des relations pas seulement professionnelles entre
The Ecole Polytechnique is known as "X" for short because of its badge 
of two crossed cannon.
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les ingénieurs des Mines. . .  moins les corps sont nombreux, plus ses 
liens sont serrés".^
A responsibility of those concerned with training is the placing of young ingénieurs 
in their first administrative post. This is a period of post-training, usually lasting four 
to five years, and offering experience of top administration and valuable contacts. 
It is generally accepted that, since the ingénieurs are paid during their training, they 
are expected to work for the Corps for a certain number of years before 
"pantouflage".
According to an official at the CFP, interviewed for this study:
"Tactiquement c'est la meilleure chose à faire. Ça permet d'observer, 
d'acquérir en douceur, ça n'aurait pas de sens de sortir du Corps des 
Mines et démissionner tout de suite et aller en enterprise . . .  ils ne 
retireraient pas les bénéfices de leur appartenance au Corps".^
While the Ministry of Industry is the obvious first destination, the ingénieurs have 
the possibility of moving to other ministries and, within the four to five-year period, 
of gaining close experience of the workings of different departments.^ For 
example, Gilles Bellec, was appointed over a six-year period to five different posts: 
in 1980 to the Ministère de ('Economie (ClAS! Comité Interministériel pour 
l'Aménagement des Structures Industrielles), in 1981 Chef de cabinet du Directeur 
Général des Télécommunications, in 1982 Conseiller technique auprès du Ministère 
délégué à l'Energie, in 1984 Directeur du Gaz, de l'Electricité et du Charbon at the 
Ministère de l'Industrie, in 1985 Directeur des Hydrocarbures."^^
The experience and contacts acquired are not only invaluable to the ingénieurs in 
their future careers, they are also of benefit to the Corps as a whole and to 
forthcoming promotions of young ingénieurs. They contribute to the creation of what 
Friedberg and Desjeux call the réseaux d'expertise.^^ It is to a large extent in these 
networks that the main influence of the Corps lies.
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Monopoly over posts
An essential function of the Conseil des Mines is to secure prestigious posts for its 
members, so that it will be in a position to attract candidates of the highest calibre 
by offering them a choice of interesting appointments. It is officially acknowledged 
that certain posts of responsibility within the Ministry of Industry will be occupied by 
the Ingénieurs du Corps des Mines, for example, the directorship of the DHYCA, of 
the Direction de l'Energie et des Matières Premières and of regional departments 
of the Ministry of Industry. On the unofficial side, however, there are many posts 
in other ministries, in ministerial cabinets and in public and private firms, which the 
Corps regards as its property, although these posts are also an object of 
competition with other grands corps. The Conseil des Mines, therefore, has to keep 
an eye, not only on the posts officially allocated to the Corps, but on those it has 
captured by some tacit agreement and which are in the Corps' interest to preserve.^
An effective tactic employed by the Conseil des Mines to preserve prestigious 
positions is to place ingénieurs of different ages in a firm, so that one can replace 
another at director level. According to an official at the CFP,
"il faut bien voir dans ces sociétés qu'on embauche régulièrement des 
ingénieurs du Corps des Mines à des âges différents pour que les 
gens soient étagés pour pouvoir un jour être directeur. . .  à la CFP et 
à Elf vous verrez qu'il y a des gens de tous âges. Autre secteur 
d'activité où il y a beaucoup d'ingénieurs du Corps des Mines, c'est 
la SNCF. Tous les directeurs généraux apparemment sont toujours 
des ingénieurs du Corps des Mines. Et là ce phénomène 
d'étagement il paraît que c'est très frappant, tous les 7 ans . . .  donc 
sauf gros problème ils sont assurés de parvenir au pouvoir".^
Another aspect of the Corps' role as an employment agency is that an influential 
figure in the Corps has the unofficial function of recommending and supporting 
appointments. He is referred to as le parrain and described in the following terms 
by an official at the SNEA:
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"le Corps considère qu'il y a un tel qui de par ses qualités 
personnelles, sa personnalité, son entregent, ses relations, les 
positions qu'il occupe est apte à faire ce métier et donc à avoir les 
entrées nécessaires pour régler les problèmes"/®
Both Pierre Guillaumat and André Giraud enjoyed this title.
Benefits
Corps members enjoy a range of personal advantages, confirming Thoenig's 
observation that "Le caste est d'une autre espèce que le commun des mortels".^ 
In addition to the prestigious posts, job mobility and valuable contacts already 
mentioned, benefits also include exceptionally high salaries, bonuses if the 
corpsard works in the administration, and job security.
Evidence shows that within companies members of grands corps have a salary 
scale of their own, above that of other company executives. According to the 
director of personnel at the CFP,
"la hiérarchie des salaires n'a rien à voir avec la hiérarchie des 
responsabilités. M. X qui est polytechnicien a une responsabilité de 
fonctionnel parce qu'il est polytechnicien. M. Y a une responsabilité 
opérationnelle beaucoup plus considérable, mais comme il n'est pas 
polytechnicien il a un salaire inférieur"/^
The Corps des Mines enjoys considerable financial autonomy through funds 
obtained from the arrondissements minéralogiques. This is one of the official tasks 
of the Corps and provides it with substantial funds which can be allocated to 
different areas. For example, the salary of those ingénieurs who work in the top 
administration can be supplemented to bring their income in line with those working 
in the private sector. This is an attempt to avoid too great a migration from the 
administration to the private sector. In addition, the funds can be used to 
supplement the financial resources of the Ecole des Mines by supporting different 
kinds of postgraduate training in the form of travel or study grants.
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According to Friedberg and Desjeux,
"Le Corps peut ainsi à chaque instant disposer des experts dont il a 
besoin dans de nombreux domaines, voire les former au fur et à 
mesure que la demande s'en fait sentir".^
A further benefit is job security, that is, a member of the Corps des Mines is unlikely 
ever to be unemployed. This point was confirmed by an official at the CFP 
interviewed for this study:
"Quoiqu'ils fassent, ils auront toujours la sécurité d'emploi, ils ne 
seront jamais blâmés . .. Moi je n'aurai jamais la chance d'avoir un 
poste qu'ils peuvent avoir. Par contre on peut les voir faire des fautes 
absolument gigantesques et rester en place".^®
Job security as a benefit is also confirmed by Suleiman's evidence:
"Regardless of their competence, or of attempts at other careers that 
may not always be wholly successful, they can always return to the 
bosom of their Corps ''^
One should add that the careers of those who resign from the Corps 
(démissionaires) are no longer "managed" by the Conseil. These are ingénieurs 
who have taken up posts in the private sector. They made up about 50% of the 
Corps des Mines in 1986. However, Thoenig points out that
"... même si I'individu en vient à démissioner, à quitter formellement 
son statut de fonctionnaire, socialement et psychologiquement, il 
restera perçu comme un membre de la tribu, comme une maille du 
réseau".®^
The fact that the Conseil des Mines is responsible for the training of the ingénieurs- 
élèves, that it has personal knowledge of each one of them, that it organises their 
career in its initial stages and in its entirety, if they choose to remain in state 
service, are the bases of the Corps' independence and capacity to manage itself. 
The content of the training course reveals the Corps des Mines' adaptability and
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capacity to exploit simultaneously a specific and a general competence. These 
features have enabled the Corps to place its members in a wide variety of posts and 
build an extensive network of contacts in the worlds of government and big 
business. As demonstrated, the Corps employs a variety of tactics to preserve 
these contacts and constantly to create new ones. Its considerable financial 
autonomy and capacity to offer prestigious posts and many other advantages to its 
members creates between the two sides allegiance and mutual dependence. The 
evidence provided bears out Thoenig's comment that "L'intérêt du groupe passe par 
celui de ses membres et vice versa. L'un travaille pour l'autre".
Consequences
What were the consequences for government-industry relations of the Corps des 
Mines capacity to diversify its activities and monopolise posts? In his discussion 
of the effects of technocratic action, Thoenig refers to "la transformation des 
responsabilités exercées par les individus en quasi-propriété du groupe".^ That 
is, the creation of strongholds where Corps members occupied decision-making 
positions. As already shown, the ingénieurs du Corps des Mines were to be found 
throughout the heavy industry and energy sectors, both in top posts in the relevant 
departments of the Industry Ministry and at director level in public-sector firms under 
its tutelle. Taking the state oil sector as our example, we shall show first that at the 
time our research was conducted (1986-88), it was a stronghold of the Corps des 
Mines, and, second, discuss the positive and negative consequences for 
government-industry relations.
A glance at the positions occupied in 1986 by the 19 ingénieurs du Corps des Mines 
in the SNEA shows that, not only the Chairman and Vice-Chairman belonged to the 
Corps, but also the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of ERAP (holding company), the 
Chairman of ATOCHEM, as well as the directors of strategic areas, namely Europe, 
the United States and Nigeria.^ Moreover, of the fourteen members of the Comité 
Exécutif, five were ingénieurs du Corps des Mines.
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Strongholds imply continuity of leadership. If one looks back over the history of the 
group it is noticeable that from its beginnings there were ingénieurs du Corps des 
Mines in the key posts.
The three founders of the BRP in 1945, all "X" Mines, were still involved in the state 
oil company's development 30 years later. Table 3.6, p. 299 confirms their 
continuity and "logical" career path from the top administration to key posts in 
public-sector firmS; An official at the SNEA, interviewed for this study, referred to 
"le noyau qui a impulsé le groupe" or a collective ambition born of a common 
training and interests.
Tout ceci n'a pu se faire que par une volonté animée effectivement 
par des gens ayant cette formation commune, ces relations étroites, 
cette appartenance sans quoi on n'aurait pas pu le faire ... il y a bien 
eu une volonté délibérée et ça c'est une création du Corps des Mines 
... C'est cette volonté de remédier à cette carence géologique qui est 
née chez eux dans la formation qu'ils ont obtenue, dans cette 
collégialité.^
Not only had several leaders of the state oil group received the same training and 
joined the same grand corps, but they also shared the same corps d'origine as 
those occupying posts of responsibility at the DHYCA. For example, in 1986, the 
following posts were filled by ingénieurs des Mines:
Direction des Hydrocarbures 
Directeur Gilles Bellec
Directeur (Service de prospection-production) Dominique Henri
Directeur (Service de la prévision) Claire Hocquard®^
The director of the DYHCA, as explained in Chapter 3, was one of the
Commissaires du Gouvernement of the SNEA, and by tradition an ingénieur du 
Corps des Mines. Pointing out this "colonisation" of the DHYCA by the Corps des 
Mines, an official at the SNEA remarked.
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"Les deux groupes pétroliers ont des relations très étroites avec cette 
administration du Corps des Mines qui est le grand corps du Ministère 
de l'Industrie dont la DHYCA est l'instrument exclusif. Il n'y a 
quasiment que des ingénieurs des Mines dans les fonctions 
importantes à la DHYCA. De ce fait on se connaît, on se tutoie".®®
The implications for government-firm relations of the fact that people with the same 
training occupied key posts in public corporations and in their ministère de tutelle 
is that top civil servants and company leaders knew and understood one another. 
The tradition of pantouflage further reinforces these links with benefits for both 
sides. As a SNEA official remarked,
"Dans une entreprise publique il y a plus de gens qui viennent de la 
fonction publique que dans une entreprise privée. Les fonctionnaires 
aident en ce sens qu'ils créent un système de relations privilégiées 
avec leur corps d'origine ... c'est l'intérêt d'avoir des fonctionnaires, 
c'est de créer avec l'administration des liens privilégiés
The three young ingénieurs du Corps des Mines mentioned above would have been 
welcomed by the firm for other reasons. They had a good technical knowledge of 
the oil sector, they understood the working of large corporations and they had 
experience of and contacts in the top administration, a useful asset in negotiations 
with government officials:
"Ça permet de recueillir des gens bien qui en plus de par leurs 
fonctions ont déjà été formés à notre métier et ont été formés dans un 
poste où ils ont vu beaucoup de choses".®®
Pantouflage was therefore extremely valuable to the top management of the SNEA 
and, as demonstrated in Chapter 2 (see p. 142), contributed to the support which 
the firm enjoyed from its supervisory ministry.
It is therefore no surprise that officials interviewed for this study should have 
emphasized the relationship of trust and complicity which habitually existed 
between the state oil group and its ministère de tutelle:
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"Les anciens chefs de la DHYCA, ils vous disent clairement que leur 
rôle n'était pas d'être des cerbères, des inquisiteurs ... il y avait un 
jugement sur le comportement de l'entreprise et sur la confiance 
qu'on pouvait faire aux hommes qui conduisaient, à être plus souple 
vis-à-vis de certains hommes que vis-à-vis d'autres".®^
Easy communications with the top administration was a related benefit of the liens 
privilégiés and possibly the most frequently mentioned by top managers in the state 
oil sector. Referring to the ingénieurs du Corps des Mines an official at the SNEA 
described them as,
"un milieu très homogène et qui communique bien"
and remarked that,
"... une entreprise de grande dimension comme nous, si elle n'avait 
pas d'ingénieurs des Mines, c'est un cas extrême, elle serait très 
gênée parce que pour correspondre avec l'administration française 
il faudrait créer les liens très difficiles avec des gens du Corps des 
Mines. Pour correspondre avec certaines grandes sociétés voisines 
il faudrait faire la même chose, donc il est intéréssant pour nous 
d'avoir un certain nombre d'ingénieurs des Mines qui assurent cette 
liaison ... ça évite les blocages ... on va plus vite avec 
l'administration".®^
This efficiency of operation has been, in the opinion of Friedberg and Desjeux, the 
chief asset of the grands corps. It stems from their capacity to exercise control 
through their network of contacts, enabling them to simplify the growing complexity 
of government decision-making processes. Increasingly, groups and individuals 
representing different interests had to be brought together in negotiations. This led 
to the "horizontalisation" of administrative structures, that is, the creation of 
interm in isterial bodies, ad hoc committees, consultative groups. In the opinion of 
the authors two kinds of administrative structure appeared, the one formal, 
bureaucratic and highly compartmentalised, the other informal, flexible and fluid. 
Increasingly decision-making processes were obliged to make use of the latter, and 
it is here that Friedberg and Desjeux see the importance of the grands corps. They
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operate like one large family with contacts in several fields whom they can consult 
easily and efficiently, whether it be a question of obtaining information, passing on 
ideas or exerting an influence; "leur expertise devient précisément la possession 
de cette capacité relationnelle".®^
A central question posed by writers on the grands corps is whether they pursued 
specific policies. Did the complicity between the state oil company and its 
supervisory ministry, together with specialised knowledge of the oil sector, which 
they jointly developed, enable members of the Corps des Mines to impose their 
choices on successive governments, in order to maintain their monopoly over the 
sector for their own career advantage? The development of the French nuclear 
industry, in which members of the Corps des Mines always occupied positions of 
responsibility, is cited as an extreme example of technocratic action.®^
Certainly while Pierre Guillaumat was influential in the state oil sector - for almost 
thirty years - members of the Corps des Mines in government and public-sector 
companies shaped national oil policy. The impetus given to exploration in French 
territories, the creation of a state-owned refining and distribution branch to capture 
a share of the national market, greater concentration of companies and increased 
internationalisation, were due to collusion between top civil servants in the Ministry 
of Industry and state oil-company leaders.
From the late 1970s, however, the picture became less clear. Other forces were as 
important in shaping the Elf group as that of building up a national champion in oil, 
namely less support from government for public-sector firms, the realisation by 
company top management of the need for an increasingly market-oriented 
approach, for wider diversification and the capture of foreign markets. The 
management of the SNEA was not dissimilar from that of a private multinational oil 
group.
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What then was the main contribution of the Corps des Mined presence in the state 
oil sector? Our evidence certainly shows that, as the Elf group expanded through 
mergers and takeovers, the number of ingénieurs in the company rose (see Table 
3.7, p. 300). This evidence concurs with that of Suleiman, who demonstrates that 
the grands corps defend career advantages for their members, and with that of 
Kosciusko-Morizet, who shows that the polytechniciens tend to maintain their pre­
eminence through the amalgamation of firms rather than through the creation of 
independent companies.®® In addition, as subsequent chapters show, over the long 
term, there was a remarkable convergence between the policies of the state oil 
group and that of successive French governments. In other words, the French state 
and big business shared the same goals of industrial growth, although the means 
by which this growth was achieved evolved from a statist to a more market-directed 
one. Therefore, the clearest contribution of the Corps des Mined presence in the 
oil sector is that it facilitated collaboration between government and large 
companies. This point was confirmed by Simonnot in Le Complot Pétrolier, where 
he showed that, in the second half of the 1970s, when French government policy 
aimed to liberalise the state oil sector, the influence of the Corps des Mines was to 
implement the denationalisation of ELF-ERAP, an établissement public, through 
amalgamation with the Société Nationale des Pétroles d'Aquitaine, one of its largely 
private subsidiaries.®® Not only did this development conform with government 
economic policy, it also enhanced the size and financial health of the state-owned 
group. Therefore, in addition to facilitating communication between the sectors of 
government and industry, the Corps des Mines ensured that the objectives of both 
coincided.
Although the good relations between sectors of government and the state oil 
industry stemming from shared goals, were beneficial to the growth of the SNEA, 
corps pratices and the similarity of training between government and company 
officials have several drawbacks. The politique de parachutage, complacency, 
introversion, an unbusinesslike approach to business and corps rivalry were
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considered by certain officials interviewed as weaknesses of the elitist system and 
responsible for the failings of French industry.
Since the grands corps* main objective is to acquire prestigious positions for their 
members, an ingénieur des Mines may be "parachuted" into a company director's 
post, not only from outside the organisation, but without having had to climb the 
echelons of office. Consequently, the new director may lack real knowledge of the 
post, while experienced staff within the firm are excluded from appointment to a 
position "captured" by the Corps des Mines. The result can be inefficiency and 
demotivation, as a SNEA official remarked:
"... premièrement, il vaut mieux avoir des gens qui connaissent les 
métiers dans lesquels ils vont travailler, deuxièmement, vis-à-vis des 
gens en place, l'arrivée d'un nouveau venu qui ne connaît rien et qui 
est nommé directeur veut dire qu'il n'y a pas de carrière, que les gens 
qui sont arrivés à un certain niveau seront de toute façon plafonnés 
par des rentrants arbitraires".®^
Security of employment and other advantages offered by the grands corps to their 
members can lead to complacency in the key positions they occupy. Moreover, a 
feeling of superiority arising from the knowledge that they were the most brilliant 
students of their generation can produce an attitude of non-accountability. As a 
public official remarked, "... ils sont moins soumis à la nécessité de se justifier de 
façon permanente ... ça peut induire un certain confort intellectuel".®®
Grands corps members are regarded by non-members as protected from the risks 
of the business world:
"Leur maison principale c'est le corps, ce n'est pas Elf. L'effet c'est 
comme sur un bateau si le commandant a une ceinture de sauvetage 
plus grosse que celle de l'équipage".®®
Although easy communication between government and company officials 
contributes to the smooth running of affairs, if circumstances change, mutual
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support and a similarity of vision can create introversion, immobility and 
conservatism. The economic growth in France during the trente glorieuses has 
been attributed in part to the cohesion between industrial and government circles. 
However, the world recession since 1973 brought unstable conditions to which 
certain sectors of French industry did not readily adjust. As a SNEA director 
remarked,
"Dès que ces croissances se sont rompues le système s'est 
complètement effondré puisqu'il y avait une inertie considérable. La 
sidérurgie est un bel exemple, l'industrie dominée par le Corps des 
Mines pendant longtemps a continué à faire comme si de rien n'était 
et n'a pas fait le mouvement de repli et de changement qu'auraient 
imposé les circonstances".^®
How were circumstances different? A major development was France's increasing 
exposure to competition from international markets, in the face of which the French 
steel industry in particular was slow to react. According to the official quoted above:
"A partir du moment où depuis 10-15 ans le problème des industries 
c'est de vivre à l'extérieur, cet avantage (cohésion interne) devient un 
inconvénient. Il vaudrait mieux avoir à la tète de Sacilor un 
Japonais
The world economic crisis also brought a considerable slowing down in demand, so 
that projects based on long-term growth confronted difficulties of adaptation. The 
same official used the example of the French nuclear industry, another stronghold 
of the Corps des Mines. Here it was a collusion néfaste between trade unionists 
and grands corps de l'Etat, both very conservative in outlook, which produced a 
nuclear industry far exceeding demand:
"on peut leur imputer des programmes comme le programme 
nucléaire français, exagéré parce que là encore une bonne cohésion 
entre l'administration et les syndicats de gauche a permis de monter 
un programme nucléaire inégalé, le premier du monde ... et comme 
toujours ce programme s'avère non adapté aux circonstances".^^
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On their own admission, a sense of public service, instilled into members of the 
Grands Corps during their training, contributed to an anti-capitalist approach to 
business. According to a director at the SNEA, an ingénieur du Corps des Mines,
"On a tous une préoccupation de l'intérêt national. On a été formé 
dans les écoles à faire du droit public, étudier la jurisprudence. On 
a passé les premières années de notre vie au service de la 
collectivité publique. Ça donne de ce fait un certain détachement par 
rapport aux affaires - on regarde toujours un peu l'intérêt national
The same official explained this sense of national interest as follows:
"Les corpsards ont une certaine notion du service public, une certaine 
responsabilité. Ils disent qu'il ne faut pas licencier les gens, il est 
hors de question d'arrêter une entreprise, quelle que soit la mauvaise 
santé de l'entreprise ... ils sont rarement de véritables capitalistes".^^
The ingénieur des Mines quoted above remarked that the Grands Corps training 
can be ill-adapted to the cut-throat world of business:
"Cette préoccupation de l'intérêt national contribue à cette tare parce 
que dans l'industrie de temps en temps il ne faut pas seulement 
regarder l'intérêt collectif, il faut aussi tirer des coups de façon un peu 
brutale et nous, on ne sait pas très bien faire ... les grands corps de 
l'Etat ne sont pas des requins industriels, il sont un peu trop gentils
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A major drawback of the elitist system is corps competition. Rivalry between grands 
corps arises from the fact that professional training is general rather than 
specialised. The result is that different grands corps compete for a limited number 
of top positions. The power struggles between Albin Chalandon, chairman of Elf 
(1977-1983), and André Giraud, Industry Minister (1977-1981), referred to in 
Chapters 5 and 6, arose from the fact that Giraud, an ingénieur du Corps des Mines, 
had been Guillaumat's preferred successor on his retirement. President Giscard 
d'Estaing, however, generally unsupportive of the state oil sector, favoured 
Chalandon, a former Inspecteur des Finances, and more ideologically akin to his
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own tastes for economic liberalism. The appointment of Chalandon was considered 
a loss and an affront to the Corps des Mines. Similarly, in 1989, the replacement 
of Jean-Pierre Capron, X-Mines and head of the CE A, a stronghold of the Corps 
des Mines, by an Inspecteur des Finances was described as une gifle - literally a 
slap in the face - towards the Corps des MinesJ^
It is unclear to what extent conflicts of this nature arose from rivalry over posts, 
policy differences or conflicts of personality. Events show, however, that corps 
competition produced divisions and inconsistencies in the policy-making process, 
as shown by the Kerr Magee episode (see chapter 2, pp. 138-141) and saga 
surrounding the group's diversifications (see chapter 5, pp.235-240). In the former 
case the attempt to expand in the US failed in 1979, but was successful two years 
later, because Industry Minister Giraud had been succeeded by Pierre Dreyfus 
(Minister of Industry 1981-1982), who was allegedly more sympathetic to 
Chalandon, having himself been chairman of another public-sector company, 
Renault.
Does our evidence confirm or contradict the technocratic myth? Have Elf s leaders 
conformed to the technocratic model? Is a state-created elite appropriate for the 
current world of market competition and privatisation?
We have shown that in 1986 all members of the Corps des Mines at the SNEA were 
in key positions. Moreover, their number had increased as the group expanded 
through mergers and acquisitions (see Table 3.7, p. 300). We have also shown that 
up to 1976 - until then the state oil sector was entirely in public ownership - 
members of the Corps des Mines not only occupied virtually all the positions of 
control in the group but also shaped French oil policy. Their collaboration with 
government had contributed to the development of a "national champion" in oil. 
Even ten years later, in 1986, when public ownership had fallen to 56%, officials still 
stressed the importance of the group's privileged links with government, maintained 
largely by the ingénieurs du Corps des Mines.
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However, in pointing out the weaknesses of the elitist system, officials interviewed 
suggested that, by the late 1980s, the Corps des Mines had in many respects not 
adapted to the more competitive conditions of international business, but had 
remained conservative in outlook and protective of their positions. In addition, 
comparisons made between Elf and other oil companies at the same time also 
revealed that the group was more inward-looking than certain of its foreign 
competitors. It was smaller, it had not internationalised to the same extent, it was 
too concentrated on Africa for exploration and France for refining and distribution. 
Moreover, there were no foreigners on Elfs executive committee, only 
Polytechniciens and Enarques^
However, we have also shown that Elfs creation, development and expansion was 
largely due to collaboration between members of the Corps des Mines in Elfs top 
management and the Ministry of Industry. Furthermore, the group's record by the 
late 1980s was not insignificant. It figured among France's top companies in 
turnover and profits. It occupied ninth place at world level among oil companies. 
Moreover, it had successfuly surmounted the vicissitudes of the world oil industry 
by diversifying into chemicals and pharmaceuticals.^® This was not the record of a 
group run by unbusinesslike, non-accountable technocrats, removed from reality 
and secure in the privileges they enjoyed.
Perhaps the answer lies with top executives from within and outside the Corps des 
Mines whose career had been spent largely in France's state oil sector. Interviewed 
between 1986 and 1988, they considered that members of the Corps des Mines at 
Elf did not conform to the technocratic image, but were a very heterogeneous group: 
"... dire le Corps des Mines, c'est déjà une erreur" and "Il ne faut pas croire que 
tout le Corps des Mines est un et indivisible comme la République".^®
In the opinion of a member of Elfs Comité Exécutif, himself an ingénieur du Corps 
des Mines, the capacities of his fellow Corpsards were extremely varied:
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"C'est un corps d'individus, il n'y a pas un comportement 
standard, collectif. C'est une bande d'individus qui ont quand 
même quelques facilités dites intellectuelles ... il y en a qui ont 
réussi avec une somme d'efforts importants, il y en a d'autres 
qui ont vraiment beaucoup de facilités".®®
The view that members of the grands corps were the best candidates for the posts 
they filled was erroneous. They could behave with varying degrees of competence, 
and membership of a grand corps was not necessarily a guarantee of the skills 
needed to run a company.
"Ce qui est néfaste c'est qu'on veuille dans certains esprits considérer 
que l'appartenance à un grand corps est un brevet de capacité à tout 
faire alors que c'est certainement un brevet de capacité de travail, de 
niveau intellectuel, de mémoire ... ce n'est pas nécessairement un 
brevet de jugement et qu'à l'intérieur de ce grand corps il peut y avoir 
des gens qui feront d'excellents hauts-fonctionnaires, d'excellents 
professeurs à Sciences-Po ou ailleurs, il y en a qui feront de grands 
industriels, de grands financiers ...".®^
In the competitive conditions of the late 1980s, although membership of a grand 
corps, such as the Corps des Mines, facilitated appointment to positions of 
responsibility, the leaders of top companies had still to prove themselves on the job.
"Ils sont plus vite admis à la tète d'une filiale, ensuite s'ils réussissent 
ils sont peut-être plus vite dans les grandes directions du groupe mais 
je crois qu'on les teste assez sérieusement à l'intérieur de 
l'entreprise".®^
"Dans ce monde moderne il sera de plus en plus difficile de 
parachuter des gens. Il faut avoir été immergé au sein des affaires 
pendant de nombreuses années pour y apporter réellement une 
valeur ajoutée".®®
What is more, the Corps des Mines was conscious of its reputation, so those who 
fell short of its image of excellence were known to have been dismissed abruptly.
"Le Corps a aussi un intérêt de sa présentation, de sa crédibilité et 
notamment un homme comme Guillaumat, moi je l'ai vu virer des gens
181
du Corps des Mines de manière très sèche parce qu'ils étaient 
ingénieurs des Mines et pas au niveau qu'il aurait souhaité".®^
"Une fois que les gens du Corps sont intégrés dans des entreprises 
et y ont fait carrière, leur problème c'est du faire vivre l'entreprise 
dans laquelle ils sont. En aucun cas ils ne mettraient quelqu'un du 
Corps des Mines s'ils jugeaient que ça risquait de compromettre 
l'avenir de l'entreprise".®®
In addition, the Mafia-like practices - widely acknowledged as a characteristic of all 
the grands corps - may not have been as prevalent as is believed. According to an 
official of long-standing at the SNEA, the shrewder ingénieurs in posts of 
responsibility, aware of their lack of expertise in certain areas, would associate 
themselves with colleagues having complementary skills:
"Une des choses qui m'a frappé chez un certain nombre de Mineurs, 
c'est que les plus intelligents sont capables de s'abstraire de cette 
situation en s'adjoignant aussi les gens d'autres origines à titre de 
complémentarité".
Career mobility, resulting from an attachment to a general competence, was a 
further characteristic refuted by officials at the SNEA. Many ingénieurs du Corps 
des Mines inElfs top management in 1988 had been with the company for the 
greater part of their career. "La plupart des ingénieurs du Corps des Mines ont fait 
toute leur carrière dans la maison ... ils sont entrés dans le groupe et ils y sont 
restés".®^
The reason given was that the oil industry is notoriously complex and takes many 
years to understand.
"Toutes les grandes sociétés pétrolières forment leurs dirigeants. La 
formation est très longue et il faut que les gens aient parcouru tous 
les cycles de la vie et de l'histoire pétrolière pour essayer d'en 
comprendre un peu la consistence".®®
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C o n c lu ding  Remarks
A more balanced view of the ingénieurs du Corps des Mines emerges from these 
comments. They do not all come to type. They perform differently and display a 
variety of talents. Knowledge and experience of the oil business and proven 
management skills came to be considered as indispensable to Elfs top executives. 
At the end of the 1980s Elfs rating as a French company and its place at world level 
showed that its top managers had adapted in several areas to more competitive 
economic conditions. The oil industry is essentially global. In order to survive oil 
companies have had to be not only very profitable, but also very flexible. A sign of 
E lfs strength in the late 1980s was that, although relatively young, it was able to 
survive alongside more powerful, established companies. It would not have 
achieved this relatively strong position, unless its top managers had been 
personally committed to the company’s success.
Throughout this analysis we have stressed the importance for Elf of the ingénieurs 
des Mines' privileged links with government. We have shown that the government- 
company partnership was also an essential factor in Elfs achievements. 
Successive French governments' disengagement from the affairs of industry 
through privatisation - which began for Elf in 1976 - made the ingénieurs des Mines  ^
role less appropriate and presented the Corps with new challenges.
From the late 1970s the SNEA underwent radical changes in both its mission and 
structure. This evolution anticipated the rapid liberalisation of the French economy 
from the mid-1980s. From being a hydrocarbon supplier, Elfs role widened to 
become that of "une entreprise de développement de l'économie française" (1981- 
1982). Its activities became increasingly more international and diversified. Tighter 
budgets forced both governments and companies to adopt more market-oriented 
policies. The sales of state shares in Elfs capital in 1976 and 1986 were 
symptomatic of this trend. Consequently, government support for France's oil 
"champion" was progressively reduced, culminating in Elfs privatisation in 1994.
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We noted in Chapter 2 (see pp. 146-147) that the gradual dismantling of the 1928 
laws governing the import and distribution of oil products brought an end to Elfs 
protected share of the French market. Yet regulation of the oil sector was a 
responsibility reserved for top officials at the DHYGA, a stronghold of the Corps des 
Mines. The speciality of the ingénieurs des Mines was becoming less relevant. 
This evolution reflected important developments in France; the decline of heavy 
industry, the ascendancy of the financier to the detriment of the ingénieur, and the 
devaluing of public service.®® In addition, many of the Corps des Mines' strongholds 
have been lost through competition with Enarques. Since 1977, three of the four 
chairmen of Elf have not belonged to the Corps des Mines, and two have been 
Inspecteurs des Finances. However, regarding the appointment in 1989 of an 
Inspecteur des Finances to the directorship of the CE A, a stronghold of the Corps 
des Mines, an official of the Corps remarked,
"Pour le CEA, il y avait dans le privé une bonne trentaine de membres 
du Corps capables de tenir le poste, mais ils ne se battaient pas pour 
y aller. Les camarades les plus brillants sont dans la banque et le 
privé".®®
At the end of the 1980s the ingénieurs du Corps des Mines were looking for new 
outlets. However, they were operating in an unfavourable environment. The best 
elements were no longer attracted to posts in the top administration nor in public- 
sector firms. Their traditional specialism had lost its prestige. Remuneration in the 
civil service was poor compared with posts in private companies. Sectors in which 
they were attempting to move, such as banking, were strongholds of their 
formidable rivals, the Enarques. In addition, their scientific training was considered 
inappropriate to what the business world had become. According to a former 
minister and eminent member of the Corps des Mines,
"They do not know how to talk or to project themselves. It's an 
enormous handicap in an increasingly media-dominated society".®^
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CHAPTER 4 
THE MULTINATIONAL DIMENSION: GOVERN MENT-COM PAN Y 
STRATEGIES IN AN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
How did Elf and successive French governments interact in the international 
sphere? This chapter will show that government both supported and hindered Elfs 
international expansion. Yet, by exploiting the convergence of its goals with those 
of the French state, Elf extended its activities abroad. Furthermore, by means of its 
international dimension. Elf achieved considerable autonomy vis-à-vis its major 
shareholder and in certain areas even took over the role of government. 
Paradoxically, the group's identity as a French public sector company favoured its 
internationalisation. However, the Single European Act and rapid liberalisation of 
world trade from the mid-1980s brought about a weakening of the state link in 
France. How did these developments affect the government-company partnership?
In discussing government-company interaction in the international sphere, we must 
take into account the Elf group's identity. During the decade with which we are 
concerned, 1976-86, the SNEA belonged to that category of companies which were 
both public and multinational. State ownership of the group stood at 67% up to 
1986. That year it was reduced to 56% through partial privatisation. The SNEA 
could also be identified as a multinational according to a range of criteria: 
possession of subsidiaries abroad, the realisation of 50% of its turnover abroad, the 
planning and management of its activities on a world scale\ Furthermore, since its 
beginnings, the group's main activity in oil and gas exploration and production made 
it the ideal field of activity for the multinational company. According to J.M. 
Chevalier, whether a country is in the position of an importer like France or an 
exporter like Saudi Arabia, oil is a world industry. The reason is that if one leaves 
aside the USA and Russia, the zones of greatest consumption. Western Europe and 
Japan, do not correspond with the zones of greatest production, the Middle East 
and Africa, and oil has to be transported by pipeline and tanker. What is more, the 
industry has several levels: exploration, production, transportation by sea, refining 
and marketing, and each phase may be located in a different place. In addition, it 
is a multi-product industry. This plurality of finished products means a plurality of 
markets. Furthermore, it is a highly capital-intensive industry. Entry into the oil
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sector demands large amounts of capital at every stage and this is a barrier which 
can only be surmounted by powerful financial groups^.
The scale of E lfs international activities in 1987 are an apt illustration of the 
characteristics mentioned above. That year the SNEA realised at least half its 
turnover from its international activities which extended over some 50 countries^. 
In fact all five branches of the group, oil and gas exploration and production, 
processing and marketing of oil and gas, heavy and fine chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals and cosmetics. Elf Aquitaine Inc., had an important international 
dimension^. The last of these - Elf Aquitaine Inc., a diversified mining and 
chemicals group - is actually situated in the US. The original and what was in 1987 
still the most important branch, exploration and production, depended almost 
entirely for its resources on the outside world. This branch had prospection 
activities in 30 countries and production activities in half of these®. Europe and 
West Africa were the most productive zones, the greater part of E lfs crude oil 
coming from the Gulf of Guinea and its gas from the North Sea®. It is for this reason 
that among Elfs most important foreign subsidiaries were the following:
Elf Aquitaine Norge - Norway
Elf U.K. - Britain
Petroland - Holland
Elf Gabon - Gabon
Elf Congo - Congo
Elf Nigeria - Nigeria
Elf Serepca - Cameroon
Elf Aquitaine Angola - Angola
As regards the refining and distribution branch, while most of the group's activity 
took place in France, it also had a share in refineries in several African countries, 
Morocco, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Gabon and Congo. The connection 
between this African bias of Elfs activities and the French Government's political, 
military and economic involvement in the affairs of many of these countries is 
therefore no accident, nor is the connection with political corruption in France
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fortuitous, in addition to 6,400 sales outlets in France, it had distribution 
subsidiaries in Germany, Britain, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Spain and Nigeria^. 
An aspect of Elfs refining activity is international trading in crude oil and finished 
products. International trading has developed in recent years for two reasons: the 
crude oil produced by the group has not necessarily been of the quality required in 
its refineries and the group naturally aims to sell the crude oil it produces at the best 
price®. Originally Elf was self-sufficient. It supplied its refineries with crude oil 
produced by its own exploration companies. As prices became volatile and markets 
developed, it became more profitable to trade with others. In 1987 only a third of 
the crude oil processed in E lfs refineries was produced by the group's production 
subsidiaries, while two-thirds were acquired on the international market®.
As regards the group's chemical interests which received their present form as a 
result of the restructuring of the French chemical industry in the early 1980s, they 
are the concern of its subsidiary Atochem, whose chief activity is heavy and 
speciality chemicals. Elf Aquitaine Inc., the group's American branch, also has 
important chemical interests, covering the production of sulphur and phosphates 
and speciality chemicals. Sanofi is the pharmaceuticals branch of Elf but its 
subsidiaries also include bioindustries, perfumes and cosmetics. In 1987 both 
Atochem and Sanofi achieved 50% of their turnover outside France^®.
Although the extent of the SNEA's operations abroad in the late 1980s justified its 
identity as a multinational company, evidence provided by E lfs officials showed a 
division of opinion regarding the group's true character. For some there was a 
reluctance to use the term "multinational" and an emphasis on the group's 
"Frenchness". According to Michel Pecqueur, SNEA chairman 1983-89, Elf was
"un groupe français par son lieu d'établissement comme par sa 
direction."
and
"un groupe international par ses activités dans plus de 50 pays."^^
For another official, the SNEA was "à base française". There was a "culture 
française dominante" in its foreign subsidiaries where French nationals occupied
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the main decision-making posts. By contrast, according to the same official, the 
true private multinational not only operated in several countries but had decision­
making centres throughout the world. Furthermore, it had no predominant 
nationality. In his opinion, the term "multinational" had pejorative connotations 
implying,
"une certaine déresponsabilité de la société où chaque filiale 
travaillait pour ses propres intérêts et non pas pour l'intérêt du pays 
d'origine de la société.
Yet another official defined Elfs character as follows:
"on est une entreprise libre de ses mouvements ... Elf a toujours eu 
dans l'esprit de se comporter comme une entreprise privée dans la 
limite où elle pouvait le faire."^^
This divergence of opinion points to Elfs dual nature and to the paradox implicit in 
its simultaneously multinational and public character. According to 
Anastassopoulos et al.,
"Très peu de ces entreprises, multinationales publiques semblent 
accepter avec sérénité leur double état, en faire mention de façon 
explicite."^^
The tensions arising from Elfs dual nature emerge clearly in the analysis of 
government-company interaction in the international sphere and were a contributory 
factor to the competitive pressures favouring outright privatisation in the 1980s. 
Nationalised industrial champions were being compelled to become 
internationalised firms while retaining their French roots.
Government support for internationalisation
France's state oil sector had to have an international dimension for a simple reason. 
As an official interviewed for this study remarked: "On est obligé d'être
international. Du pétrole, on n'en trouve pas en France. Donc on est obligé d'aller 
le chercher là où il se trouve."^®
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As Chapter I explained, the Bureau de Recherches de Pétrole (BRR), created for 
this very reason in 1945, was given enormous help from government to supply 
France with oil. Government policy at the time was directed at production although 
an international dimension was also implicit in the BRP's task, as shown by the 
ordonnance for its creation:
"Du pétrole produit et raffiné en France et dans son empire est la 
seule solution parfaite aux problèmes d'approvisionnement du pays 
en hydrocarbures."^®
The support received from government, namely, presidential backing, financial help 
from the first Plan (1946-50) and the Fonds de Soutien aux Hydrocarbures (FSH), 
tax exemption and the protection of the 1928 legislation, not only enabled the BRP 
to implement a national oil policy but also encouraged it to behave like a 
multinational, although with an emphasis upon the French colonies.
The BRP's early activities show features of multinational behaviour, namely the 
search for more abundant sources of supply, association with foreign companies 
and the creation of subsidiaries. As noted in Chapter I, since the ordonnance for 
the creation of the BRP implied geological examinations of all territories of IVnion 
française and prospection in regions which seemed technically and economically 
promising, the use of private capital to share the costs and risks was recommended. 
This would entail association with foreign oil companies notably the Majors.^^
The BRP was created not just as a government agency but also as a holding 
company. Not only were shares in companies operating in metropolitan France, 
Société Nationale des Pétroles d'Aquitaine (SNPA) and Société Nationale des 
Pétroles du Languedoc et du Midi (SNPLM), transferred to it but it also took over the 
French government's role in companies developed from syndicat d'études working 
in different parts of Africa, notably, Tunisia, Gabon, Madagascar. Prospection in 
such underdeveloped regions necessitated the creation of companies which would 
service the industry, such as drilling, the construction of offices and housing, 
transport of oil and gas by pipeline, engineering. These were the activities of the
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BRP's first holdings. As discoveries were made and the industry developed, the 
BRP's holdings naturally became more diverse.^®
It was the efforts of the BRP's overseas operations which gave the state oil sector 
its first successes in the late 1950s, in Gabon, the Congo and more especially, the 
Sahara. Practically inexistant in the early 1950s, oil production from the franc zone 
amounted to 18 million tonnes by 1962^ ®. Moreover, structures were in place, 
knowledge of the regions and technical know-how had been acquired. Such 
expertise was invaluable when rapid internationalisation became a necessity after 
the state oil companies' withdrawal from Algeria in 1971.
The state oil companies, as we have shown, were given enormous financial support 
from government to develop in their early years. Furthermore, with the signing of 
the Treaty of Rome, GATT agreements and gradual opening of the French economy 
to international trade from the 1960s, the concentration of firms to create "national 
champions" which could compete internationally became government policy^®. The 
Nora report of 1967 strongly recommended greater internationalisation for French 
firms. The Entreprise de Recherches et d'Activités Pétrolières (ERAP), formed out 
of the merger between BRP and the Régie Autonome des Pétroles (RAP), in 1965, 
is an excellent example of a public company which was given all kinds of 
advantages to compete both on national territory and in the international arena.
We shall show that ERAP's international dimension was supported by governments 
in three areas; regulation and prices, the relaxation of certain government control 
procedures and financial benefits. By consolidating public enterprise in its country 
of origin, governments indirectly gave it a basis for expansion abroad. It should be 
added that similar advantages were enjoyed by a large number of other public 
sector companies, for example, Renault, Air France, Entreprise Minière et Chimique 
(EMC), Compagnie Internationale pour l'Informatique (Cll)^^ reflecting the fact that 
this was general government policy.
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Chapter I has shown that by means of the 1928 legislation, the DICA, throughout 
the 1960s, steadily increased the share of the French refining and distribution 
market held by the young state oil companies to the detriment of that held by the 
Majors. By the late 1970s a certain balance had been achieved by which Elf and 
the CFP held 50% of the market, while Shell, BP, Exxon and Mobil, held the other 
50%. As noted in a study of government influence on the French oil sector,
"Comme dans toute oligopole bien établie, une certaine forme de 
cartellisation est bénéfique aux compagnies."^^
An example of these benefits was that in their international activities, the French oil 
firms' association with the Majors on French territory was negotiated in exchange 
for shares in permits abroad acquired by the Majors. Consequently:
"Elf et la CFP peuvent développer leurs opérations outre-mer en 
contre partie d'association avec les internationaux sur les permis 
accordés aux sociétés françaises.
It was by means of such associations that Elf and the CFP were entitled to begin 
North Sea exploration from the early 1970s.
A further result of the state managed cartel, emanating from the 1928 laws, was that 
the price of oil products was always higher in France than in other EC countries. As 
the president of Shell's French affiliate put it in the late 1970s, "the French 
regulatory system assured a market where profitability was more constant than 
elsewhere."^"* Chapter I has explained how responsibility for fixing the price of oil 
products moved from the ministry of Industry to the ministry of Finance in the wake 
of the affaire de Marseille and oil crisis. Yet both ministries favoured high prices. 
Industry traditionally supported the firms under its tutelle while Finance encouraged 
high prices to allow firms to use their own funds for investment. Pricing policy 
therefore brought large profits to the oil companies operating in France, although 
it also meant high prices for the consumer^®.
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Regarding the mechanisms for the control of public sector companies, analysed in 
Chapter 2, it was recognised that these should be lightened to facilitate their wider 
internationalisation^®. There were two reasons for this. First, it was acknowledged 
that firms which showed good results as a consequence of efficient management, 
should be allowed to make their own decisions. Second, it was recognised that 
control procedures, imposed by national governments, were ineffective at 
controlling the foreign subsidiaries of public sector firms. As mentioned in Chapter 
II, the subsidiaries of nationalised companies are immune from investigation by the 
Cour des Comptes. A further example of this relaxation of control procedures is that 
when the SNEA was created in 1976 (out of the merger between ERAP and the 
SNPA) and given instructions to be "responsible for its profitability and 
development", the government chose not to exercise its right of vote beyond 52.2%, 
although it owned a 70% stake in the oil group through ERAP.
As regards the financial advantages enjoyed by the state oil sector, we have 
already mentioned that from its creation, the BRP benefited from tax exemption and 
a fund created to assist oil exploration, the Ponds de Soutien aux Hydrocarbures 
(FSH). In addition, as the internationalisation of the economy became more 
pressing from the mid-1960s, public sector firms were allowed to internationalise 
their profits. Both Elf and the CFP were allowed this advantage in order to put them 
on an equal competitive footing with the international oil firms operating on French 
territory. A further advantage was that borrowing by public sector firms was 
guaranteed by government^^.
What is more, like other public sector firms. Elf and the CFP enjoyed the advantage 
of public procurement contracts. Writing in the late 1970s, de Bodinat and 
Chambaud noted that:
"Elf a obtenu que d'autres sociétés nationalisées (Air France et 
Renault) s'approvisionnent en carburant auprès de lui-même plutôt 
qu'auprès de concurrents internationaux."^®
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From the early 1980s, however, a combination of new challenges stemming from 
the international nature of the oil industry, from France's closer integration in 
Europe and successive French governments' need to curb public expenditure, 
progressively swept aside many of the privileges which Elf was accustomed to 
receive. Since then. Elf has been forced to adapt to increasingly fierce world 
competition. Firstly, the 1928 laws had always been a bone of contention between 
successive French governments and the European Commission since they 
contravened the Treaty of Rome. Under pressure from Brussels during the late 
1970s and early 1980s, French governments gradually and reluctantly dismantled 
the 1928 legislation and lifted price controls on oil products. The freeing of petrol 
prices was completed by the Chirac government of 1986 in its general lifting of price 
controls^®. Secondly, when the Socialist government came to power in 1981, in 
spite of its moves to establish good relations with the business community, evidence 
for which was the government's authorisation to Elf to purchase Texas Gulf, the 
Socialists nevertheless refused to give any financial help to the venture. The 
transaction had to be carried out by an exchange of subsidiaries. Therefore, 
although the government was anxious to give "guarantees of liberalism to the 
outside world", it was also intent on making Elf pay. Thirdly, the fall in world oil 
prices in the mid-1980s meant that oil produced by the French companies would no 
longer finance their exploration costs. These had become prohibitive, multiplied by 
seven between 1977 and 1987^. As a result, acording to the oil correspondent of 
l'Expansion, writing in the late 1980s, Elf and the CFP went through a "cultural 
revolution". Responsible in the past for meeting the needs of the French market, 
they benefitted in return from guaranteed sales. Once they were freed from the 
constraints of supply, they lost part of their share of the national market. A parallel 
development took place in distribution when supermarkets obtained permission to 
sell petrol at reduced prices.^^
The result of this greater liberalisation and fiercer competition between companies 
was that to survive. Elf and CFP had to adapt increasingly to the laws of the 
international market. This implied drastic cuts in their exploration budgets, more
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cost-effective refining and distribution activities and the acquisition of new skills, 
notably those of international dealer in oil and oil products with profitability as their 
only criterion^^.
Obstacles to Internationalisation
The previous section has shown to what extent Elfs links with government favoured 
its international expansion. Yet there were also cases in which government 
hindered the group's international activities, arising from the fact that the state oil 
sector was created as an instrument of government. Originally government aimed 
to use the sector to provide France with secure supplies of hydrocarbons in an 
attempt to achieve independence in energy supplies. Governments and economic 
circumstances change, however. Besides, public sector companies are vulnerable 
to the ideological and economic imperatives of their major shareholder^^. 
Furthermore, since the early 1970s, French firms have been increasingly exposed 
to changes in world markets. The oil crisis of the early 1970s not only brought 
about the switch from oil to nuclear energy as the major source of power in France, 
but also marked the beginning of a fall in demand for energy worldwide. 
Governments also became more demanding. Elfs major shareholder expected it 
not only to continue fulfilling its original mission, but to be profitable like any "normal 
company" and to take responsibility for the tasks which governments habitually 
assumed.
We shall examine interventions by governments of Right and Left which indirectly 
and directly hindered Elfs international expansion. Any obligation imposed on an 
international company by government in the national interest can be an indirect 
handicap to the company's international ventures because such obligations divert 
company funds away from these activities. Governments can also intervene directly 
to veto company activities which do not conform to national policy objectives. How 
did this affect French industrial, social and foreign policy?
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Social Policy
"Nous sommes considérés comme une des sociétés qui doit être exemplaire en 
matière salariale et d'emploi", remarked an Elf official interviewed for this study^ ®.
Government social policy has three main objectives: better working conditions, job 
creation and an improved geographic distribution of employment®®. In the context 
of a public company and in so far as they concern its home state, these objectives 
are totally contradictory to the multinationalisation of its activities. Better working 
conditions imply a reasonable salary and security of employment. In most 
developed countries, public companies have traditionally offered both these 
advantages. In addition, the staff of public companies and frequently their families 
enjoy many other benefits. Consequently, the expense incurred by public 
companies, as a result of a highly progressive social policy, is not particularly 
favourable to them in the context of international competition,
"Car elles ne sont pas compensées, bien au contraire, par un dynamisime 
plus grand de leurs employés, habitués à être bien traités, considérant ce 
qu'ils reçoivent comme un droit.. .
Over-manning can present an even more serious handicap to a public company's 
internationalisation. On the one hand, "les employés représentent une 
immobilisation à long terme puisqu'elles (les entreprises) ne peuvent pas les 
licencier."^^ On the other, the public company must obtain agreement from 
government and unions, who are endeavouring to combat unemployment, for the 
fact that it is creating jobs abroad, while at home it is creating few, or none at all, or 
actually reducing them. The international investments of the SNEA have always 
come in for considerable criticism on this point, as confirmed by an official 
interviewed for this study:
"On est obligé d'investir ailleurs une partie des résultats obtenus en 
France. C'est toujours la question que les syndicats critiquent parce 
que ça fait plus d'emplois à l'étranger que d'emplois en France."^^
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Although hostility to délocalisation does not generally prevent investment abroad, 
it can have a negative influence on the global strategy of firms:
"Celles-ci ont en effet plus de mal à fermer des usines et à licencier 
du personnel dans leur pays d'origine alors qu'elles créent des 
emplois à l'étranger: elles auront donc tendance à 'supporter' une 
certaine dose de sureffectifs dans leurs usines domestiques; par 
ailleurs, elles auront aussi tendance à modérer corrélativement leur 
expansion à l'étranger."^
A public company's third 'social mission' is the creation of jobs at a local level and 
here the unions find support from another forceful group, regional authorities. For 
example, in 1976, in anticipation of the future decline of the Lacq gas-field, pressure 
was put on the newly formed SNEA to invest a percentage of its profits (5-10%) in 
the region of Béarn and process a proportion of the by-products of gas on the spot, 
rather than export them. The SNPA (which amalgamated with Elf Erap in 1976), 
responsible for the exploitation of Lacq, had been the 'moteur économique' of the 
region since 1957 and was directly and indirectly giving work to some 50,000 
people. It seems that from 1972, the SNPA, aware that gas production would begin 
to run down from the early 1980s, was no longer investing in the region. The 
response, given by the vice-chairman of the SNEA, to demands was: "II n'est pas 
question de nous substituer à la puissance publique, ou à la DATAR."^
Demands of this kind only add to the numerous constraints on public companies 
aspiring to extend their international dimension, by attaching them more firmly not 
only to their country but to their region of origin.
Foreign Policy
Abroad a French public company is always expected to represent the state which 
is its sole or major shareholder. The company's activities outside national 
boundaries can never be disconnected from the foreign policy of its country of
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origin^. The link between the public company and its home state manifests itself 
in two ways: the first is that host countries perceive the company as an agent of its 
home state, the second is that the firm's home government tends to use the 
company as an agent of national foreign policy. These two phenomena can be a 
handicap to the public company in its international expansion, as shown from 
numerous examples in Chapter 1.
Perhaps the most notable period in Elfs history, when it was perceived to its 
detriment as an agent of its home state, occurred after Algeria gained its 
independence in 1962^ .^ The attitude of the French oil companies towards the new 
Algerian state hardly changed. In fact the Sahara Oil Code of 1958, which defined 
conditions under which Algerian oil could be exploited and which distinctly favoured 
the French companies, was hastily amended, just prior to the Evian agreements of 
1962, so that French interests could be safeguarded. The French companies in 
Algeria enjoyed far greater advantages than companies in other oil-producing 
countries, having complete control of their production costs and prices at which they 
sold Algerian crude. They were thus able to transfer considerable profits to France 
to develop their refining and distribution network and finance prospection in other 
countries. The Algerians became conscious of how they were being exploited and, 
anxious that Algerian hydrocarbons should contribute to the economic development 
of their own country, they demanded from 1964 a revision of the Evian agreements. 
A plan was drawn up which seemed to promote real industrial and commercial 
cooperation between France and Algeria but it did not satisfy the Algerians for long. 
In addition, they began demanding higher prices for their oil after the closure of the 
Suez Canal in 1967. Relations deteriorated fast, with Algeria unilaterally raising 
prices and France resorting to delaying tactics regarding the payment of 
accumulated arrears. The beginning of the oil crisis in 1970 brought matters to a 
climax, for although France agreed to renegotiate economic cooperation, Algeria 
was demanding still higher prices in line with world rates. France's delaying tactics 
were on this occasion ineffectual, because on February 24th 1971, President 
Boumedienne announced the takeover of a majority share in French oil companies
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in Algeria and the nationalisation of pipelines and natural gas reserves. The loss 
to the French oil companies, as already mentioned, was enormous and took several 
years to repair.
Insofar as it is an instrument of the foreign policy of its home government, the public 
company, and especially the oil companies, can be subjected to all kinds of 
pressures against their own interests, as a comparison with Italian policy highlights;
"Le secteur pétrolier est très caractéristique de ce genre 
d'interférence entre la politique et l'économie car il est lui-même très 
politisé. Ainsi l'ENI ira en Libye parce que le gouvernement italien le 
lui demande mais Elf Aquitaine y "gèlera" ses activités parce que le 
gouvernement français engagé aux côtés du Tchad contre l'armée du 
colonel Kadhafi l'y oblige."^
These instructions from the French government to the SNEA were actually the last 
stage of one of the many battles waged between Albin Chalandon and André 
Giraud, his ministre de tutelle. In the midst of hostilities between Gadaffi's soldiers 
and pro-French Tchadian forces, in November 1980, Chalandon had quietly agreed 
an important exploration-production deal with Tripoli. He had characteristically not 
asked the permission of André Giraud but referred instead to the secrétaire général 
de l'Elysée* vjho had given him the go-ahead. Giraud was only informed in the 
press about the deal some days later.
"II y (dans Le Monde) apprend simultanément l'entrée des chars 
libyens dans N'Djamena et l'obtention de cinq permis d'exploration en 
Libye par Elf Aquitaine"'*®
Giraud was forced to admit, at the Conseil des Ministres of 7th January, that he 
knew nothing of the agreement and Raymond Barre was obliged to save his 
minister's dignity by demanding that at the next meeting of the board of the SNEA, 
there should be a temporary freezing of Libyan oil permits.
Since de Gaulle's presidency, there has always been a special 
supervision of France's African policy within the President's Office.
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still in the context of Franco-Libyan relations, the US suggested, in April 1986, that 
Europe follow their example in economic sanctions against Libya. France, the first 
European country to follow suit, asked not only its oil companies. Elf and Total, to 
stop buying oil from Libya but also subsidiaries of foreign companies operating in 
France. Government orders were implemented and the companies interrupted their 
imports. The oil correspondent for Le Monde pointed out that the French oil 
companies were likely to suffer the most. Not only was France a good customer of 
Libya which supplied 6% of France's crude oil but Libyan prices were also 
particularly competitive^.
During the Iran-lraq war, Iran was also the object of an oil embargo. In 1987 it was 
in an even stronger position vis-à-vis France than Libya, representing 14% of 
French supplies in June - France's most important supplier in fact - and offering 
crude oil at very attractive prices, 1-2 dollars per barrel cheaper than crude of other 
origins. The extent to which national companies were made to comply with 
government wishes is illustrated by the fact that although the French government 
had obtained the agreement of Elf and Total to abstain from buying Iranian crude, 
after a period of "autodiscipline", the companies resumed their purchases, 
provoking a discreet call to order by the authorities.®^
Submitting public companies to the imperatives of national policies can, as we have 
seen, handicap their international ambitions, their relations with foreign partners 
and company profits. Changes in government, government policy or international 
tensions which suddenly give rise to new directives, can be a real obstacle to a 
company's strategies worked out with a long term perspective in view.
A Convergence of Objectives
While the close relations which a public company has with its major shareholder can 
handicap its internationalisation, company strategies which benefit from the state 
link can actually strengthen its establishment abroad. In the areas of diplomacy, 
technological development and industrial policy, company and government 
objectives can converge closely®  ^. With regard to these areas, let us examine how
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the SNEA has exploited its links with the French government.
Diplomacy
In the sphere of diplomacy, the French government made efforts in the 1960s to 
break the power of the Majors by means of ERAP. Like other national oil 
companies, for example, the Italian Ente Nazionale d'ldrocarburi (ENI),
"ERAP sought to diversify her sources of supply and, with a view to 
obtaining exploration permits, offered producing countries more 
advantageous terms than those offered by the Majors, that is, agency 
contracts, under which the national company of the producing country 
retained mastery over all operations, while the foreign company 
offered financial, commercial and technical services. This was how 
ERAP gained a foothold in Iran (1966) Iraq (1968) black Africa, 
Canada and Europe.
Close diplomatic ties between France and former West African colonies have 
been and still are extremely beneficial to the SNEA. In return, it is partly due to 
Elf that France maintains a presence in francophone Africa and extends it to 
other countries. The affaire Le Floch* of 1996, leading to the imprisonment for 
suspected abuse of funds of former chairman of Elf, Loïk Le Floch-Prigent, give 
these relations a highly topical perspective.
As shown in Chapter I, it was certain states in the Gulf of Guinea which contributed 
enormously to Elf-Erap's survival after its departure from Algeria in 1971. In fact, 
it was intended that oil from this region should replace Algerian oil. According to 
Le Floch-Prigent,
"Les gaullistes souhaitaient une sorte de ministère de pétrole 
inamovible assurant l'approvisionnement de la France puisque le 
pétrole algérien n'était géré par les Français que jusqu'en 1971."
Loïk Le Floch-Prigent, chairman of Elf 1989-93. His imprisonment 
provoked a "confession", published in /'Express 12.12.96, pp. 62-70.
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Consequently, French government policy inherited from the Gaullist era and then 
continued by the RPR Gaullist party, promoted Elf as "the secular arm of the state 
in Africa". We shall look in particular at the case of Gabon.
Revenue from oil is vital to the Gabonese economy, representing 60% of the state 
budget in 1986^. Although other companies operate there, their activity is limited 
compared with that of Elf Gabon. For example, between 1971-76, Elf Gabon and 
the SNEA were responsible for 85% of Gabon’s oil production. In 1987 Gabon 
accounted for one fifth of the total production of the SNEA's operated fields and 
30% of production accruing to the SNEA®®. The interdependence between Gabon 
and Elf, explained in Chapter I, has been such that it is impossible to know who 
controls whom®®. French parachutists reinstated a former Gabonese president on 
the orders of de Gaulle after an allegedly US inspired coup d'état in 1964. The 
Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE), now 
called Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure, and French army maintain a 
presence in Gabon to protect French interests which in the main are those of Elf. 
A top manager of the state oil group was simultaneously adviser on African affairs 
to Pierre Guillaumat and to the Gabonese president, Albert Bernard Bongo. The 
same personality was still advising the president in 1981. In return, the state oil 
companies benefitted from President Bongo's relations with neighbouring states. 
He is reported to have said:
"C’est moi qui ai demandé à Pierre Guillaumat d'aller au Congo et qui 
l'ai aidé à obtenir des permis de recherche en 1968."
Furthermore, Elf has always had the advantage in Gabon of a lower rate of tax than 
that recommended by OPEC (73% instead of 85%). It seems that this fiscalité 
douce was a formula devised by the Gabonese president, the above-mentioned 
adviser and the head of Elf Gabon. Elf Gabon would be exempt from paying a 
proportion of company tax on condition that the money, provision pour 
investissements diversifiés (PID), was reinvested in government approved projects 
In addition, the PID enabled the Gabonese authorities to use Elfs expertise in
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certain development projects.®^
It is clear from the case of Gabon that Elfs interests and those of succesive French 
governments have been and still are inextricably linked. The implications have 
been far-reaching. It is only with Elfs backing that the present leaders of Gabon, 
the Congo, Cameroon and the Ivory Coast are in power. France has used Elf to 
maintain its presence in Africa and to extend it to other states. According to Le 
Floch-Prigent,
"Elf s'introduit en Angola, au Nigeria et plus récemment au Tchad à 
la demande du gouvernement français qui veut étendre sa zone
d'influence et la sécuriser grâce à des liens économiques solides....
Elf est bien conçu comme une entreprise au service de l'Etat pour sa 
politique extérieure, le vote des pays africains avec la France à l'ONU 
faisant partie de sa position de grande puissance."®®
Le Floch-Prigent described his role in Africa, while chairman of Elf, as that of 
mediator in and between the different states with the help of Gaullist networks. His 
comments on Elfs role in Africa in 1996 hardly differ from those made by Péan and 
Séréni in the early 1980s during the Chalandon era:
"Ce n'est pas un hasard si le président d'Elf Aquitaine s'occupe 
personnellement de l'Afrique. L'avenir d'Elf Aquitaine se construit 
encore, pour une part déterminante, dans le golfe de Guinée. Et très 
largement dans l'ancien Empire français."®®
Clearly, Elf benefits from France's political and economic ties with West Africa but 
also contributes to and reinforces them. The case of West Africa shows that Elf 
played its role as instrument of successive governments' foreign policies so 
effectively that it gradually took over their responsibilities. Moreover, there has 
been a striking continuity in the government-company diplomatic arrangements, as 
the Le Floch "confession" reveals:
"L'argent du pétrole est là, il y en a pour tout le monde. Les 
arrangements de Gaulle-Guillaumat avec les pays francophones 
courent toujours, à la satisfaction des gaullistes et des Africains."®®
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However, the suspected abuse of funds, uncovered by the Le Floch affair and 
involving not only a former chairman of Elf but also heads of West African 
subsidiaries, shows that French governments, however reluctantly, must accept the 
consequences of handing over their responsibilities to France's top industrial group. 
The increasing intrusion of the French judiciary into the corrupt financial practices 
to which this intimacy of government - firm relations has led, has occurred in the 
years after those with which we have been concerned.
Technological developments
In the area of technological development, principles of government and of large 
companies, namely the maintaining of technical competence, are seen to converge. 
Public companies, especially in industrialised countries, are considered 
instruments of national technological development, but technology can only 
progress if it is given opportunities to develop, in the form of adequate funding and 
the chance to be tested and compared with foreign technologies^^ In the area of 
technological development therefore, the international dimension is vital. As world 
reserves of hydrocarbons decrease, new sources must constantly be found, yet 
conditions in which they are obtained are becoming progressively more hazardous. 
Since the oil companies are constantly preoccupied by rising costs, the search for 
cheaper means of production becomes essential. For the SNEA, in 1987, 
exploration costs were a prime concern because of their impact on the group's 
profits and investments. According to Elfs annual report:
"la recherche et l'exploitation des gisements d'hydrocarbures .... 
constituent toujours l'activité principale du Groupe, sa plus importante 
source de profit et sont à l'origine de la majeure partie de ses 
investissements."®^
It is therefore no surprise that in the early 1980s the SNEA was one of the foremost 
companies in oil exploration technology and played an initiating role in devising 
revolutionary methods for automated under-water production. The Skuld system 
was devised and tested by Elf Norge which also bore the major part of the cost: 180
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million francs divided as follows:- Elf Norge 80%, Total Marine Norsk 10%, and two 
Norwegian companies, Statoil 5%, Norsk Hydro 5%^. It was described as:
"une installation totalement sous-marine sans même une plate-forme 
de commande - mise en place par modules, sans interventions de 
plongeurs et télécommandée non plus à 18 mais à 100 km de 
distance à partir de côtes ou d'un champ voisin."^
France was justifiably proud of her industrie parapétrolière, second at world level 
after the USA and described as "by far the most dynamic in the hydrocarbon sector 
with an export balance of 45 billion francs in 1982, double that of the car industry"®® 
The French government naturally wished to maintain the prestige of its industries 
since the quality of technology in this area ensured important contracts for the 
SNEA. For example, the granting of permits by Norway to the SNEA to explore new 
North Sea oil fields was, in the opinion of Michel Pecqueur, chairman of the group 
between 1983 and 1989, "proof that the quality of our technology has been 
recognised".®® As a result the French government supported oil exploration by 
means of the Comité d'études pétrolières marines, which was funded by a budget 
drawn from an internal tax on oil products amounting to 250million francs in 1986.®  ^
In addition, the industry had the benefit of a "technological" loan which the 
authorities wished to maintain in spite of the economic situation.®®
Industrial Policy
In the area of industrial policy there have been many occasions where Elfs 
international ambitions have coincided with government objectives. The SNEA's 
purchase of Texas Gulf, already mentioned, after the victory of François Mitterrand 
in the 1981 presidential elections, was a case in point. Elf had for a long time been 
seeking to establish itself in the US, geographic diversification being considered 
one of the major elements of company strategy by chairman Albin Chalandon.®® At 
the end of the 1970s the SNEA was concerned about the declining production of the 
Lacq gas field, one of its main sources of revenue, and was seeking new forms of 
income. Its choice of Texas Gulf was dictated by the fact that the US was "one of
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the last countries where substantial profits could be made and where no restrictions 
were imposed on their transfer abroad". It was ironic that a Socialist government 
should allow a nationalised company to carry out "an operation of wildcat 
capitalism"^® which a previous liberal government had vetoed (Kerr Magee), but the 
Socialists were keen to give guarantees of liberalism to the outside world.
Multinational Behaviour
The previous section has shown that Elfs international dimension benefitted 
enormously from the company's "national interest" mission. This section will 
highlight how Elf, in its efforts to establish itself abroad, overcame constraints 
imposed by host and home states. We shall show that in attempting to minimise 
these constraints, the state oil group's strategies have been no different from those 
of a private multinational.
In states whose government had no special relationship with France, ERAP always 
had to compete on an equal footing with other oil companies. Chapter 1 has shown 
how the oil group, in its attempts to internationalise rapidly in the late 1960s, was 
obliged to offer producer states more advantageous terms than other companies, 
as shown by its efforts to obtain exploration permits in the Middle East where the 
Majors were already well established. In the 1970s, when Elfs internationalisation 
was a question of survival but producer governments more demanding, the 
company's establishment abroad entailed a constant weighing up of the financial, 
technical and political risks and making choices on purely commercial terms. The 
Middle East, for example, is considered to be a region characterised by its political 
instability, even though oil is abundant and easily accessible. The North Sea, on 
the other hand, is politically safe but exploration is technically hazardous. At the 
financial level, there is considerable risk involved in exploration, since companies 
can spend phenomenal sums of money drilling for oil and gas yet fail to find any^\ 
According to an Elf official interviewed for this study;
"Si on fore à la Jamaïque, on a une chance sur dix de trouver quelque
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chose et ensuite une chance sur dix que ce soit exploitable... un 
risque politique nul comme en Norvège peut équilibrer une lourde 
fiscalité."”
A further constraint is that since competition to obtain zones in oil rich areas is 
intense, foreign governments impose all kinds of conditions on the oil companies. 
Norway provides the case of particularly strict regulations. According to Elfs 
director for Europe:
"En Norvège vous appliquez la politique d'exploration norvégienne et 
vous devenez un agent norvégien et vous recrutez des Norvégiens 
et vous les faites travailler dans un esprit de défense des intérêts en 
priorité de la Norvège .... c'est un régime extrêmement bureaucratisé 
avec un tas de règlements de tous genres que ce soient sociaux, 
industriels, sécurité, engagement des dépenses d'exploration, 
engagement de faire travailler l'industrie norvégienne. On est 
Norvégien parmi les Norvégiens."^^
A specific example of Norwegian oil policy is that the government, in exchange for 
the most attractive concessions, can lay down the condition that the oil companies 
maintain exploration in less promising areas, "Ce qui n'est pas toujours facile à faire 
accepter par Paris", according to Elfs director for Europe^"*. It is therefore no 
surprise that in order to obtain the best zones to explore in a country such as 
Norway, the oil companies make all kinds of commitments as regards technical 
cooperation, employing the local workforce and subcontracting to local firms.^® In 
short, according to an official at the SNEA: "You've got to show you're working in 
the interests of the country where you are."^ ®
In Norway, Elfs policy of "norwegianisation" has contributed enormously to the 
group's success there. Long-term establishment in order to build up a relationship 
of trust with host countries, was confirmed as an important strategy by an SNEA 
official:
"Elf a I'habitude de s'installer durablement dans les pays, surtout en 
Norvège, en Angleterre et d'essayer en même temps de faire des 
actions un peu parallèles, marginales, de développer son activité sur
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place, d'obtenir d'autres permis, de s'établir pour longtemps, grâce 
aux relations de confiance qu'on essaye d'avoir avec ces pays."^
The SNEA's "actions marginales" in Norway are a clear example of how the 
company strives towards good relations with host states. Elf Norge has financed 
a cultural centre at Stavanger and continues to subsidise all kinds of activities there: 
concerts, plays, lectures, seminars. At the cost of 490,000 francs (Elf Norge's 
contribution for 1983), the company's motives are not entirely philanthropic, since 
it obtains substantial tax relief on monies allocated to the centre^®.
Strategies such as these will minimise the impact of Norwegian legislation for the 
Elf group. In addition, due to its nature as an international group, whose activities 
are organised on a world scale, the company can also use differences in various 
national bodies of legislation to alleviate the effect of any one government's 
regulation. This is considered the chief attraction of the multinational structure^®.
In recognition of the constraints imposed by foreign governments on its state-owned 
firms and in order to encourage their internationalisation, the French government, 
as mentioned above, has always allowed these companies a relaxation of certain 
control procedures. In addition, company leaders have fought for greater financial 
independence and autonomy from their ministères de tutelle. Chapter 6 shows that 
the chairmanship of Albin Chalandon (1977-83) marked an accelerated 
development in Elfs market orientation. When Chalandon took up his chairmanship 
in 1977, he saw the Elf group as a multinational like any other:
"I'une des premières entreprises industrielles du pays; en tout cas 
celle qui, dans le secteur concurrentiel, gagnait le plus, investissait 
le plus, travaillait dans trente ou quarante pays, défiait par sa 
capacité technique et ses ambitions les "grands" du pétrole, qui 
étaient anglo-saxons.
He is given particular credit for emphasising the fact that Elf should be run like any 
"normal company". He saw the Elf group less as a firm providing a public service 
and more as one which should be profitable. Moreover, because of the
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uncertainties of oil activities - fewer discoveries, the increase in technical costs, 
tighter tax conditions, the problems of the refining sector - Chalandon considered 
it vital to find new areas of development. These motives underpinned his strategies 
while chairman of Elf; expansion of the group's diversified activities which would 
require lower investment and labour costs; restructuring of Elfs refining sector to 
reduce losses and direct refining towards more lucrative products; expansion in the 
U.S. to give Elf a foothold there.
Chalandon's determination to make the SNEA profitable is also related to his pursuit 
of autonomy from his ministères de tutelle. His chairmanship of Elf witnessed his 
dismissive attitude towards civil servants (over Kerr Magee purchase and Libyan 
contracts), his frequent requests that administrative procedures should be 
lightened and his resistance to government attempts to use the SNEA as an 
instrument of national policy (over diversifications and chemical restructuring). 
Chalandon was also highly skilled at exploiting divisions within government, as 
shown by the Texas Gulf purchase and, like his predecessor, Pierre Guillaumat, of 
using "national interest" or "shareholder interest" arguments to the advantage of his 
company®\
Chalandon's mentality of opposing the wishes of government is part of a longer 
tradition in the state oil sector. Did not Pierre Guillaumat go against the wishes of 
President Pompidou in withdrawing from Algeria in 1971? Two years later the 
accusations of the Schwartz report revealed that Elf-ERAP adopted practices which 
were hardly in keeping with a public service mandate. As Chapter 1 explained, the 
report accused the big oil companies operating in France (including ERAP and the 
CFP) of using loopholes to avoid paying taxes to France and of witholding and 
falsifying information concerning access prices for crude oil in order to keep 
administered prices unnecessarily high. It accused the two French companies of 
conspiring with affiliates of the Majors to maintain unusually high jet fuel prices 
supplied to Air France. Finally, it accused the state-appointed auditors of 
representing company interests to the state rather than the reverse.
As the above examples show, the fact that the oil market is inherently international
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has always limited the ability of government to control it. The necessity of operating 
in an international environment causes state firms to follow the logic of the 
international market and resemble their multinational counterparts. While 
successive French governments encouraged the multinationalistation of state- 
owned firms and allowed them all kinds of freedom, the firms naturally took 
advantage of this freedom and adopted strategies similar to those of private 
multinationals.
Conclusion
Government-company interaction in the international sphere shows that Elf has 
indeed played the dual role of the public multinational, in the aftermath of World 
War II, the French government created a state oil sector for its own purposes. It 
developed an integrated oil industry under French control, on which it could rely for 
secure supplies of oil. From the mid-1960s, in line with the evolution in government 
policy, which moved from protecting French interests to integrating France into the 
world economy, governments encouraged the state oil sector's growth in order to 
have industries capable of competing in the international arena. As a company with 
a "national interest mission". Elf benefitted from the positive measures instituted by 
governments to consolidate its position at home and enable it to expand abroad.
Yet Elfs link with government enabled it to progress beyond simply being an 
instrument of government plans. Increasingly, company leaders could be seen to 
be exercising power with their major shareholder^^. While Elf exploited the state link 
to establish itself in Africa, French governments allowed Elf to take over some of 
their foreign policy responsibilities in African states. It is clear that in the 
international sphere, as in other spheres, the interests of French governments and 
those of Elf have been inextricably linked. Yet it is company leaders who are in the 
driving seat, who take initiatives, possess the required knowledge and contacts, 
defend the interests and argue the case of their firm. Whereas in its early years, 
the state oil sector was dependent on government, over time, governments became
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dependent on the firm. The trend towards greater liberalisation of world trade, 
establishment of the Single European Market in 1993 and privatisation movements 
throughout Western Europe, have all weakened the state link and shifted the 
balance of dependence within a declining interdependence..
There is a further force at work: the nature of a firm's activity. Since oil is a world 
industry, in its efforts to internationalise, the state oil group increasingly acquired 
the characteristics and adopted the behaviour of a private multinational, that is, 
working in its own interests. In the interests of their company, we have seen Elfs 
leaders circumventing French legislation in the manner of the private multinational, 
flouting administrative procedures, opposing the highest authorities in government, 
exploiting divisions within government in order to impose the company view. In fact, 
French governments have been treated by Elfs leaders little differently from foreign 
governments. Conflicts have ensued between Elf and certain sections of 
government, while other sections have supported the company's behaviour. 
Besides, due to the benefits which big companies bring France, governments of Left 
and Right have increasingly recognised that competitive firms need freedom of 
manoeuvre. As a result, in the international sphere. Elf has enjoyed considerable 
autonomy vis-à-vis its major shareholder precisely because of the diversity of 
support it can exploit at home and abroad.
In the 1980s, observers drew comparisons between Elf and its international 
competitors, concluding that the French oil group was too small and too 
concentrated geographically on France and Africa®^. Had Elfs interdependence 
with its major shareholder held back and circumscribed its international 
development?
Many in France recognised that government interference in the life of firms was 
inhibiting their development. Certainly at the end of the 1980s, Elfs chairman was 
seeking to "break state chains" further®  ^-11% of the state's share in Elf was sold 
off in 1986. Greater private ownership would enable the group to develop like any
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"normal company" and give it the flexibility to tap financial markets to finance its 
international development and fund big acquisitions. Yet this chapter has shown 
that the state link actually enabled Elf to acquire an international dimension. 
Moreover, the state link is still essential to the Elf group in Africa which, in the late 
1980s, accounted for 115 million of its 190 million tonnes of oil reserves®®. 
Although, as mentioned above, a host of challenges faced the group in the late 
1980s, Elf was adapting to the international market. In order to offset the risks 
attached to oil production worldwide, it had made a success of its diversifications 
into chemicals and pharmaceuticals and acquired new métiers. Although a "young" 
group by comparison with its competitors. Elf was, in 1987, the ninth oil company 
at world level®® and most profitable French company after Peugeot. "Nous voulons 
être partout dans les trois ou quatre meilleurs" remarked Elfs chairman in 1988."®  ^
At the end of the 1980s, therefore, although many of Elfs international activities still 
depended on the group's link with the French state, top managers were looking 
forward to a further reduction in state ownership in order to increase the firm's 
capital and reinforce the international base of all its branches.
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CHAPTER 5
THE ELF GROUP DIVERSIFIES: COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION
French industrial policy was characterised before the mid-1970s by an emphasis 
on industrial concentration to attain an internationally competitive scale of 
operations. Why did a different strategy, industrial diversification, become popular 
in the 1980s, more especially in the case of Elf? Was it due to the government's 
and/or company's wish to make Elf the national champion both in oil refining and 
heavy chemicals? In the case of pharmaceuticals, was it a case of genuine 
diversification to support the main activities of Elf? To what extent were the aims 
of successive governments, motivated by public policy objectives and of successive 
managements of Elf, driven by market considerations, consistent or conflicting? 
The resounding clash between Industry Minister Giraud, determined to assert public 
control and a would-be autonomous chairman of Elf, Albin Chalandon, - particularly 
over the policy of diversification - places the issue in especially sharp focus. These 
are the questions to be investigated in this chapter.
A glance at Elf Aquitaine's annual reports between 1986 and 1988 shows that the 
group's activities were highly diversified. Apart from oil and gas related business, 
chemicals, health, hygiene and bio-industries, regional development, the funding 
of aid projects to developing countries, the management of research laboratories 
linked to the group's strategic activities, environment protection programmes and 
the sponsorship of arts and sports events figured among its main activities.^
In the present chapter we shall concentrate on the sectors of chemicals and of 
pharmaceuticals, the two areas of Elfs operations which together with the 
production, processing and distribution of oil and gas form "les trois piliers du 
groupe."^ Although the group's reputation is based on its oil and gas business, by 
1987, Elf had also developed two important diversified subsidiaries, Atochem and 
Sanofi. In that year Atochem was France's third chemical group while Sanofi 
occupied second place in pharmaceuticals.^ Together they accounted for half the 
profits of the SNEA.
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Hydrocarbons are well-known for the multiplicity of their by-products. Crude oil and 
gas figure among the ten or so vital raw materials mentioned in this description of 
the main characteristics of the chemical industry:
"La caractéristique la plus apparente des industries chimiques tient à 
l'extrême complexité des procédés de fabrication et à la diversité des 
produits obtenus. Une dizaine de matières premières soumises à des 
transformations de plus en plus complexes (par extraction, synthèse ou 
substitution) conduisent à plus de 100,000 produits utilisés pèle-mèle 
dans les automobiles, les détergents, la pharmacie, l'habillement, les 
engrais, les équipements sportifs, la conquête spatiale ou 
l'alimentation." ^
Certain products can be used directly as the result of an initial transformation 
process, for example, plastics and fertilisers, or they can be processed further, 
generating another range of products, some of which may undergo yet further 
transformations, for example, in the pharmaceutical industry. In this context, 
another characteristic of the industry is the close interdependence between 
products and chains of production, as explained by Bertrand Bellon:
"On ne fait pas de matières plastiques sans éthylène mais pas 
d'éthylène sans produire du benzène ou du propylène que l'on retrouve 
dans les produits pharmaceutiques ou les dérivés organiques fluorés 
qui demandent à leur tour du chlore et quand on fait du chlore on 
produit de la soude et des dérivés chlorés."®
Oil companies became involved in chemicals for a number of related reasons. They 
aimed to expand in order to compete and growth in itself may be a major reason for 
diversification. In addition, oil companies seek to diversify their risks by developing 
the by-products of their refineries. In the process they exploit the above-mentioned 
interdependence of products and production chains. (Figure 5.1, p. 301, shows 
how production chains can supply one another with raw materials, intermediate 
products or outlets.) Moreover, the more elaborate the product, the less affected 
it is by the conditions of supply of its raw materials.® Oil companies, such as the 
SNEA, may therefore diversify into the manufacture of increasingly complex 
products, for example, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, not only to escape the 
factors affecting the supply of raw materials but also to benefit from increased value
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The success of a firm's diversified operations depends on keeping abreast of 
scientific knowledge/ New materials, new uses and new products are constantly 
being developed and firms aim to take advantage of the opportunities offered. 
Large companies are not content to rely on the discoveries of others. They can 
direct research themselves by acquiring existing research centres or developing 
their own. Research can therefore generate further diversification by revealing 
different uses, products and production methods. Moreover, new products in their 
turn create new demands.
A company can be encouraged or hindered in its diversification ambitions by 
government policy.® Encouragement may come in the form of industrial policies 
which favour mergers, acquisitions and takeovers. Regional policies aimed at 
creating jobs may allow a firm to direct government aid to its own projects in an area 
of the country where it has long-standing ties. A company's diversification plans 
can also be hindered by inconsistencies or a lack of policy on the part of 
government. In certain circumstances, supervisory ministries may be positively 
obstructive for a whole host of reasons. In the case of the SNEA, however, we shall 
consider to what extent the policies of a strongly interventionist government 
favoured the group's diversified activities.
D iversification  into C hem icals
Elfs entry into chemicals can be traced back to the Lacq gas field on which so much 
of the company's fortune was based. The sour nature of the gas necessitated the 
removal of sulphur from which the Société Nationale des Pétroles d'Aquitaine 
(SNPA) naturally developed an interest in thiochemicals.* Some time later, in 1960, 
ethane from Lacq was used to feed the Mont steam cracker. It was not until 1971 
that Elf became more involved in the heavy end of the business when the 50:50 joint 
venture with the Compagnie Française des Pétroles (CFP), Elfs competitor in the
Branch of the chemical industry dealing with chemicals containing sulphur
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oil business, created ATO.
The creation of ATO
The impetus to diversify into chemicals therefore originated in the SNPA which, as 
manager of the Lacq gas field, became the group's main actor in chemicals. As 
early as the mid-1960s it was exploiting its own raw materials, by-products of gas 
and sulphur, as well as those of crude oil coming in large quantities from the 
Sahara. The limited scope and purely regional dimension of the SNPA's chemical 
activities became a handicap, however. In the late 1960s concentrations and 
"national champions" were the priority of government industrial policy.^ ® The 
SNPA's chemical experts wanted to take advantage of new openings and new 
materials and acquire international status. Since there was no likelihood of the firm 
associating with the large chemical groups, Rhone-Poulenc, Péchiney and CDF 
Chimie, the only possible partnership was the Compagnie Française de Raffinage 
(CFR), refining branch of the Compagnie Française des Pétroles (CFP).
A treaty was drawn up in March 1969 without intervention from the supervisory 
ministries, providing for a new joint company, ATO (Aquitaine and Total), which 
would bring together the activities of the two firms in petrochemicals and plastics 
and later, packaging and building materials. The SNPA's managers envisaged that 
the new company should make chemicals a distinct activity, not simply a 
downstream activity from oil refining. According to the 1969 agreement, however, 
there was to be strict parity between the two firms in the areas of decision-making, 
the financing of projects, information, the use of raw materials and research 
programmes (see Chapter 1, p. 93).
Collaboration between the CFR and SNPA proved difficult, because of the differing 
views of the two firms. The SNPA's chemical experts had ambitious plans to create 
a distinct chemicals branch, whereas for the CFR, petrochemicals were the logical 
downstream activity from refining. In addition, the equal status of the two firms
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tended to paralyse decision-making. The consequences of the oil crisis and 
saturation of the French market with petrochemical products at a time when 
economic growth was declining only aggravated the existing difficulties. What is 
more, government intervention was conspicuous by its absence. According to a 
former official of Elf interviewed for this study,
"Chacun a construit son vapocraqueur et sept ou huit ans plus tard, la 
France se retrouvait avec une industrie surcapacitaire."^^
The creation of CHLOE
A further development in the creation of ATO took place in the summer of 1980 
when Jean Gandois, chairman of Rhone-Poulenc, anticipating the over-supply 
market situation, made moves to sell the heavy chemicals branch of his group, that 
is petrochemicals and plastics. André Giraud, Minister of Industry, recommended 
that the sale should be concluded with Elf rather than the CFP. The reason was 
that Rhône-Poulenc's activities complemented those of Elf, whose chemical 
specialists were anxious to expand the group's openings in chemicals and to 
diversify its range of plastics, over-concentrated on ethylene.^^ The more important 
reason for Giraud's recommendation, however, lay in the plan to restructure the 
French chemical industry, of which the purchase of Rhône-Poulenc's assets was the 
first step. Chalandon mentions that in January 1980,
"le ministre de l'Industrie me fit part d'une décision prise en conseil 
restreint à l'Elysée de constituer un pôle pétrochimique en France dont 
Elf devait être l'animateur. Il souhaitait notamment que notre entreprise 
achetât la pétrochimie de Rhône-Poulenc."^^
As already mentioned, the problematic aspect of the cooperation between Elf and
the CFR in chemicals was that neither firm could act independently of the other.
Chalandon hoped that the purchase of Rhône-Poulenc's assets would break up the
association, that it would be,
"le moyen de sortir de la pire des situations: deux associés à part égale 
qui se neutralisent et condamnent l'entreprise qu'ils possèdent en
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Negotiations were therefore carried out in the greatest secrecy between Elf and 
Rhone-Poulenc, the plan being to present the CFP with a fait accompli. Chalandon 
had reason to believe that he was well supported by Elfs chemical experts. They 
not only considered their association with the CFR an obstacle to their ambitions 
but they were also keen to get their hands on Rhône-Poulenc’s assets. These were 
its share in the steam cracker at Feyzin, an industrial complex at Lavéra which 
would give Elf access to the Mediterranean and the much desired essential third 
ingredient in the chemical industry, chlorine, the other two being sulphur (from 
Lacq's natural gas) and carbon (derived from methane in natural gas and from oil 
products).
The price agreed by Elf was considered very high at the time and more so in 
retrospect because of the imminent recession in the chemical industry, as 
underlined in a note from the SNEA's, Direction Générale Chimie of 1.7.80.
"l'acquisition se fait à l'aube d'une récession sévère sur ces activités 
chimiques et que l'émergence prochaine à Berre du vapocraqueur de 
Shell, en association avec PCUK, introduira un facteur négatif dans les 
premières années de cet ensemble industriel."^®
When the deal, concluded on July 9th 1980, was presented to the chairman of the 
CFP, René Granier de Lilliac, he demanded a half share in the purchase in 
accordance with the 1969 treaty. He was supported in his demand by the top 
management of ERAP, opposed to breaking the original deal, and by the Minister 
of Finance who was against any extension of the public sector.
It was their wishes which prevailed and in September 1980, an agreement was 
signed, by which the SNEA and CFP would each hold a 40.25% share in the new 
company, Chloé (Chlo-Chlorine and E - Ethylene), while Rhone-Poulenc would hold 
the remainder.^®
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Chalandon's hopes to break the association with Total did not therefore materialise 
in this instance. As in the case of his unsuccessful attempt to purchase Kerr Magee 
five months earlier, his animosity towards André Giraud only increased because of 
what he saw to be another deliberate volte-face on the part of the Minister of 
Industry. The government's action in this episode was somewhat unclear in view 
of the imminent restructuring of the whole French chemical sector. Was Giraud 
again obstructing the ambitions of the SNEA chairman? Did the decision represent 
a victory for the Minister of Finance over the Minister of Industry? Whatever the 
reason, by forcing Elf into another joint venture vA\h Total, the government delayed 
the recovery of the heavy chemicals sector by a number of years.
Cooperation with government
Further expansion of Elfs chemical activities took place in the context of the 
Socialist government's nationalisation programme of 1981-82. The programme 
involved the nationalisation of France's two large steel firms, Usinor & Sacilor, of 
five leading multinationals, the Compagnie Générale d'Electricité (industrial 
electronics) Péchiney Ugine Kuhlmann (aluminium and chemicals) St. Gobain 
(glass and electronics) Rhone-Poulenc (chemicals) Thomson-Brandt (electronics 
and electrical goods), majority shareholdings in Dassault (aircraft) and Matra 
(armarments and electronics) and the nationalisation of thirty-six private banks.
The main preoccupation behind the programme was the stagnation of industrial 
investment and the result of two oil shocks, which had created a lack of demand and 
serious overcapacity in certain areas. Consequently industries were unable to 
benefit from gains in productivity created by new technologies. It was intended that 
the nationalisation programme should channel money from the banks into industry, 
enabling the firms to be freed of short-term financial constraints and to make 
long-term decisions regarding new technologies. In addition, the programme would 
facilitate the restructuring process and allow the concentration of resources on the 
métiers d'expertise. It was envisaged that the newly nationalised groups should
227
provide direct means by which the objectives of industrial policy could be pursued 
and that they should impart a competitive impetus to other companies^
The problems of the French chemical industry
The situation in the heavy chemicals sector was particularly dramatic with the big 
public and private companies forecasting serious losses for 1981. According to 
Cohen and Bauer,
'TEntreprise Minière et Chimique (EMC) - société publique prévoit une 
perte de plus de 100 millions de francs, Rhône-Poulenc de plus de 300, 
Ato-Chloé de plus de 500, PCUK de plus de 800, CDF-Chimie de plus 
de 1,2 milliard: soit au total 3 milliards de francs (l'équivalent d'une fois 
et demie le budget "d'intervention" du ministère de l'industrie)^®
The crisis was in fact a world crisis, resulting from the second oil shock, but the 
French companies were affected more seriously, as the Merrill Lynch report of 1987 
points out:
"To say that the French chemical industry during the late seventies and 
early eighties resembled the sick man of Europe is a masterpiece of 
understatement."^^
Chemical firms in France seem to have suffered from a variety of weaknesses. The 
majority belonged to the private sector, Rhône-Poulenc, Péchiney, St. Gobain, and 
chemicals for these firms had always been a secondary activity. In addition, 
chemicals had not been a priority of the Monnet Plan, nor since that time of any 
national strategy on the part of government. Firms were relatively small and 
dispersed compared with those of other European countries, for example, Germany, 
Holland and Great Britain. Moreover, they had not begun to merge until the mid- 
1960s when a "national champions" policy was being encouraged. Then the large- 
scale projects which government pushed companies to undertake, for example, 
CDF-Chimie's petrochemical platform at Dunkirk had to face the first oil crisis and 
consequent decline in dem and.W hat is more, unlike their European competitors.
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French firms had not diversified on a large scale into sectors which by the late 
1970s were in relatively good health, that is, speciality chemicals, agrochemicals 
and pharmaceuticals. The problems of French chemicals were compounded by the 
fact that prices were fixed by government at a lower level than those of European 
firms preventing the companies from making profits. Thus as Elfs Bulletin Mensuel 
d'information of November 1982 pointed out, just prior to the Socialist 
nationalisation programme, the specific ills of French firms, overcapacity and lack 
of specialisation, were aggravated by a fall in demand and rising costs at world 
level.^ ^
One company, in particular, Péchiney, was losing money on all fronts. Not only was 
aluminium, the company's major activity, in a critical state worldwide, but successive 
governments had refused to allow it to sell off loss-making steel and chemical 
sectors. Péchiney's attempt, in 1980, to sell its petrochemicals to Occidental 
Petroleum had met with a refusal because, according to Cohen and Bauer,
"la campagne électorale s'ouvrait et il s'agissait de vendre à un
étranger le deuxième groupe chimique français."^^
It became rapidly apparent that Péchiney's chemical branch. Produits Chimiques 
Ugine Kuhlmann (PCUK), would fail completely, so following on the nationalisation 
of Rhône-Poulenc and Péchiney in February 1982 and in the context of the 
restructuring plan for the whole of the chemicals public sector, the government 
initiated a sale of PCUK's assets. The plan consisted of two stages. Firstly, Elf, 
chosen as the champion of French chemicals, was to acquire majority shares in 
ATO and Chioé, while PCUK's assets were to be shared between Elf and 
Rhône-Poulenc. Secondly Elf, CDF-Chimie and Rhône-Poulenc had to propose a 
plan for reorganising their activities and rationalising investments sector by sector.
As far as the government was concerned, the underlying objective, set out in the 
communiqué from the Ministry of Research and Industry, was that restructuring 
should restore the competitiveness of the chemical industry through greater
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specialisation and a more efficient use of the complementary nature of the different 
groups. Thus in the distribution of PCUK's assets Elf was given the lion's share to 
become a leader in halogen chemicals (chlorine, fluorine and bromide) and in 
organic chemicals linked to halogens (oxygenised water and derivatives, see Figure 
5.2, p. 302). Rhône-Poulenc received several fine and mineral chemical plants 
from PCUK, confirming its important industrial role in healthcare, fine chemicals and 
bio-industries. As for CDF Chimie, its activities in organic chemicals and plastics 
were also reinforced (see Figure 5.3, p. 303).
The government's plan corresponded to Elfs own proposals that the restructurings 
should be "coherent", in other words, respect the strategic branches of production 
of each firm. Through ATO and Chloé Elf was already involved in petrochemicals 
and chlorine chemicals. By acquiring PCUK's assets (halogen chemicals and 
oxygenised water) the group not only strengthened its own chlorine chemicals 
branch but gained new areas in oxygenised water and those requiring treatment 
with chlorine, that is fluorine and bromide. Thus the government plan substantially 
raised Elfs national and international status in the chemical industry, as the Bulletin 
Mensuel points out:
"le Governement rend ainsi possible la création d'une super-filière - 
hydrocarbures, chlore, fluor, brome, eau oxygénée - parfaitement 
cohérente; du même coup, progressant d'une quinzaine de places, Elf 
Aquitaine atteint le 3*""® ou 4^"’® rang mondial en ce qui concerne le 
chlore et devient le 2^ ""® fluorier mondial."^®
Cohen and Bauer remark that Elf, in the restructuring plan, "got what they wanted". 
Negotiations had been lengthy, complex and acrimonious, with changes of Minister, 
changes of company chairmen and companies fighting over the most lucrative parts 
of PCUK. Finally however, the voluntarist action of Jean-Pierre Chevènement, 
Minister of Industry, 1982-83, who imposed a plan de dévolution on the five 
nationalised chemical groups, was beneficial to Elf. The group was able to 
disentangle itself from its paralysing partnership with the CFP and increase its 
importance in vital branches of the chemical industry.^^ The creation of a new
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company, ATOCHEM, (through the merging of ATO, Chloé and assets of PCUK)
contributed to making Elf in 1983 "France's largest chemical producer.
Yet Elf was also forced to pay a price. The chairman of the CFP, René Granier de 
Lilliac, insisted that his company be compensated for its investments in ATO and 
Chloé. Chalandon, however, having accepted loss-making assets, refused to 
jeopardise further the interests of his own healthy company. Combined with earlier 
confrontations with his supervisory minister, Chalandon's refusal to compensate the 
CFP in any form, (a cash payment, one of Elfs pharmaceutical subsidiaries or a 
section of a North Sea gas field had all been suggested) led to the non-renewal of 
his chairmanship of Elf, in 1983, on the recommendation of Laurent Fabius, Minister 
of Industry, 1983-84. It was left to his successor, Michel Pecqueur, to compensate 
the CFP partly in cash and partly in shares.^®
A convergence of policy
Events surrounding the restructuring of chemicals show that the top management 
of Elf did not get their way at every stage of the process. They were obliged to take 
over loss-making assets so that Elfs heavy chemicals showed a loss for the next 
three years.^ They were also obliged to compensate the CFP. In addition, the 
government used one of its means of controlling the company by not renewing the 
chairman's term of office in the face of his refusal to comply with their instructions. 
However, the results of the group's heavy chemicals four years after restructuring 
bear out the comment by Cohen and Bauer that:
"l'état volontariste est une providence pour la grande entreprise."^^
By 1986 Atochem was balancing its books and by 1987 making a comfortable profit. 
Indeed, that year the whole of Elfs chemical branch, although contributing only 27% 
to the group's turnover, was securing 50% of its profits.^^
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We have shown that Elf had been striving to expand its chemical activities since the 
mid-1960s. In the Socialist government's industrial restructuring plans, the group 
got what it wanted and considerably increased its national and international status 
in chemicals. It therefore seems that there was a close convergence of policy 
between the company and government. One could also say that government takes 
into account the wishes of its most profitable firms in formulating its own policies or 
that it is the initiatives and long-term strategies of its strongest firms which 
determine government plans.
D iversification  into  Pharmaceuticals  (healthcare  a nd  b io -industries)
Elfs second most important area of diversification, healthcare and bio-industries, 
is concentrated on Sanofi. It is a field which has grown steadily since the mid- 
1970s and, as with Elfs chemicals, the impetus came initially from certain 
personalities in the top management of the Société Nationale des Pétroles 
d'Aquitaine. In 1986 Sanofi was the second largest pharmaceutical group in France 
after Rhône-Poulenc. Elf had a 61 % share in the company although it did not exert 
managerial influence over it. With a holding in 1986 of 140 companies, Sanofi had 
three main areas of operations; human health, bio-industries , perfumes and 
cosmetics. In 1986 contributions to sales were 46%, 27% and 27% respectively. 
Just under 50% of the group sales were in respect of the French market.^^
In Chapter I we reviewed the factors which gave birth to Elfs pharmaceutical sector 
in the early 1970s (see Chapter 1, pp. 94-96). These were the nationalisation of the 
group's assets in Algeria and first oil shock, bringing higher prices in crude oil and 
subsequent financial burden for Elfs refining and petrochemical sectors; the 
SNPA's large cashflow from 1971, stemming from the creation of ATO which 
relieved it of investments in chemicals over the following three years; the 
approaching decline of the Lacq gas field and need to create jobs in South West 
France;^ the fact that pharmaceuticals did not require heavy investment but did 
demand a large labour force; the group's long-term policy to diversify beyond 
refining and petrochemicals shortly to become areas of competition from
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oil-producing countries. Although sections of government were initially opposed to 
the group diversifying its activities, there was a change of heart after the oil shock 
of 1973, when they acknowledged the necessity for oil companies to diversify their 
investments. A further reason why the Treasury in particular reversed its position 
was that foreign groups were rapidly capturing a large share of the French 
pharmaceutical, perfume and cosmetics markets.^®
These were the reasons behind the SNPA's creation of Omnium Financier Aquitaine 
pour l'Hygiène et la Santé (SANOFI) in 1973, a holding company under the 
directorship of René Sautier.^ Initially, SANOFI acquired controlling interests in 
small drugs companies in difficulty, Labaz, Choay and the Robillard and Castaigne 
laboratories. From 1974 it developed a second leg in perfumes and beauty 
products by acquiring interests in Yves Rocher, Roger et Gallet and Stendhal 
perfumes. In the early 1980s Charles J. Molyneux and Van Cleef and Arpels were 
added to Sanofi's beauty products sector. Sanofi's third leg developed from the 
early 1980s when the firm acquired the pharmaceutical sector of Clin-Midy. Not 
only did this acquisition enable SANOFI to attain "critical size" but also to gain 
access to an important research centre at Labège (Toulouse) and to the whole field 
of bio-industries, that is, additives, gelatine, and fragrances for the food-processing 
industry, veterinary products and seeds.
In 1986 the healthcare sector dominated Sanofi. Speciality drugs designed to 
prevent or treat cardiovascular diseases and disorders of the central nervous 
system were Sanofi's top performers. Diagnostic products (through the subsidiary. 
Diagnostics Pasteur) and the development and marketing of a human growth 
hormone by genetic engineering were two other areas in which Sanofi strengthened 
its posiiton by 1987.^
Bio-industries have an increasingly important role in many fields, especially 
agriculture and the food-processing industry. Sanofi made further progress in this 
area when it became, in 1985, the centre of a merger of all E lfs business in
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objective behind the merger was to benefit from the increasing application of 
biological research to all branches of bio-industries "from seeds right through to 
perfumes".'’®
Sanofi's growth was extremely rapid. A turnover of 1,5bn francs in 1976 had 
climbed to 16bn francs by 1986. In the process of expansion Sanofi also achieved 
one of its main objectives, the creation of jobs. In 1989, a top ranking official of Elf, 
interviewed for this study, commented that Sanofi's rapid growth in barely 12 years 
had been astonishing. Initially considered as just a back-up diversified activity, 
Sanofi was giving employment to 16,000 people, a bigger workforce than that of 
Elfs oil business.**’
Although a high percentage of Sanofi's business was French-based, international 
expansion was a major priority for all divisions of the company. The group was 
therefore actively seeking acquisitions, especially in the United States.^^
Yet certain areas of Sanofi's business had been held back in terms of their 
maximum profit potential. For example, the French healthcare market was difficult 
for several years due to price controls in France. In addition, all branches of the 
group had high expenditure on research since development of their business was 
research-based. Between 1981-86 spending on research rose substantially to 
reach 20% of group pharmaceutical sales.R esearch is nevertheless an essential 
element of Sanofi's activity in view of the rapid pace of scientific discovery and the 
necessity to develop and introduce new products.
It emerges that Sanofi's rapid growth was due to a policy of acquisitions, merging 
similar activities, greater specialisation and a strong commitment to research. The 
group's development was achieved largely through company initiatives with little 
intervention from government. The Socialist government of 1982 did, however, 
recognise the duopoly of Rhône-Poulenc and Elf in fine chemicals, bio-industries 
and pharmaceuticals and admitted that it was in fact desirable.** Sanofi, on the
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other hand, positively facilitated the government's chemical restructuring task. 
Profits from pharmaceuticals and cosmetics enabled Elfs heavy chemical business 
to survive the loss-making years of 1983-86.^ In addition, Sanofi was successful 
in creating jobs during a period when unemployment was a major preoccupation of 
government. Therefore, in the second area of Elfs diversified activities, 
governments benefited from the achievements of one of its major companies.
A  Paroxysm  of G o ver n m en t-C o m pany  C onflict
The question of E lfs diversifications reveals much about govemment-company 
relations. It shows that governments are concerned about broad national aims and 
these may run counter to a company's projects. It also reveals that the economic 
and political conditions of the day can influence how supervisory ministries behave 
with regard to company ambitions. Needless to say, the personalities involved and 
their relationships with one another will also influence the outcome of events. An 
episode from the Chalandon era illustrates one of the many confrontations between 
the top management of the group and the Minister of Industry.
Soon after taking up the chairmanship of Elf in 1977, Albin Chalandon realised that 
a state-owned group whose business was based almost exclusively on oil was 
unlikely to make large profits. He saw the group as a multinational just like any 
other and is reported as saying:
"elles (les multinationales) ont toutes à la fois l'obligation de faire des 
profits et le devoir de satisfaire leurs clients."^
One of his chief ambitions therefore was to develop Elfs diversified activities. The 
future of the group's oil business was threatened by fewer discoveries, higher 
exploration costs and more difficult tax conditions.'*^ In addition, Chalandon realised 
the importance of creating jobs in Aquitaine to compensate for the decline of the 
Lacq gas field. It was to this end that in 1978 the Société de Financement Régional 
Elf Aquitaine (SOFREA) was formed. It had the opportunity to become involved in
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more ambitious projects than its predecessor, the Bureau de Développement 
Eœnomique des pays de l'Adour.^ Furthermore, the deterioration of the group's 
refining sector made closures of refineries and restructurings imminent.
In the spring of 1979 the rise in oil prices and subsequent increase in Elfs revenue 
gave Chalandon greater liberty to pursue his ambitions. The group's profits 
approached 15bn francs per annum, a figure never previously attained by a French 
company.^ ® Chalandon was determined to take advantage of the extra resources 
to expand Elfs diversified areas. He remarks that.
"alors que l'activité pétrolière pouvait se révéler plus incertaine, Elf 
compenserait la baisse éventuelle de ses résultats, de son activité et 
de ses effectifs dans ce domaine par une forte expansion dans deux 
autres secteurs.
Sanofi's activities already offered considerable potential for development. 
Moreover, Chalandon's relations with managing directors in these areas were far 
more relaxed than those in the oil sector. The second area was food-processing. 
Chalandon's plan, through his contacts with a world leader in cereals, was to 
develop a food-processing industry based on synthetic products. For him this 
industry had several virtues:
"expansion et stabilité, pérennité et légèreté des investissements, 
autant d'attraits face à une activité pétrolière dévoreuse de capitaux et 
déclinante."®^
Although the food-processing project and a plan to acquire a controlling stake in a 
large electronics firm never materialised, due to the opposition of André Giraud, 
Minister of Industry, from 1980 onwards, the SNEA pursued acquisitions in areas 
as diverse as solar energy, coal, the production of photocopiers and mineral water.
Giraud's disagreement stemmed from several factors. In his view Elf should remain 
true to its mission of supplying France with hydrocarbons as a priority and 
diversifications should take second place. He was also concerned because 
diversified activities, being managed by outside agencies, might lead to a relaxation
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of control procedures. Moreover, in accordance with the wishes of the President, 
Giraud was anxious that the public sector should not be extended.
The top management of ERAP was similarly concerned because the group's 
diversified activities were not always compatible with its original mission. An added 
reason was that certain acquisitions had been made in loss-making sectors whose 
recovery would demand a close knowledge of markets and of distribution networks 
more complex than those of oil.“
The concern felt by Giraud and the top management of ERAP was also shared by 
other sections of government. In the last years of the Giscard presidency they were 
attempting to solve a whole variety of national economic problems. Raymond Barre, 
"France's best economist" in Giscard's view, was appointed prime minister in 1976, 
for that very purpose. The stop-go measures of the previous Chirac government 
had driven inflation up to 11% and Barre was committed to bringing it down. His 
austerity programme, introduced in 1976, aimed to control credit, cut public 
spending and induce wage restraint. As a "liberal" he was convinced that French 
industry should be made to stand on its own feet and be freed of excessive 
government intervention. He therefore lifted price controls in many industries. He 
also made it clear that public funds would become less available for "lame duck" 
firms, whatever the cost in jobs. Industries would have to be efficient and pay their 
way.®  ^ This was the politico-economic context which explains Giraud's concern 
about les nationalisations rampantes.
The question of the nature and extent of Elfs diversified business, therefore, acted 
as a catalyst in forcing the government to clarify where responsibilities lay within the 
state-owned oil group. Remarks made by Giraud and others at the time echo the 
accusations levelled against Elf Erap in the Schwarz Report of 1974;
"Nous voulons savoir qui fait quoi et comment circule l'argent."
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"Quand l'Etat est actionnaire à 67%, on ne peut pas être indifférent aux 
impératifs nationaux et affirmer qu'il suffit de gagner de l'argent."
"La filialisation et la "cuisine" de Bonnet de la Tour (directeur financier), 
interdisent de savoir ce qui se passe à Elf Aquitaine."^
The diversification issue also revealed divisions among the Gauliists themselves 
and combined with many other sore points between Chalandon and Giraud, 
producing a public battle of words between the two men throughout 1980. There 
was the vetoing of the Kerr Magee purchase in the spring of 1980, on the grounds 
that the Ministry of Industry had insufficient information on the company and then 
the ensuing attacks against Giraud and state interventionism launched by 
Chalandon through the media. By way of riposte, Giraud, who had been instructed 
by a œnseil restreint at the Elysée in April 1980 to restructure Elf Aquitaine, "dont 
la puissance inquiète les milieux politiques",^ devised the plan to end Chalandon's 
double chairmanship of the SNEA and ERAP. He would give the former to Georges 
Besse, chairman of COGEMA, and leave the latter to Chalandon. Giraud also 
planned to terminate Chalandon's chairmanship when it came up for renewal in July 
of that year. However, the sacking of Chalandon ten months from the elections 
would have caused serious rifts within the majority. As a former leading member of 
the Gaullist party, Chalandon had loyal supporters in high places, especially Roger 
Frey and Jean-Jacques Chaban-Delmas, presidents of the Conseil Constitutionnel 
and Assemblée Nationale respectively, as well as the leaders of several African 
states.^
In order to reconcile Chalandon with his ministre de tutelle, Raymond Barre 
instructed him to reorganise the structures of Elf Aquitaine himself to make them 
more appropriate to new developments within the group. Chalandon agreed to 
transfer the SNEA's stake in diversified activities to private shareholdings while the 
hydrocarbon sectors would remain largely in public ownership. The Council of 
Ministers meeting of July 1980 also stressed the distinction between the 
hydrocarbon and diversified sectors. According to the official communiqué.
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"Ce sont le pétrole et le gaz qui génèrent l'essentiel de son cash-flow.
C'est au pétrole et au gaz qu'il doit être consacré par priorité car la 
taille du groupe pétrolier n'est pas supérieure à celle des autres 
groupes pétroliers internationaux. Le responsable de la SNEA doit 
ainsi accorder l'essentiel de ses préoccupations aux affaires 
pétrolières."®^
Sectors in which the group had diversified "ne correspondent ni aux mêmes ordres 
de grandeur financiers ni aux mêmes réflexes ni aux mêmes compétences."®®
These were the reasons used by the government to separate the double 
chairmanship of the SNEA and ERAP. While Chalandon remained head of the 
SNEA, Pierre d'Alby, ingénieur des Mines and chairman of the board of Gaz de 
France, took charge of ERAP. He was instructed to respect four principles 
concerning the general management of Elf Aquitaine:
Elfs oil strategy should conform with French oil policy 
Elfs activities in other energy related fields should take account of France's 
■ future supply needs 
diversified activities should be clearly distinguished from those of 
hydrocarbons and pursued solely in areas approved by the authorities 
E lfs activities in South West France should be reinforced
The question of diversification has shown that a state-owned group and 
governments can and did have opposing objectives. Chalandon, like any company 
chairman, aimed to ensure the survival of his group. He therefore sought to 
develop new branches to compensate for the problems of existing ones. The 
windfall of increased profits at the end of the 1970s was most opportune. It was 
unfortunate for Chalandon that he and his Minister of Industry were so ill-matched. 
An ingénieur des Mines and grand commis de l'Etat, André Giraud took the view 
that the state-owned group should devote its energies to the purpose for which it 
was created, that is, supplying France with hydrocarbons. Not only did Elf lack 
specialised knowledge of the new areas which it sought to acquire but no control
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procedures were in place to enable supervision of them. Moreover, in the economic 
climate of the late 1970s the government was especially concerned about cutting 
public expenditure. It could not afford to come to the aid of yet more industries in 
difficulty. What is more, the restructuring of the whole French chemical sector in 
which Elf would play a major role, was already being planned. As Minister of 
Industry, Giraud was responsible for knowing where Elfs money came from and 
where it was going. The fact that the same person was chairman of ERAP, the 
holding company, and the SNEA, its main subsidiary, only served to obscure 
matters, since the role of ERAP was topontfbl the state's 67% share in the SNEA. 
By separating the chairmanship, the government created another level of control, 
so that Chalandon would have to refer to the head of ERAP before spending public 
money. In this particular episode of Elfs development, therefore, the government 
was shown to exercise control on the company chairman by forcing him to 
reorganise the financial structures of the group and imposing on him another level 
of supervision.
C o nclusion
This review of how Elfs main diversified activities developed shows that the present 
status of the group's chemical and pharmaceutical business was achieved through 
a combination of factors. The company's ambition to develop the by-products of its 
refineries, to diversify its risks and to achieve competitive size led to the adoption 
of a variety of long-term strategies and decisions. These included; joint ventures 
with rival companies (and the breaking of alliances), exploiting the interdependence 
of chains of production, merging subsidiaries, increased specialisation in products 
incorporating a greater percentage of value added and high investment in research. 
Except for a short period at the beginning of the 1980s, government policy 
regarding the diversified operations of a largely state-owned group was either 
lacking or very unclear. Yet in the process of reinforcing and expanding its 
diversified areas, the Elf group contributed to solving many of the problems which 
beset governments, such as unemployment and the underdevelopment of regions.
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At a time of strong intervention by government, when the Socialists in 1981-82 
nationalised key sectors of industry in order to restructure them, Elfs healthy 
position also aided their plans. Although the group’s wealth at the end of the 1970s 
was due to good fortune rather than to the achievements of its top management, by 
this stage Elf had proved that it was capable of developing distinct activities in 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals without help from government. Events therefore 
show that the achievements of the Elf group facilitated the implementation of 
government policy. However, a strongly interventionist government can also 
advance company projects, particularly when the long-term policies of both 
converge. Elfs desired expansion into chemicals coincided with the government's 
plan to restructure the industry.
Our review also shows that governments did not intervene systematically in the 
management of state-owned companies, but in unpredictable ways. The economic 
and political climate at a particular moment, the personality and status of officials 
in decision-making posts and the political affiliations of the government in power 
can affect the level of intervention. Events also show that government does not 
take the initiative in deciding the management strategies of public sector^ 
companies. They tend to intervene in retrospect and in limited areas, tightening 
control procedures or replacing company chairmen. The development of Elfs 
diversified activities demonstrates clearly, however, that governments take 
advantage of the technological and managerial skills, the imagination, the drive and 
the achievements of teams within state-owned companies to advance their own 
broad plans for the national economy. It is the initiatives of major firms which 
facilitate and determine government policy.
NOTES
1. Société Nationale Elf Aquitaine: Rapport Annuel 1986, 1987, 1988, Paris.
2. Le Monde, 7 February 1989.
241
3. Le Monde, 18 June 1988.
4. Bertrand Bellon, "La chimie, une richesse menacée", in Bertrand Belion and
Jean-Marie Chevalier (eds.). L'industrie en France, Paris, Flammarion, 1983,
p. 160.
5. Ibidem, p. 171.
6. Ibidem, p. 168.
7. Elie Cohen and Michel Bauer, Qui gouverne les groupes industriels? Paris,
Seuil, 1981. pp. 72-79.
8. Ibidem, pp.96-123.
9. Merrill Lynch Report, Société Nationale Elf Aquitaine, The forgotten OH
Company, 26 January 1987, p.42.
10. Elie Cohen and Michel Bauer, Les Grandes Manoeuvres Industrielles, Paris, 
Belfond, 1985, pp.95-96.
11. Private interview.
12. Christophe Babinet, Histoire du groupe Elf Aquitaine, (unpublished) Paris, 
1986, p.356.
13. Albin Chalandon, Quitte ou Double, Paris, Grasset, 1986, p.231.
14. Ibidem.
15. Christophe Babinet, op.cit., p.358.
16. Quoted in ibidem, p.359.
17. Eiie Cohen and Michel Bauer, op.cit., 1985, pp.87-88.
18. Christophe Babinet, op.cit., pp. 359-360.
19. "Les nationalisations industrielles et bancaires". Cahiers Français, No.214, 
Documentation Française, 1984, pp.7-11.
20. Elie Cohen and Michel Bauer, op.cit., 1985, p.88.
21. Merrill Lynch Report, op.cit., p.42.
22. Eiie Cohen Michel Bauer, op.cit., 1985, pp.94-98.
23. "La restructuration du secteur public de la chimie française" in Bulletin 
Mensuel d'informations, SNEA, November 1982, p.4.
24. Elie Cohen and Michel Bauer, op.cit., 1985, pp. 102-108.
25. Bulletin Mensuel d'informations, SNEA, op.cit., pp.5-8.
26. Ibidem, p.6.
242
27. Elie Cohen and Michel Bauer, op.cit., 1985, pp. 102-108.
28. Herald Tribune, 15 November, 1983.
29. Elie Cohen and Michel Bauer, op.cit., 1985, p. 107.
30. Herald Tribune, op.cit.
31. Elie Cohen and Michel Bauer, op.cit., 1981, pp.113-115.
32. Le Monde, 18 June 1988.
33. Merrill Lynch Report, op.cit., p.49.
34. "L'ensemble des prises de position dans le secteur Hygiène et Santé comme 
dans la chimie fine vise enfin à servir les objectifs régionaux du groupe." 
(Extract from meeting on SNPA's diversified activities 2.3.77) Christophe 
Babinet, op.cit., See note 103, Chapter IX.
35. Ibidem, pp.297-299.
36. René Sautier was appointed chairman of Sanofi in 1973. In 1986 he became 
director of the chemicals branch of the SNEA.
37. Christophe Babinet, op.cit., p.300.
38. Rapport Annuel, SNEA, 1988.
39. Communiqué de Presse, SNEA, 15 November 1984.
40. Le Figaro, 22 September 1986.
41. Private interview.
42. Le Figaro, op.cit.
43. Merrill Lynch Report, op.cit., p.48.
44. Bulletin Mensuel d'informations, SNEA, op.cit., p.6.
45. Le Monde, 18 June 1988.
46. Quoted in Pierre Péan and Jean-Pierre Séréni, op.cit., p.209.
47. Albin Chalandon, op.cit., p. 171.
48. Christophe Babinet, op.cit.. See note 22, Chapter XI.
49. Ibidem, p.339.
50. Albin Chalandon, op.cit., p. 171.
51. Ibidem.
52. Christophe Babinet, op.cit.., pp.338-342.
53. P. Hall, J. Hayward, H. Machin (eds.) Developments in French Politics,
243
London, Macmillan, 1990, p. 176.
54. Pierre Péan and Jean-Pierre Séréni, op.cit., pp.216-217.
55. Christophe Babinet, op.cit.., p.351.
56. Ibidem, p.352-355.
57. Ibidem.
58. Ibidem.
244
CHAPTER 6
THE PRIVATISATION PROCESS:
SHARED OBJECTIVES AND DISPUTED METHODS
Privatisation has been described by John Vickers and Vincent Wright as a 
"strengthening of the market at the expense of the state"\ a definition which 
embraces a whole host of policies. Although in the recent history of the Société 
Nationale Elf Aquitaine there have been two occasions - in 1976 and 1986 - when 
the government sold off a proportion of the state's share in the group, during that 
decade Elf also became progressively more market-oriented in character. Over the 
last twenty-five years all large companies have been locked into the international 
as well as their national economies and this is truer for an oil company which is 
multinational by nature, so competition has been keener and survival more 
precarious. Strategies aimed at increasing profits, developing new activities and 
new markets, achieving greater financial and managerial independence, cutting 
back loss-making sectors and avoiding potentially burdensome demands that 
government might impose on the company are some of the methods employed by 
large firms, such as the SNEA, to move out of the focus of the state. This chapter 
will argue that privatisation can therefore assume many different forms.
Privatisation for Elf, at least, was also a gradual process. Firstly, we shall consider 
the circumstances of the first denationalization of Elf under a liberal right-wing 
government in 1976. We shall then examine how the managerial approach of the 
chairman appointed by the same right-wing government took the privatisation 
process a step further. His chairmanship, however, was subject to the 
interventionist policies of a Socialist government, policies which paradoxically 
revealed a continuity with those of the previous administration. Finally, the second 
official partial privatisation of Elf under a liberal right-wing government in 1986 will 
be analysed within the context of a national and international privatisation 
movement. We shall also consider whether politics have made any difference to 
this evolution.
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T he  ERAP-SNPA Merger
The nationalisation-privatisation debate, although high on the political agenda in the 
1980s, began well before the decade. In January 1976, the merger of the 
Entreprise de Recherches et d'ActivItés Pétrolières (ERAP), établissement public, 
with its rich subsidiary, the Société Nationale des Pétroles d'Aquitaine (SNPA), 
entailing the transfer of 30% of the state's share from the public to the private 
sector, created the Société Nationale Elf Aquitaine (SNEA) as it is known today.
The SNPA, in which ERAP owned a 52.22% share, was responsible for managing 
the gas field at Lacq, the major source of the company's fortune and which, after the 
rise in oil and gas prices in the mid-1970s, became even more profitable. The 
merger was in fact a logical step in the development of an integrated oil group, if 
one considers the creation of the Union Générale des Pétroles (UGP)^ in 1960 and 
of ERAP^ in 1966 as the first steps. ERAP's precarious state after its departure 
from Algeria in 1971 and the radical change in the world oil market from 1973 
accelerated this evolution. Since the late 1960s there had also been a world-wide 
tendency towards concentration in the oil industry, as pointed out in the letter from 
André Bouillot, vice-president of ERAP and the SNPA, to SNPA executives in 1970. 
His argument was that:
"une politique solitaire ne peut conduire qu'à des situations 
économiques de médiocrité et de dépérissement si l'on n'a déjà - ce 
qui n'est pas notre cas-atteint la taille indispensable à la survie dans 
un monde international où les faibles sont rapidement écrasés.""*
The attainment of optimum size was also behind instructions given to ERAP/SNPA 
in July 1971 by an interministerial council on energy. The firms were urged to 
coordinate their management, especially in the area of exploration - production, to 
ensure greater efficiency, economies and increased profitability.
A first step towards the merger took place in the course of 1973 when a single 
Comité Exécutif formed under Pierre Guillaumat, chairman of ERAP and SNPA,
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and several important functions, Finances, Economie et Ressources, Personnel, 
Chimie, Exploration-Production were assumed at group level. Regarding the merger 
itself, it was decided that the SNPA should be the main focus and that the operation 
should be carried out at two levels. First, all exploration and production assets of 
ERAP and the SNPA were merged into a single subsidiary of the SNPA under the 
name of the Société Nationale Elf Aquitaine (Production) (SNEA (P)). Second, 
ERAP brought all its other assets to the SNPA whose name changed to the Société 
Nationale Elf Aquitaine (SNEA).®
When in the middle of 1975, it was rumoured that ERAP and the SNPA would soon 
be merged, the news had an immediate effect on the Bourse with the SNPA share 
price falling from 539 francs to 485 francs in four days. 'Tempête; la Bourse craint 
une fusion d'Elf avec Aquitaine" were the headlines in the Journal des Finances of 
June 9th®.
Private shareholders of the SNPA feared the nationalisation of their assets and 
demanded reassurance, which Guillaumat, as chairman of the SNPA and ERAP, 
was unable to give. The uncertainty caused the share price to fall even further and 
this downward movement was only halted a few days before the official 
announcement of the merger on January 9th, 1976, when the price actually rose, 
possibly due to the intervention of ERAP.^
There are clear indications that the sections of government involved in the merger. 
Ministries of Finance and Industry, and the top management of ERAP and the SNPA 
- in effect the same people - were anxious that the operation should succeed. In 
other words, the SNPA share price had to be maintained, since the private 
shareholders of the firm had to approve the merger. Furthermore, the project had 
to be seen by managers and staff of ERAP and the SNPA as a logical step for both 
firms. Two texts in particular, the ministerial communiqué and the press 
communiqué from ERAP, are revealing on these questions. Both texts stress that 
the merger had strong government support and that it was the economic conditions
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of the time which necessitated the merger of the two firms' assets. In a detailed 
study of the two texts, Philippe Simonnot clearly underlines a discrepancy between 
the stated and the real aims.® For example, the ministerial communiqué stresses 
that ERAP's discoveries in several parts of the world would compensate for the 
decline of the Lacq gas field. In reality Lacq was the reason why the SNPA's wealth 
had increased substantially since the oil crisis, which resulted in a quadrupling of 
oil prices and a considerable increase in gas prices. Moreover, ERAP's discoveries 
would only start being productive at some future date while in the present, its debts 
were considerable, interest on them had to be paid and further loans made to 
finance exploration activities. In addition, the serious losses ERAP had suffered in 
its refining and distribution sector are played down, since the impression ministers 
wished to create was that the SNPA was benefitting from its merger with ERAP 
rather than the reverse. On this point Simonnot describes the operation as "Cette 
manière de hold-up ... occultée dans les communiqués", in which "il ne faut pas 
faire trop apparaître les énormes appétits financiers de l'ERAP".®
Both texts reveal a strong desire to reassure the private shareholders of the SNPA 
that their interests would be protected and to this end they glossed over the 
question of state control but underlined emphatically the capitalist nature of the 
operation. In the ministerial communiqué we read;
"... le Ministre de l'Industrie et de la Recherche et le Ministre de 
l'Economie et des Finances ont donné mission à M. Pierre Guillaumat 
de mener à bien cette évolution en respectant scrupuleusement les 
intérêts des diverses parties en présence, et tout particulièrement 
ceux des actionnaires de la SNPA .. .Ils lui ont en outre indiqué que 
comme la SNPA à l'heure actuelle, la nouvelle Société Nationale Elf 
Aquitaine sera avant tout considérée comme une entreprise normale 
responsable de sa rentabilité et de son développement...."^®
It is with the same intention that the ERAP communiqué points out that it would give 
up voting rights corresponding to the assets it would bring to the newly formed 
SNEA - in whose capital it would be owning a 70% share. Despite this two-thirds 
share, the ministerial communiqué never mentions the subject of government
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control. The ERAP communiqué, however, states quite plainly that its majority 
holding in the SNEA would mean that the newly formed group would be managed 
like any private company.
Dans la S.N. Elf Aquitaine, le contrôle de l'Etat découlera d'une 
participation de l'ERAP maintenue supérieure à 50% et s'exercera 
dans l'esprit qui, précisément, a permis la réussite de la SNPA c'est- 
à-dire qu'aucune activité ne sera décidée dont la rentabilité ne soit 
assurée à des conditions normales pour une entreprise faisant appel 
à l'épargne privée.
The merger produced considerable controversy at workforce level and in political 
circles. For the CGT it was an "inadmissible transfert d'un bien public au secteur 
privé" and for the Union des Cadres et Techniciens SNPA it was "une véritable 
annexion de la SNPA par le groupe ELF".^^ In parliament. Socialists, Communists 
and Gauliists criticised not so much the principle of restructuring the group as the 
methods employed, namely that the merger was being carried out by decree without 
a parliamentary vote. Michel Rocard, secretary to the PS, admitted that,
"La complexité des structures actuelles, les difficultés de 
commandement, les rivalités entre une SNPA riche et l'ERAP 
dévoreuse de crédits pour l'exploration ... tout cela méritait 
réorganisation".^^
whereas Julien Schwartz, député (UDR), opposed the merger more especially 
because it contravened Article 34 of the Constitution, which stipulated that any 
transfer of assets from the public to the private sector must be submitted to a vote 
of parliament;
"En cédant les actifs industriels de l'ERAP à la SNEA société de droit 
privé, le gouvernement opère un transfert qui doit être approuvé par 
les élus"
The related question of the abandonment of state control in the new company was 
brought to public attention by the appearance in Le Monde of March 3rd 1976 of "la 
note Ramel", one of a series of confidential letters addressed to Guillaumat from 
Gaston Ramel, chef de la Mission de Contrôle des Entreprises Pétrolières, the
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Ministry of Finance representative on the boards of the national oil companies. The 
letter from Gaston Ramel raises the questions of the composition of the board of the 
SNEA and the organisation of state control in the new company. It shows that 
Guillaumat was putting up the greatest possible resistance to attempts by Gaston 
Ramel to increase the number of government representatives on the board and then 
to enhance the powers of those from the Ministry of Finance. On all points, 
however, he was forced to fall in line with Guillaumat's wishes that the form of state 
control in the SNEA - 70% state owned - should remain the same as it had been in 
the SNPA (formerly 52% state-owned).^®
The government played down the affair, maintaining that the transfer was not illegal 
because ERAP continued to be 100% state-owned and held a majority share in the 
newly formed SNEA. Moreover, "plutôt que d'une fusion, il s'agit d'une 
simplification puisque la majorité de l'un des deux groupes appartenait déjà à 
l'autre", and the presence of private shareholders should not pose the threat of a 
"blocking majority", because they were extremely dispersed.^®
It was the government's wishes which prevailed and on July 9th 1976 at an 
extraordinary meeting of the SNPA's shareholders, the merger was approved. The 
government's approach to the merger was altogether very pragmatic. Ministers 
were accepting the inevitable: that ERAP, originally created to be the instrument 
of French oil policy, should behave like a private company. This trend had in fact 
begun some years earlier. Did not the Schwartz report of 1974 accuse ERAP along 
with the CFP of ententes with the "Majors"? Did not ERAP leave Algeria in 1971 
against the wishes of President Pompidou, who thought that the group should have 
established closer economic ties there? President Giscard d'Estaing is quoted as 
saying.
"Peut-on rendre responsable le gouvernement français de la 
conception que se fait l'ERAP de ses intérêts en politique pétrolière? 
Chacun sait bien que non."^^
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The government also accepted that the role of the établissement public had 
evolved. No longer the instrument of important national projects, firms such as 
ERAP were being forced by economic conditions to be profitable and attain optimum 
size in order to compete in world markets. Whereas the BRP, when it was created 
in 1945, had been given a national interest mission, to set up "an oil exploration 
programme and ensure its implementation in the exclusive Interest of the nation", 
thirty years later the newly formed SNEA was considered to be "a company like any 
other, responsible for its profitability and development". (See extract from 
ministerial communiqué concerning ERAP/SNPA merger quoted above.)
It was also to the government's advantage that firms such as ERAP should have a 
substantial number of private shareholders. For example, it was a way of making 
private investment contribute to the financing of costly exploration projects and thus 
relieve in part the Treasury's contribution to such projects. A large private 
shareholding also ensured for the SNEA a more "capitalist" management. This 
point is aptly reinforced by Péan and Séréni concerning the change of approach 
which the merger would bring about. They underline that the private sector logic 
which had always characterised ERAP's jp^^ubsid ia ry, the SNPA, would rapidly 
permeate the new Elf group:
"De toutes les filiales du BRP puis de l'ERAP, Aquitaine est, depuis 
sa naissance, la plus liée au privé, la moins pénétrée de l'esprit de 
mission nationale. A la SNPA, on n'est pas là pour trouver du pétrole 
mais pour gagner de l'argent. On y raisonne plus en industriel et en 
chimiste qu'en pétrolier. Sa mentalité "capitaliste" va rapidement 
contaminer le nouveau groupe Elf Aquitaine."^®
T he  C halando n  Era
1976, the year of the ERAP/SNPA merger, also witnessed preparations for the 
retirement of Pierre Guillaumat as chairman of the state oil group. In many ways the 
chairmanship of his successor, Albin Chalandon, marked a further stage in the 
group's increasingly market orientation. As a convinced liberal, Chalandon was the
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preferred choice of Giscard d'Estaing and Jacques Chirac. Like Giscard, he was 
an Inspecteur des Finances and had spent the early part of his career in banking. 
In fact his training was that of banker and businessman rather than industrialist.^®
On account of Chalandon's background - the scandals in which he had been 
involved were also well known - and the fact that he had "stolen" a post which the 
Corps des Mines considered their preserve, many top managers of the SNEA were 
opposed to his appointment.^® He was also viewed with suspicion by his Ministre 
de tutelle, André Giraud. Their different conception of the oil industry was the 
source of many conflicts. For Giraud, who remained loyal to the Guillaumat étatiste 
approach, the prime function of the industry should be security of supply and to 
serve the aims of national fuel policy, but for Chalandon, its purpose was not only 
to supply France with oil and gas but to make money. First and foremost for 
Chalandon, the role of the newly formed SNEA was to be profitable and all activities 
other than the production of hydrocarbons and their by-products should contribute 
towards the company's cashflow.
Another point of conflict between Chalandon and Giraud was Chalandon's strong 
aversion to all forms of government intervention in industry, notably, the control of 
prices, credit and exchange rates.^ ^ Furthermore, he had been appointed by the 
President of the Republic and considered that he was answerable to him alone. 
Chalandon believed he was at least as good a judge of the national interest as the 
Minister of Industry himself. Consequently, he was dismissive of civil servants and 
paid little attention to administrative procedures. For example, he did not inform the 
authorities about the Libyan contracts in December 1980. His style of management 
was very different from that of Guillaumat who, as a grand commis de l'Etat, was 
highly skilled in handling top civil servants. As a result, Chalandon aroused the 
hostility of Giraud and senior administrators at the Direction des Hydrocarbures 
(DHYCA) who, in return, seem to have obstructed many of his plans.
Chalandon's aim to make the group profitable clarified a number of contradictions 
which struck him when he first became chairman. In his view Elf had a dual image; 
a firm created by government and excessively bureaucratic but also financially
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independent and enjoying the reputation of being one of France's most profitable 
f i r m s . T h e  importance he attached to cashflow pleased both the Ministry of 
Finance and former executives of the SNPA:
"Chalandon a eu le grand mérite de trancher le débat, de dire: Vous
êtes à capitaux d'Etat, mais vous n'êtes pas une entreprise publique.
Votre seule motivation est le profit car sans profit vous mourrez."^^
Chalandon's determination to make the SNEA more profitable underpinned the 
group's strategies during his chairmanship. In addition to strengthening the group's 
diversified activities, he is given particular credit for restructuring its refining sector 
and reinforcing its presence in the US.
On taking up his chairmanship in 1977 Chalandon was convinced by a whole series 
of uncertainties in the SNEA's oil sector that it was urgent to find new areas of 
development. These difficulties arose from fewer discoveries, increased exploration 
costs, higher taxation, the importance of creating jobs in S.W. France where the 
Lacq gas field would soon be exhausted and the progressive deterioration in the 
group's refining sec to r .A f t e r  the rise in oil prices in the Spring of 1979 and 
subsequent profits for the group, Chalandon sought to take advantage of the 
increased cash to move into several diversified areas. Although the healthcare 
activities managed by Sanofi were the most promising, food processing, electronics, 
the production of photocopiers and mineral water also figured among the areas 
which he attempted to bring into the group. Giraud and the top management of 
ERAP were consistently opposed to these diversifications which were frequently 
incompatible with the basic activities of the group. In Giraud's view diversifications 
should not be pursued to the detriment of oil exploration, production, refining and 
distribution, the group's essential task.^ ®
To increase the group's profits was also the intention behind Chalandon's efforts to 
expand the SNEA's activities in the US, "the only oil-producing country where 
substantial profits could be realised and brought back to France.^ ® Although his first 
attempt to buy the much coveted Kerr Magee in 1979 was vetoed by Prime Minister
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Raymond Barre, on Giraud's advice, Chalandon took advantage of the change of 
government in 1981 to push through the purchase of another American firm, 
Texasgulf. Texasgulf was chosen for a number of reasons. It was highly profitable 
- figuring top of Fortune's list of companies - it would expand the diversified and 
traditional activities of the SNEA and it would allow the group to rid itself of 
Aquitaine Company of Canada, a Canadian subsidiary of the former SNPA, 
threatened by a fall in its production of crude oil and sulphur. This exchange of 
subsidiaries was one of the conditions attached to the acquisition of Texasgulf by 
the Comité Spécial of ERAP. Indeed, it was laid down that no funds were to be 
transferred from France for the purchase, which at the time was the highest 
investment ever made by a French company abroad.^^
Chalandon's restructuring of Elf s refining sector was also in line with the logic of the 
market place. The group's refining activities had suffered severely as a result of the 
oil crisis and there were three major factors which prevented recovery. First, the 
price of oil products was controlled by government and had been so since the 
Liberation, when an ordinance of 1945 enabled it to fix the price of all products at 
production and distribution level. All governments are concerned about the price 
index level because of its repercussions on the rate of inflation. Governments also 
take a short-term view for electoral reasons and this can have a negative effect on 
industrial investment which by nature is long-term. The policy imposed on the 
refining sector was to bring prices in line with European levels when they were low, 
but to freeze French prices when European rates rose.^ ® This naturally led to 
enormous losses in the refining sector. The second problem facing the group's 
refineries was that they were the necessary outlet for oil produced by the group's 
exploration branch and were not allowed to purchase supplies elsewhere and 
negotiate over the price and quality of different types of crude. The third factor was 
that anxiety over oil shortages after the 1973 crisis led successive French 
governments to conclude "state to state" agreements. These submerged the 
refineries of Elf and CFP with enormous quantities of Saudi, Venezuelan and 
Mexican crude oil, exceeding their needs three and four times over. Naturally the
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companies tried to disengage themselves from these contracts frequently in 
disagreement with the DHYCA. A lack of profits for reinvestment, rigid price 
controls and overcapacity had thus led to a serious deterioration of the group's 
refineries. Restructuring took the form of closures, the automation of production 
methods and the installation of conversion equipment - catalytic cracking - allowing 
the manufacture of lighter fuels - petrol, domestic fuel - in preference to heavy 
varieties. Thus from 1979, refineries throughout France were either modernised 
and "converted" or closed down. At the level of distribution also, there was a drastic 
reduction in the number of depots and petrol stations.^
Although decided within the context of the Socialist government's nationalisation 
programme of 1982-83, the restructuring of the French heavy chemicals sector, in 
which Elf played a major part, can be seen not only as conforming to the logic of the 
market but also relieving the Treasury of subsidies to "lame ducks". France's 
chemicals sector suffered from similar problems to those of E lf s refineries: it was 
producing more than the national market could absorb; there was a slowing down 
in demand outside France and an increase In the price of raw materials and energy. 
Prices were fixed by government at a lower level than those of European 
competitors and no French chemical group had reached the critical size enabling 
it to make a name for itself in a particular branch of production.
The plan to restructure the whole of the chemicals public sector was approved by 
the Conseil des Ministres in May 1982 following the nationalisation of Rhone- 
Poulenc and Péchiney Ugine Kuhlmann (PUK) in February. It consisted of two 
stages. Firstly, Elf was to take over from the CFP majority shares in ATO and 
Chloé, while PUK's chemical assets were to be shared between Elf and Rhône- 
Poulenc. Secondly, Elf, CDF Chimie and Rhône-Poulenc had to propose a plan for 
reorganising their activities and rationalising investments sector by sector.^ There 
had been a division of opinion about whether ERAP or the SNEA should lead the 
restructuring exercise. As Industry Minister, Pierre Dreyfus had planned that it 
should be ERAP, while the chairman and vice-chairman of ERAP were of the
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opinion that the SNEA should be the leader, in order to protect dividends paid by 
ERAP to the State. It was the latter solution, supported by a new Industry Minister, 
Jean-Pierre Chevènement, which was finally adopted. The SNEA, however, as the 
main inheritor of PUKs loss-making activities and because its top management had 
not initiated the restructuring plan, refused to compensate the CFP for past 
investments it had in ATO and Chloé. This became the stumbling block in 
negotiations. The chairman of the CFP demanded that Elf buy all his company's 
shares in ATO and Chloé, while Chalandon argued that the Treasury, by means of 
ERAP, should pay compensation to the CFP.^  ^ The intervention of yet another new 
Industry Minister, Laurent Fabius, laying down conditions by which Elf should 
compensate the CFP, only reinforced Chalandon's resolve:
"C'est la première fois dans son histoire que l'entreprise reçoit des 
instructions que l'on peut assimiler a un ordre de service qu'un 
ministre adresse à son administration. Cette attitude me paraît 
contraire, non seulement à l'autonomie de gestion et à la 
responsabilité de ses dirigeants telle qu' elle a été affirmée maintes 
fois par le Président de la République et, plus récemment encore par 
vous-même mais aussi, aux termes de la loi sur les sociétés à 
laquelle l'entreprise se trouve soumise.... Face aux intérêts de 
l'ensemble de mes actionnaires, il m'appartient de prendre en mon 
âme et conscience les décisions que j'estime conformes à leurs 
intérêts. L'actionnaire majoritaire qui parle par votre voix peut 
m'indiquer des orientations, me révoquer, mais non m'imposer ma 
conduite."^^
It is reported that Chalandon's refusal to comply with Fabius' instructions
contributed to the non-renewal of his chairmanship in June 1983.^ ^
Although during Chalandon's chairmanship there was no reduction in the state's 
shareholding in the SNEA, his six years in office witnessed his efforts to develop the 
group's activities, markets and cashflow, to cut back loss-making sectors and to 
oppose government interference in the group's affairs. Chalandon behaved not as 
a grand commis de l'Etat but as an autonomous company chairman, fighting against 
the principle of his group being used as an instrument of government economic 
policy.
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It also emerges that the Socialist government which came to power in May 1981, 
although resolved to break with capitalism, actually adopted policies characteristic 
of state capitalism. The restructuring of industry shows the government's use of 
profitable firms to help those which were making losses, a determination to protect 
their dividends and a refusal to allow a state-owned group to risk its own funds in 
foreign acquisitions (Texasgulf). In other words, the Socialist government of 1981 - 
83 wanted a state-owned group like the SNEA not only to be "une entreprise 
normale responsable de sa rentabilité et de son développement" but more 
especially to relieve the Treasury of having to make good losses incurred in other 
areas of the public sector.
What had happened by 1983 was that the Socialist government had "rediscovered 
the firm" as the principal instrument of wealth creation.^ The expansionist and 
redistributive policies which they had adopted in 1981 in accordance with their 
electoral promises were going seriously wrong by mid-1982. Unemployment and 
inflation rose, the balance of payments deteriorated, social measures increased 
firms' costs, while reflation increased the state budget deficit and exerted downward 
pressure on the franc. Under the influence of the United States and Great Britain 
where monetarist policies seemed to be bearing fruit and of Finance Minister, 
Jacques Delors, one of the more moderate ministers, the Socialist government 
made two U-turns from reflation to austerity in July 1982 and March 1983. Peter 
Hall notes that one of the main factors behind this decision was President 
Mitterrand's choice not to devalue the franc in order to maintain France's 
membership of the European Monetary System (EMS). He was anxious to maintain 
France's long-standing commitment to fuller economic integration in the European 
Community. However, the conditions for falling in line with France's major trading 
partners was tighter control on public spending, higher taxes, a policy of wage 
restraint, while the nationalised industries were told to put their finances on a 
sounder footing.^®
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By mid-1985 the nationalised groups were in much better health.^ State funds, 
however, had been exhausted. Compensation to shareholders, increases in capital, 
payment of debts and the financing of new equipment meant that there would be far 
less financial aid from the State in the future. The financial journalist of the Nouvel 
Observateur concluded that: "Les fonds que l'Etat accorde aux groupes dont il est 
l'unique actionnaire ont diminué en 1984 par rapport à 1983 et diminueront encore 
en 1985".^^ Yet to be competitive, firms needed to be equipped to an increasingly 
high level. Thus between 1983 and 1986 the Socialists allowed a kind of 
surreptitious privatisation of public sector firms referred to as the "respiration" 
literally, "breathing space" for the public sector. This included the sale of 
subsidiaries to private firms, the raising of funds on the Stock Exchange - a 
prerogative of private companies - and the public flotation of subsidiaries of state- 
owned companies.^
For the Opposition, however, the denationalization of subsidiaries alone was not 
going far enough. They were calling for the total denationalization of nationalised 
groups and when the Chirac government came to power in 1986, privatisation 
formed one of the key issues of their economic policy.
T he C hirac  G overnment 's  Privatisation  P r ogram m e
The motives of the privatisers in 1986 were both varied and extensive. Scholars 
writing on the subject^ ® indicate four main sets of arguments for privatisation: the 
ideological, the economic, the managerial and the financial. Their comments reveal 
common elements between the ambitions of the privatisers in 1986, those of 
Chalandon during his chairmanship of the SNEA and those of the Socialist 
government in its post-1982 "financially sensitive" phase.
Among the principal ideological motives was the struggle against the tradition of 
dirigisme. The focus of the privatisation campaign in France and Great Britain was 
to push back the frontiers of the state, considered to be inhibiting, and create an
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environment for individual actors. Stemming from this anti-state sentiment was the 
desire to build a property-owning democracy and increase worker participation in 
the functioning, development and survival of companies. As for the economic 
motives, the objective of achieving more efficient and flexible structures was the 
principal one. The view is widespread that public sector production and services 
are less efficient than those in the private sector, because they are not vulnerable 
to market forces, there are no private shareholders to satisfy and there is no threat 
of bankruptcy or takeover. On the other hand, the public sector is vulnerable to 
demands made by governments pursuing their own macro-economic objectives, for 
example, to maintain low prices, to safeguard jobs, to take over firms in difficulty, 
and these aims may well run counter to company ambitions. It is for this reason that 
most heads of public sector companies favoured privatisation, since it would ensure 
greater autonomy for themselves and less likelihood of their company being used 
to further government economic objectives. This constitutes the managerial 
argument for privatisation.
Regarding the financial motives for privatisation, there is for privatised firms quicker 
and more direct access to international capital markets, whereas for state-owned 
companies, the necessity of obtaining permission for the buying and selling of 
shares can considerably delay the decision-making process. For governments, the 
financial reasons for privatisation are substantial. Money from the sale of state 
assets accrues to the Treasury and allows governments to reduce their debts and 
budget deficits. Financial aid given to certain state-owned companies in the form 
of grants, subsidies and loans can also be reduced, once these firms have been 
handed over to private ownership. Moreover, the sale of unprofitable subsidiaries 
contributes to making public sector companies healthier, and this indirectly relieves 
the national budget since firms no longer need state aid.
In 1986 in France there were particular factors which favoured a programme of 
privatisation. Commentators on the subject point to a whole host of features in the 
political, social, financial and international environment which contributed to the
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success of the movement. As regards the political environment, the 65 companies 
to be privatised included not only those nationalised by the Socialists in 1981 but 
also a certain number of those nationalised at the Liberation. Michel Bauer 
underlines the fact that it was the presence of the RPR in power in 1986 which 
enabled the privatisation of what de Gaulle had nationalised in 1945. At the 
Liberation there was such total agreement among all political parties about 
transferring to the state the large private monopolies, that since that time no one 
had dared question what was considered to be one of the main achievements of the 
Resistance. In Bauer’s words "it could only have been the Gaullist party who could 
dare to do so".^° As for the Socialists, by the mid-1980s, they had become 
increasingly sceptical about the merits of nationalisation and, as already mentioned, 
had recognised the need for respiration in the public sector.
There were also many social factors which favoured privatisation in the mid-1980s 
in F ra n ce .F o r  example, in certain areas there was work-force disenchantment 
with the public sector. Restructurings had led to wage freezes and massive lay-offs. 
Those who might have been expected to defend the public sector no longer gave 
it their support. In addition, the trade unions who tended to resist privatisation 
movements had been weakened by government legislation and their own falling 
membership. What is more, in France the Privatisation Law of August 1986 
guaranteed employees the right to buy a proportion of the initial share issue of the 
privatised company. This was very likely to encourage the interest of employees 
in activities of the company. Public sector managers, as already mentioned, formed 
another group who favoured privatisation because it was a means of acquiring 
greater autonomy, of improving the financial position of their company and being 
less dependent on the Treasury.
As regards the financial environment of the mid-1980s, there were a number of 
aspects which contributed to the success of privatisation.^^ First, the share market 
in France had grown between 1982 and 1985 due to government measures 
designed to facilitate and increase transactions (easing of exchange controls and
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new computerised trading techniques). Second, the fact that only profitable 
companies were chosen as candidates for privatisation encouraged investors to risk 
their money. Third, the sale of shares at below their market value was a further 
attraction, enabling the small shareholder to make a quick profit.
Regarding the international environment, privatisation movements in 1985-86 were 
already widespread in the industrialised world. Over the following three years they 
extended to as many as sixty countries, several of which were in the developing 
world.'^ The increasing internationalisation of economies meant that similar ideas 
on how to achieve greater competitiveness, to stimulate financial markets and to 
solve budgetary problems had been diffused transnationally.
At the European level 1986 was the year of the Single European Act negotiated by 
Laurent Fabius and ratified by Jacques Chirac. It relaunched European integration 
by laying down the measures required for the completion of the Single European 
Market by December 31st 1992.^ A consistent aim in the construction of Europe 
has been to improve the competitiveness of European economies in relation to non- 
European competition. This has involved not only the strengthening of market 
mechanisms within the European Community but also the gradual removal of all 
forms of national protectionism. While the Treaty of Rome instituted a free-trade 
zone, involving the elimination of internal tariff barriers, non-tariff obstacles 
persisted, for example differences in technical norms, taxation systems, nationalistic 
preferences in the attribution of public procurement contracts. These barriers 
limited competition within the EC and encouraged the creation of national markets. 
The objective of the Single European Act was the removal of these obstacles by 
December 31st 1992.
An increasingly integrated European market accelerated changes in competition 
policy in France.'^ ® In comparison with some other European states, France had 
been slow to abandon practices which distorted competition, for example, public 
procurement contracts, state aid, cartels and price fixing. These practices had
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persisted in France because supervisory ministries had traditionally intervened in 
the strategies of state-owned firms over measures designed to protect and/or 
expand the industry. The oil business in France has provided numerous examples 
of this government - industry collaboration. It was pressures exerted jointly by the 
European Commission and the economic crisis of the mid-1970s to mid-1980s 
which brought about radical changes. Raymond Barre reinforced competition 
through legislation in 1977 and set up the Commission de la Concurrence which for 
the first time had powers to intervene in the area of mergers. Barre also went some 
way towards abolishing price controls. Real enforcement of competition law had to 
wait until the mid-1980s when the Chirac government introduced wide-ranging 
reforms to make companies compete more effectively. In addition to the 
privatisation programme, these included the abolition of price controls and the 
reduction of regulations and subsidies affecting businesses. For example, 
regulations limiting lay-offs were repealed, the deregulation of financial services, 
begun by the Fabius government and providing firms with new sources of private 
finance, was pursued and enlarged by Chirac. The Commission de la Concurrence 
was replaced by the Conseil de la Concurrence which had independent powers to 
curb anti-competitive practices and punish guilty parties. Moreover, the wording of 
competition legislation was tightened. From 1986, enforcement of competition 
legislation became increasingly rigorous.
The Chirac privatisation programme can be seen to be a part of this trend towards 
an increasingly integrated European market. It aimed to sever the link between 
public companies and their national governments, making it more difficult for 
governments to use their public firms as instruments of national policy. It aimed to 
give state-owned companies access to capital markets, enabling them to enhance 
their profitability and gain financial independence from government. In removing 
the hand of the state it aimed to allow firms to respond faster and more efficiently 
to business partners and forge cross-border and international alliances. These are 
some of the ways in which the Chirac privatisation programme was a response to 
the challenges of the Single European Market of 1993.
262
Much of what has been said about privatisation in general applies to our case- 
study, the SNEA. In line with the government's attitude towards other state-owned 
companies belonging to strategic sectors, energy, transport, telecommunications, 
aircraft, the authorities did not want to disengage themselves at one go from 
France's top industrial group. Yet Elf did belong to the competitive sector, it was 
France's most profitable company and the government was counting on the sale of 
a part of the state's share in the group "to balance its 1986 budget".^ It was 
envisaged that the privatisation of Elf would proceed in stages but that the state 
share should not fall below a blocking minority. The first stage was therefore a 
partial privatisation with the state selling off 11% of its 66.8% share yet still 
preserving over 51%. The operation was intended as a test case for the whole 
privatisation movement. In the event the share offer was oversubscribed four times, 
a success which encouraged the government rapidly to undertake the mainstream 
privatisations."*^
As in the case of other privatisations a major objective was to boost budgetary 
receipts and increase the capital resources of the company. Elfs partial 
privatisation was therefore planned as a twofold operation; a public flotation of 11 % 
of the company's capital held by ERAP worth 3.3bn francs, followed by the issue of 
convertible bonds on the international market. The latter operation would allow Elf 
to raise new capital, $200m initially and another 2.1 bn francs over the following four 
years.^ According to reports at the time, an increase in capital was a long-term 
necessity for the company.'^ ® There were several reasons. In the course of 1985 
oil prices had fallen, resulting in less revenue from oil. Moreover, not only would 
the gas field at Lacq and the Frigg oil field - the group's most important sources of 
profit - be exhausted by the mid-1990s, but no major discoveries had been made 
in zones - Europe and North America - where profits were highest. In addition, the 
purchase in 1981 of the diversified mining company, Texasgulf, was proving to be 
a financial burden for the group. Partial privatisation would bring a number of 
benefits. The increase in capital would enable the group to make new acquisitions 
in the oil, chemicals and pharmaceuticals sectors. Moreover, it was expected that
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the group would gain greater freedom to pursue its own strategies without having 
to come to the aid of failing industries. The chemical restructuring of 1983 and 
bailing out of Technip - an oil engineering company - had been particularly 
burdensome.
The procedures by which the partial privatisation of Elf would take place were 
similar to those applied to other candidates for privatisation. The Finance minister, 
anxious that the share flotation should succeed, fixed the price of Elf Shares below 
their market value. On September 25th they were put on offer at 305 francs, that 
is below the previous day's closing price of 339 francs. There were 10.8m shares 
on offer and more than 46m applications were received. 300,000 small investors 
subscribed for up to 10 shares each, enabling the Finance minister to claim a 
success for the government campaign to establish a shareholding class. A 
considerable proportion of the 10.8m shares were also bought by large institutions, 
in the case of Elf, by the Caisse des Dépôts as well as other French and foreign 
institutions.^ In line with other privatisations, it was important for Elf to keep a 
noyau stable of institutional shareholders to deter takeovers. For the same reason, 
the government was to keep a "golden share" giving the Finance minister the right 
during a five-year period to veto any purchase by an individual shareholder of more 
than 10% in Elf.®'
In an assessment of the impact of the 1986-88 privatisation programme of the 
Chirac government, one must ask if the ambitions of the privatisers were realised. 
The speed with which the five-year programme was implemented was certainly 
impressive. Twenty-two out of the sixty-five companies were privatised in the first 
18 months and 70.8bn francs were raised. This represented a rapid and major shift 
in the public - private industrial boundary.®^
In other ways, however, the changes which the programme introduced were not as 
radical as promised. Michel Bauer's evidence shows that in France the new 
shareholding class was not as influential as might be expected and that the frontiers
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of the state were not pushed back particularly far. Although the number of small 
shareholders rose from 1.5 million in 1985 to 8 million in 1987, the discount price 
of the shares ensured rapid profit only if they were sold quickly. This is in fact what 
happened, so that by 1988 the figure of 8 million individuals had fallen to 1.6 million 
households. Furthermore, no attempt was made to organise, inform or interest 
these small shareholders, with the result that they were unable to exert any 
influence on the boards of privatised firms and their representation was largely 
symbolic. As regards reducing the role of the state in favour of the market, it seems 
that the very opposite took place. Not only were all privatisations carried out 
according to the same scheme -10% to employees, about 15% to foreigners, about 
50% to the public at large and about 25% to around ten large shareholders who 
constituted the noyau stable, but this last group was allowed to hold sufficient 
portions of the capital - 0.5%-5% - to exercise potentially some control over these 
groups. Furthermore, Finance Minister Balladur always refused to establish clear 
mechanisms for constituting this controlling shareholding and arbitrarily selected a 
chosen few. There were also other ways in which he distorted the market. It was 
he who fixed the share price - with a discount of 5%-30% - it was he who decided 
on the percentage share - up to 20% - to be acquired by foreign financial groups; 
it was he who had the right to use the state's "golden share". It therefore seems 
that the privatisation programme revealed a suspicion of the logic of the market and 
strengthened the prerogatives of the state and particularly those of the Finance 
Minister.®^
Although new groups of shareholders were created, they did not alter the control of 
industry. It seems that in choosing the noyau stable, the Finance Minister was 
sensitive to the wishes of the management of privatised groups. Moreover, the fact 
that there were many examples of cross-shareholdings shows that the Minister was 
trying to establish an interlocking network of French-controlled holdings in the 
privatised groups. In this way privatisation did not change the established "private 
governments"; it merely brought about a greater concentration of private economic 
power. ^
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C onclusion
We have seen that privatisation, as illustrated in the ten years of the SNEA’s 
development between 1976 and 1986, took different forms. We have also shown 
that it was an evolving process, closely linked to national and international, 
economic and political circumstances. The case of Elf in the mid-1970s, during 
Chalandon's chairmanship, and in the mid-1980s, has shown that a major state- 
owned industrial group had a constantly pressing need for funds to maintain existing 
activities and develop new ones. During this decade governments were less 
generous and the growing internationalisation of products and markets forced 
companies to seek ways of becoming more competitive. The ERAP/SNEA merger 
in 1976, accompanied by the partial denationalization of ERAP, or using the rich to 
help the poor, was one illustration. However, as the SNEA belonged to the public 
sector, it had to take account of government policy in its strategies and respect 
administrative procedures. These constraints constituted a further financial burden 
and slowed down the decision-making process. State-owned companies belonging 
to the competitive sector, such as the SNEA, therefore sought greater autonomy 
from government. The Chalandon era illustrates an attempt on the part of the 
group's top management to avoid being used as an instrument of government policy 
and to pursue a more "commercial orientation" without government interference. 
This period marked a further stage in the privatisation process and in the blurring 
of distinctions between public and private companies. Governments, however, 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s were subject to increasing demands on the 
Treasury. They therefore needed to make use of the wealth of firms they owned to 
cut back public expenditure. It is ironic that the Socialist government's 
nationalisation and restructuring programme of 1982-83 and the neo-Gaullist 
government's privatisation project of 1986-88 were motivated by the same goal. It 
is also ironic that although the wealth of firms seems to have its origin in the efforts 
of top management to be independent of government, governments actually benefit 
from firms' striving towards autonomy.
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Our analysis of the privatisation process over the decade 1976-1986 also shows 
that governments, whether of the Left or Right, adopt similar policies but under a 
different name. Government industrial policy is therefore largely unchanging, 
although it may assume different guises for electoral and ideological reasons. It 
also emerges that the movement for change actually comes from firms. The 
restructuring of E lfs refining sector, the expansion of its chemical and 
pharmaceutical activities, and the selling of subsidiaries from the public to the 
private sector began before they actually became government policy. Governments 
therefore adopt as national policy a trend which is already in progress in certain 
sectors. In other words, in the industrial sector it is the top management of large 
companies rather than governments who determine policy.
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CONCLUSION
Collaboration and conflict characterised the relationship between France's state- 
owned oil group, Elf Aquitaine, and French governments between 1976 and 1986. 
Created as an instrument of government with a "national interest" mission, this state 
oil group was expected to work for and with governments. Government gave it the 
means to develop while the state oil group carried out the tasks assigned to it. This 
cooperative venture was an example of French voluntarism or initiative taken by the 
State to correct perceived market failure. The government - company partnership 
was considered the means not to destroy but to reinforce the market.
The relationship was altered, however, by the changing international character of 
the oil industry. Exposed to world events and especially to the consequences of the 
oil crisis of the early 1970s, the state oil group suffered from the switch made by the 
French government from oil to nuclear energy as the main source of power. This 
inevitably changed not only the nature of ERAP, which was obliged to diversify 
rapidly its sources of oil, activities and range of products, but also its relationship 
with government. The support it had enjoyed from government could not be 
sustained. Although the group remained in public ownership, it became financially 
independent of its major shareholder and acted increasingly as a private company. 
Government was also affected by the economic crisis and by widespread demands 
for public funds. While Elf became concerned with maximising profits, its major 
shareholder became dependent on the oil group's wealth. It was this confusing 
combination of dependence and the fact that government could still use its powers 
of ownership and Elfs "national interest" mission which produced conflicts. Yet 
company top managers could also exploit the state link and use government goals 
to achieve their own objectives. Cooperation was facilitated by the presence of 
members of the same techno-bureaucratic elite in both the top administration and 
company.
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Our conclusion focuses on our findings in cases of restructuring, diversification and 
internationalisation in which the goals of company and government converged and 
diverged. It also asks to what extent Elfs partial privatisation in 1986 resolved the 
contradictions inherent in the government - company partnership.
C ases  of  C ollaboration
Cooperation between top managers and supervisory ministers and officials over the 
merging of ERAP with its rich subsidiary, the SNPA, in 1976 was strikingly close. 
In fact, the objectives of company and government converged to such a degree and 
some individuals were so inextricably involved with both sides that it is difficult to 
talk in terms of "sides". For the sake of clarity, however, let us distinguish the 
respective approaches of ministers and managers.
In 1976 the highest authorities in government supported the fact that one of their 
établissements publics, created originally to ensure for France secure supplies of 
hydrocarbons, should be rescued by private capital. There were several reasons 
for this.
Firstly, President Giscard d'Estaing considered that ERAP already belonged to the 
private sector. Comments made by him and prime minister Jacques Chirac in 1976 
show that as far as they were concerned, the controversy produced at the time of 
the merger by the transfer of assets from the public to the private domain was 
meaningless.
Secondly, the merger would mean fewer demands on the state budget at a time 
when government was beset by a range of economic problems: rising inflation, a 
rising budget and trade deficit, soaring unemployment, a slowdown in growth and 
the decline of strategic industries. Moreover, government had to finance the 
enormous expense of replacing oil by nuclear power as the major source of energy. 
It was no longer prepared to make good the losses of its large firms. On the
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contrary, it was obliging even its établissements publics, created originally to be 
instruments of government policy, to become, like ERAP, "une entreprise normale 
responsable de sa rentabilité et de son développement". An ERAP/SNPA merger 
would not only be a saving for government at a time when government needed to 
save money but since this case of restructuring also involved a reduction in the 
state’s share of the newly emerging SNEA, it would also reduce government's 
responsibility for the future development and financial health of ERAP.
Thirdly, the ERAP/SNPA merger would produce a stronger "national champion" in
oil. Since the 1960s successive French governments had been recommending 
industrial concentrations in order to improve the competitiveness of French firms on 
the world stage. The creation of ERAP in 1966 had been the first step. The 
restructuring process culminated in the 1976 merger creating the SNEA, a new 
stronger oil champion, more diversified geographically and at product level and 
benefitting from the wealth of the former SNPA.
At company level the top management of ERAP and SNPA - in effect the same 
people - were of the opinion that a merger was necessary simply to survive. Top 
managers were acutely aware of constraints on them stemming not only from world 
events but also from decisions taken at national and EC levels. In 1971 ERAP had 
lost two-thirds of its reserves of crude oil in the Algerian nationalisations of French 
oil company assets. This loss was compounded by the world oil crisis of 1973, after 
which ERAP had to pay new higher prices for its crude oil on the international 
market rather than at the special prices at which it had purchased Algerian oil. In 
addition, it had to find new zones to explore and exploration costs were soaring. 
Furthermore, the particular difficulties of ERAP's downstream sectors were 
aggravated by the oil crisis, as explained in Chapter 6. Moreover, the liberal policies 
favoured by Giscard d'Estaing heralded an end to the protectionism which the state 
oil companies had enjoyed. What is more as part of its drive to increase 
competition the European Commission had for a long time been calling for the
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abolition of the 1928 laws and an end to the fixing of quotas on imports from 
Europe.
Cooperation between government and ERAP over the merger was and had been 
extremely close, thanks to officials at the Industry ministry, and especially the 
DHYCA, who supported the state oil group. From 1964 André Giraud, as Directeur 
des Carburants, had set in motion the reorganisation of the state oil companies. 
The merging in 1966 of the BRP and RAP to form ERAP, with Pierre Guillaumat at 
its head, was the first step. It is clear from the high-ranking posts to which other 
members of the Corps des Mines in the group were appointed that an integrated oil 
company had obvious advantages for them (see chapter 1, p. 72). Serious thought 
was given to the role of the SNPA because, as manager of the Lacq gas field, it was 
a wealthy company. It was therefore decided that it should not be totally merged. 
Instead, ERAP took over the public shareholding of 62% in the SNPA and Pierre 
Guillaumat was appointed chairman of both companies. As mentioned in Chapter 
1 (see pp. 69-72), the top management of ERAP intended making full use of the 
SNPA's private wealth to extend their exploration zones and develop their 
downstream sectors while simultaneously making requests for public funds. The 
push towards closer integration by réquipe Guillaumat was pursued over the next 
decade. Further evidence of collaboration between managers and ministers, 
analysed in Chapter 6, is to be found in the actual means employed to ensure the 
success of the 1976 transaction.
Behind government-company cooperation in the restructuring of ERAP, there was 
a convergence between the goals of ERAP/SNPA's top management and 
supervisory ministers. They were greater financial autonomy for ERAP and the 
creation of a more integrated industrial group. We have shown that the 
achievement of these goals brought benefits to both sides. For government a more 
self-sufficient national oil company would enable it to withdraw from its funding of 
the state oil sector now that the decision had been taken to make nuclear power the 
main source of energy. Besides, government could oblige the top management of
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the newly created SNEA to use company funds rather than those of the Treasury 
in extending its exploration activities and developing its downstream sectors. In 
addition, a more integrated oil group would mean a stronger French company better 
able to compete in foreign markets. As for ERAP's ambitions, access to the SNPA's 
private wealth would enable it to make good its refining-distribution losses and 
finance further exploration. Moreover, having always benefitted from government 
subsidies as an établissement public with a national interest mission, ERAP also 
planned to continue making requests for state aid. The top management of ERAP 
saw their survival in a stronger, more integrated group and in this they were 
supported by the ministries of Industry and Finance but more especially the 
Directeur des Hydrocarbures. This post "belonged" to the Corps des Mines, so both 
government and ERAP gained from the Corps' drive towards industrial 
concentrations. For its part, the Corps des Mines benefitted from an increased 
number of top posts resulting from larger industrial entities.
In a case of internationalisation provided by Elfs purchase of Texasgulf in 1981, 
there was cooperation between government and company because the goals of 
each side coincided. The Socialist government of 1981 was able to give 
“guarantees of liberalism to the outside world" without any cost to the Treasury, 
while the SNEA fulfilled its ambition, thwarted in 1979, to establish itself in the US.
When the Socialists came to power in 1981 they were eager to dispel their non­
capitalist image and establish good relations with the business community. Pierre 
Dreyfus, former head of Renault, and generally sympathetic to the chairmen of large 
companies, was appointed Industry minister. On several occasions the government 
stressed that the international activities of public sector firms would not be affected 
by government policy and that nationalised companies should continue to establish 
themselves abroad. In addition, not only did President Mitterrrand express his 
support for Albin Chalandon, SNEA chairman, by confirming him in his 
chairmanship but he also approved the SNEA's purchase in the US of the 
diversified mining company, Texasgulf. However, conscious of the wealth of the
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SNEA, recently enriched by the second oil crisis, and conscious also of the 
enormous expense of their reflationist policies, the Socialist government was not 
prepared to assist in this purchase. On the contrary, one of the conditions of the 
sale was that no funds were to be transferred from France (see Chapter 6, pp. 263- 
254). The SNEA's top management was obliged to conclude the transaction by 
means of an exchange of subsidiaries.
As far as the SNEA's top management was concerned, an acquisition in the US was 
vital. Moreover, the failed purchase of Kerr Magee in 1979 had strengthened 
Chalandon's resolve. With his overriding ambition to make the group profitable and 
diversify its activities beyond oil, Texasgulf seemed an appropriate choice. 
Furthermore, top management was anxious to compensate for the difficulties of their 
traditional sectors: fewer discoveries of oil and gas, rising exploration costs, the 
losses of the group's refining sector, the decline of the Lacq gas field and the need 
to create jobs in South West France. Chalandon therefore took advantage of the 
Socialist government’s international stance and a more sympathetic Industry 
minister to push through the acquisition.
The acquisition of Texasgulf therefore resulted from the fact that the goals of the 
SNEA and government coincided. The SNEA achieved its long-awaited ambition 
to gain a foothold in the US and thereby the means to expand traditional and 
diversified areas, increase market share and rid itself of losses. The Socialist 
government showed the world that it supported the business community and that it 
would not inhibit firms' efforts to internationalise. With consummate political skill 
Chalandon not only exploited the government's goals but also the change of 
government minister. (Pierre Dreyfus was personally committed to the principle of 
independent management.) The Socialist government, for its part, by imposing the 
condition of no transfer of funds from France, used the wealth of their richest 
company rather than its own in this demonstration of "wildcat capitalism".
As a case of both restructuring and diversification, the creation of Atochem shows 
once again cooperation between Elfs top management and government because
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the goals of each side converged. In the Socialist government's nationalisation 
programme of 1981-82, their aim was to rescue several strategic industries of which 
one was chemicals, while Elfs top management, for its part, had for the previous 
decade been seeking to expand and diversify the range of their chemical activities.
The broad reason for the nationalisations of 1981 was to combat the economic 
crisis. The two oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 had produced a fall in demand, serious 
overcapacity and a lack of investment in several strategic industries. The nine 
industrial groups nationalised in 1981 were all in a serious financial situation. 
Government feared that certain firms would fail completely, causing mass 
redundancies or be taken over by foreign buyers. By taking them into public 
ownership, government aimed to give them a massive transfer of public monies 
necessary for restructuring and modernisation.
Several chemical groups were forecasting serious losses for 1981. Victims of the 
world crisis in chemicals, they also suffered from the long-standing weaknesses 
specific to the French chemical industry referred to in Chapter 5, pp. 228-231. 
Government's solution was to make Elf, seen as a wealthy company, the champion 
of French chemicals. To this end and with the agreement of its top management. 
Elf would purchase majority shares in ATO and Chloé (joint subsidiaries owned 
50/50 with CFR), while the loss-making chemicals of Péchiney (PCUK) would be 
shared between Elf and Rhône-Poulenc.
It is clear that there was and had been close cooperation between government and 
the SNEA over this plan since it corresponded so closely to objectives which Elfs 
chemical experts had pursued over the previous decade: to expand and diversify 
the range of its chemical activities and achieve international status in this field. The 
creation of both ATO (1970) and Chloé (1980), not to mention the development of 
the group's pharmaceutical sector, are proof of their efforts. Further proof of 
government-company cooperation is that the details of the restructuring package 
fulfilled Elfs wishes (see Chapter 5, p. 230).
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If one overlooks the resounding conflict between Chalandon and prime minister 
Laurent Fabius over the compensation payment to the CFP (see Chapter 6, p. 256), 
it is clear that in the medium and long term, both company and government 
benefitted from the restructuring plan. By using top management's goal to expand 
in chemicals and the wealth of the SNEA rather than the resources of the Treasury, 
the government gained more competitive chemical firms for France. By 1984 both 
Rhone-Poulenc and Péchiney were on their way to recovery. Elf, on the other hand, 
through exploiting government policy, not only gained the opportunity to develop 
massively in chemicals, but also realised a long-term ambition to obtain a distinct 
chemicals subsidiary of its own, Atochem.
These three cases of government-company collaboration show government and 
company using one another in the achievement of their respective goals. 
Government's goals were: to rescue sectors in difficulty and develop France's 
strategic industries, making them bigger, more competitive internationally and more 
financially independent. However, aware of the increasing demands on the state 
budget, government also aimed to avoid incurring the cost. In the three cases 
analysed it is obvious that government was using the past achievements, initiatives, 
ambitions, expertise and more especially the wealth of the state oil group in 
achieving these goals. Whether Right or Left was in power, there was a 
consistency in government use of SNEA resources to implement their policies.
It is noticeable, however, that over time governments were imposing heavier 
demands on healthy public sector companies. For example, comparing the 
restructurings of 1976 with those of 1983, the state oil group was rescuing not only 
firms within the same sector but firms from an entirely different industry. The three 
cases analysed also show that for its part, the SNEA's goals were: to grow by 
diversifying its activities, to expand internationally and to achieve greater financial 
independence from government. All three cases show the company taking 
advantage of government's long and short-term policies. They also demonstrate top 
management's skill in exploiting changes of government and government officials.
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We have seen that the Corps des Mines was a key structure of collaboration. In the 
two cases of restructuring, it was a prominent figure in the Corps, André Giraud, 
who initiated and/or engineered these restructurings. Since he was at the time of 
the creation of ERAP (1966) Directeur des Carburants and minister of Industry 
during discussions about chemical restructuring (1980), it is obvious that the SNEA 
benefitted from the presence of influential figures in government belonging to the 
same techno-bureaucratic elite as top managers in the SNEA. It should not be 
forgotten that André Giraud was also seen to be working in the interests of the 
Corps des Mines whose goal was prestigious posts for its members and 
consequently greater influence in the oil and chemical sectors. Yet government 
also benefitted from these corps networks which contributed to the realisation of 
broader national goals.
C ases  of  C onflict
The Elf group's diversification, internationalisation and restructuring also gave rise 
to resounding conflicts. They have been discussed separately in preceding 
chapters but here we can show that they were in fact related by the similarity and 
recurring nature of the real issues at stake. What is the role of state-owned 
companies? How autonomous is the chairman? To what extent can government 
control the activities of public companies? Ambiguity over these questions was not 
only a source of conflict but highlighted the fact that between 1976 and 1986 the 
state oil group was in the process of evolution. Moreover, disagreements over 
these issues were exacerbated by differences in personality and background of key 
decision-makers, by the socio-economic climate and by the clash between the long 
and short-term goals of policy-makers.
Between 1977 and 1981 many of the conflicts between the SNEA and government 
were intensified and brought to public attention by the differences in personality, 
career path and grand corps of AI bin Chalandon, SNEA chairman 1977-83, and his 
supervisory minister of Industry, André Giraud. Giraud had followed the traditional
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career of the ingénieur du Corps des Mines in the top administration of the energy 
sector: Directeur des Carburants, head of the CEA, minister of Industry. In many 
ways he looked upon the state oil group as his property. Moreover, when 
Guillaumat retired in 1977, Giraud was his preferred successor. It is therefore no 
surprise that he should have objected to the appointment of Albin Chalandon. 
Banker and businessman rather than industrialist, Chalandon was a notorious critic 
of government intervention in industry. Furthermore, as a former Inspecteur des 
Finances, Chalandon's appointment was considered an affront to the Corps des 
Mines who regarded top positions in the energy sector as their preserve.
The role of the state oil group was one of the many issues over which there was a 
clash of views. For Chalandon profitability ought to be the chief goal of the SNEA. 
Since oil activities in the late 1970s were becoming increasingly unpredictable and 
costly, areas other than oil had a greater profit potential. Moreover, Chalandon had 
the support of the ministry of Finance in the emphasis he put on profit. Thanks to 
E lfs large cashflow after the second oil crisis of 1979, Chalandon pursued 
acquisitions in diverse fields quite unrelated to the group’s original role. Supported 
by officials of ERAP, Giraud put up strong opposition and obstructed many of these 
ventures. In his opinion, the SNEA had been created to provide France with 
hydrocarbons. It was therefore essential that the group’s activities conform with its 
mission. Moreover, since there were no control procedures in place, as in the case 
of oil, to supervise these diversified areas, it was impossible to monitor how money 
was being spent (see Chapter 5, pp. 237-238).
Furthermore, government had other plans for Elf. Giraud had recommended at the 
beginning of 1980 that the group should be the leader of French petrochemicals, 
the creation of Chloé in the summer of that year being the first stage. Having 
selected Elf to assist government with its chemical restructurings, it is not surprising 
that the minister of Industry should be anxious to know how and on what the group’s 
money was being spent.
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The autonomy of the chairman of state-owned companies was another point of 
confrontation between Chalandon and his supervisory minister. The issue surfaced 
in the context of the group’s establishment in the US. Since Chalandon wished to 
take advantage of the group's windfall profits resulting from the second oil crisis, the 
purchase of a company in the US was being hotly debated at roughly the same time 
as the diversification issue. Although the company selected, Kerr Magee, fulfilled 
all the criteria laid down by the authorities and Giraud agreed in principle to the 
acquisition, he vetoed the purchase at the last minute on the grounds that he had 
not been given sufficient information. Not only had administrative procedures been 
disregarded but both he and his representative in the oil industry, the director of the 
DHYCA, had been overlooked in negotiations.
During negotiations over the Kerr Magee purchase, Chalandon’s behaviour was 
symptomatic of his desire to be the autonomous chairman. His willingness to 
communicate with the Elysée and reluctance to inform both the director of the 
DHYCA and Industry minister are revealing. Having been appointed by Giscard 
d’Estaing, Chalandon considered he was answerable to the president alone. In this 
case Chalandon’s behaviour vis à vis the Industry minister fuelled animosity on both 
sides.
However there were other factors which contributed to the government’s veto of the 
Kerr Magee purchase. Firstly, elections were approaching and the Barre 
government was aware of its unpopularity due to the austerity measures it had 
brought in to combat the economic crisis. News of a large investment by a state- 
owned firm abroad when companies at home were laying off workers would have 
increased the government’s unpopularity further. Secondly, the question of Elfs 
diversifications was simultaneously being debated in government circles. When 
strategic industries in France were making huge losses and government was calling 
for further cuts in public spending, how Elf with its enormous profits was using 
public funds worried not just André Giraud but many in government.
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The disagreements between Chalandon and his supervisory minister regarding the 
role of the SNEA and autonomy of the chairman led to the series of controls placed 
on Chalandon by government in the course of 1980. However, the proximity of 
elections, the economic climate and government's knowledge of the SNEA's wealth, 
intensified the conflicts and also contributed to these controls. The veto of the Kerr 
Magee purchase was followed by government instructions to Giraud to restructure 
Elfs top management. This resulted in his dividing the chairmanship of the group 
between ERAP and the SNEA. In addition, Chalandon was instructed by 
government to reorganise his company's activities according to principles laid down 
by government.
The extent to which government can control a public sector company was another 
issue over which Chalandon confronted the minister of Industry. This conflict 
formed the sequel to the chemical restructuring of 1982-83 and concerned 
compensation to the CFP for their share in ATO and Chloé.
The conflict arose for several reasons. Firstly, there was an initial division of opinion 
as to whether the SNEA or ERAP (holding company) should be leader of the 
chemical restructuring. In 1981, Pierre Dreyfus, Industry minister, thought it should 
be ERAP while the chairman and vice-chairman of ERAP thought it should be the 
SNEA (in order to protect ERAP's dividends). The latter view, supported by a new 
Industry minister from 1982, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, prevailed. Secondly, the 
actual restructuring process dragged on for three years. Although Chalandon had 
agreed the terms of Elfs intervention with Pierre Dreyfus, there were between 1981 
and 1983 four different ministers of Industry. The terms of settlement also changed 
during this period. Initially Chalandon had refused to compensate the CFP 
chairman for his company's shares in ATO and Chloé but later agreed to do so as 
long as payment could be protracted. Both sides agreed on the price and on 
payment by instalments but the terms of the settlement were not clarified. It was 
then that Industry minister, Laurent Fabius, stepped in, impatient that the deal 
should be concluded. He laid down the terms and deadline by which the settlement
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should be made. It was with these instructions that Chalandon refused to comply, 
stressing that the expansion of the group's chemical activities should respect 
shareholders' interests and protect Elfs traditional activities. Moreover, he pointed 
out that Fabius was overstepping his brief in dictating to the chairman of a public 
sector firm how he should manage his company.
In this case of conflict, Chalandon was defending the financial interests of his 
company. Fabius, however, was aiming to reduce the state's financial contribution 
to the chemical restructuring and make the SNEA pay instead. No doubt the reason 
for his impatience was that when the Socialists came to power in 1981 they had 
ambitious plans for renovating French industry. The reality was very different. The 
immediate concerns of unemployment and falling output prevailed over long-term 
structural plans. The Socialist government's reflationist policies and 
nationalisations were financed by a rising budget deficit which contributed towards 
downward pressure on the franc. This was the decisive factor behind the Mauroy 
government's U-turns from reflation to austerity in July 1982 and March 1983. It 
was faced with the choice of devaluing the franc and taking France out of the EMS 
or maintaining membership and reducing the budget deficit. Mitterrand chose the 
latter course, anxious to maintain France's long-standing commitment to fuller 
economic integration in the E.C. However, the choice of austerity involved a tighter 
control on public spending, higher taxes, a policy of wage restraint and the 
nationalised industries were told to put their finances on a firmer footing.
As for Chalandon's conflict with his supervisory minister, the last in a long series, 
government got its way by using its power to change the chairman of public sector 
companies. Chalandon's mandat was terminated when it came up for renewal and 
It was Chalandon's successor, Michel Pecqueur, who compensated the CFP 
chairman for his company's shares in ATO and Chloé.
These conflicts between Elfs chairman and his supervisory ministers can be 
summed up in the comment made in 1986 by a former company secretary of the
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SNEA and quoted in our Introduction:
"Ce groupe a été géré un peu comme une entreprise privée mais 
même si ce n'était pas écrit, elle avait toujours une mission d'intérêt 
national même si ça a évolué. Donc c'est toute la difficulté."
The confrontations analysed have focused on the role of a state-owned company 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, on questions of autonomous management and 
government control. Chalandon, with his emphasis on profit and diversifications, 
was actually taking the group further in the direction it was going. Did not the 
official documents concerning the ERAP/SNPA merger of 1976 specify that the 
newly emerging SNEA should be run like an "entreprise normale responsable de 
sa rentabilité et de son développement"? In emphasising profit, extending Elfs 
diversified activities, establishing the group in the US, Chalandon was pursuing the 
very activities which would ensure the group's survival.
André Giraud, on the other hand, was wanting to preserve what the group had 
achieved and in which he had been deeply involved. Moreover, as minister of 
Industry, he had to know what Elf was doing. He was familiar with an oil sector 
closely supervised and regulated. Unless administrative procedures were 
observed, how could he remain informed about developments in the industry? He 
was also aware of Elfs enormous wealth from 1979, which government intended 
using in the restructuring of chemicals. Giraud expected the SNEA to remain true 
to its "national interest mission" but also aimed to take advantage of the company's 
past achievements and recently acquired wealth.
There were also corps interests at stake. Giraud was a prominent figure in the 
Corps des Mines. It was due to efforts of members of this corps that the state oil 
sector had come into being. Elf had accomplished the mission it had been assigned 
and become one of France's top companies. If the nature of the group was 
changing, the Corps des Mines was in danger of losing one of its most important 
fiefdoms. Giraud's interventions were therefore driven by the fact that he had 
contributed to the growth of the state oil sector which, as a prominent member of the
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Corps des Mines, he had an interest in preserving. In our cases of confrontation, 
the Corps des Mines can also be seen as an agent of division.
The conflicts analysed show a government torn by contradictory interests and 
wanting the best of all worlds. For example, Chalandon's attachment to cashflow 
and profit was welcomed in the late 1970s by the ministry of Finance; two years 
after the failed Kerr Magee purchase, the SNEA was allowed by Giraud's successor 
to purchase a company of the same type in the US (Texasgulf); the minister of 
Industry in 1981, Pierre Dreyfus, who set the chemical restructurings in motion was 
of the opinion that ERAP (holding company), not the SNEA, should bear the cost. 
Therefore in other circumstances and under different officials, decisions more 
favourable to the SNEA might have been taken.
It also emerges that governments did not intervene systematically in the 
management of state-owned companies. The socio-economic and political climate, 
the personality, ambitions and political affiliations of officials in decision-making 
posts could determine the level of intervention. Governments tended to intervene 
after the event, obstructing company plans or appointing more amenable officials 
who would carry out their wishes. Our cases of conflict show that in spite of 
government controls, the SNEA went ahead in acquiring a US company and in 
expanding its diversified activities, showing that more powerful market forces were 
at work.
The cases of conflict also show that the group and government were in a state of 
change between two modes of relationship. At one extreme were the government 
officials who stood for what the oil group had been: an instrument of government, 
protected and enjoying privileged links with the state. At the other, a would-be 
autonomous chairman of the SNEA and more market-oriented government officials 
who stood for what the group was becoming: a private company forging its own 
destiny.
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In the wider context, French economic policy was also in a state of evolution. 
Although state-directed mechanisms - planning, public ownership, preferential 
treatment, regulation, the interpenetration of personnel - had ensured a high level 
of growth during the trente glorieuses, they proved less effective from the mid 
1970s. The integration of the French economy into an international one limited the 
ability of French governments to direct the economy and their will to intervene. 
Between 1976 and 1986, the two oil crises, dollar fluctuations and the increasing 
influence of closer European integration showed French governments that dirigiste 
mechanisms were less capable of producing prosperity than hitherto. Paradoxically, 
it was the Socialist government's massive intervention in the economy at the 
beginning of the 1980s which brought them to the conclusion that state influence 
on companies should be lightened.
Beyond the Contradictions: Privatisation?
Particular features of government-company relations emerge from these cases of 
collaboration and confrontation. The cases of collaboration have shown that there 
was a consistency in government's use of the state oil company's expertise, 
achievements and wealth in carrying out government's tasks. Examples show that 
it was the initiatives of large firms which determined government policy. Moreover, 
as state resources dwindled and greater demands were placed on the Treasury, 
government made heavier demands on those firms capable of assisting it. The 
roles had been reversed from Elfs early years when government fostered its 
growth. Now government was increasingly dependent on Elf. However, there was 
also consistency in Elfs use of government. Not only did the Corps des Mines' 
networks bring advantages to the SNEA but top managers were skilled at exploiting 
government policy and divisions within government.
However, the cases of collaboration gave rise to many contradictions. Firstly, while 
the SNEA was expected by government since the mid 1970s to be financially 
independent, it was also expected to bail out sectors in difficulty on behalf of
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government, such as, ERAP in 1976, PCUK in 1983. Secondly, its obligation to be 
independent of government drove it to pursue strategies which increased profits, for 
example, expansion in the US and diversifications. While government benefitted 
from the group's financial independence, these ventures could also conflict with its 
"national interest" mission and put government's dividends at risk. A third area of 
contradiction concerned the autonomy of the SNEA's top management. Since the 
Nora report of 1967, the autonomy of management of public sector companies had 
been confirmed by successive governments. Yet, when expedient, government 
officials still made use of the fact that government was the group's major 
shareholder in order to subject it to its own macro-economic goals. We have seen 
that it was ambiguities surrounding the group's mission, the autonomy of the 
chairman and the extent to which government could impose tasks on the firm or 
control its activities, which gave rise to our three cases of conflict. They show that 
governments were very divided over the issues at stake with the result that their 
interventions were often inconsistent, causing delays and errors of judgement. 
Furthermore, they show that government-public company interaction is at the mercy 
of short-term or ephemeral factors: the personality of those in power, the
relationships they establish with one another, corps competition, the socio­
economic and political climate.
If there is one issue that pinpoints the changing nature of the relationship between 
the government and its oil national champion, it is the privatisation that took place 
at the end of the decade which we have considered. The process of privatisation 
within the state oil group was one which had received government approval and 
encouragement since the mid 1970s. In the context of the SNEA the process 
started a whole decade before the first official privatisation programme launched by 
the Chirac government of 1986. We have shown that it was a logical evolution and 
assumed a diversity of forms.
The reasons for "strengthening the market at the expense of the state" are clear 
from the cases of collaboration and conflict analysed: government's increasing
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need for funds; its use of the wealth and initiatives of healthy companies to carry 
out the tasks incumbent on governments; the necessity for public firms to maximise 
profits in order to meet increasing costs and compensate for losses independently 
of their major shareholder. Furthermore, the state link had become a source of 
contradiction and confrontation for state-owned companies: their "national interest" 
mission, the autonomy of the chairman and the extent to which government could 
control their activities, had all become contentious issues. Privatisation, or the 
divesting of government's stake in public sector companies, would be a way to avoid 
the conflicts linked to the powers of the major shareholder and generate revenue 
for governments and companies.
Chapter 6 has shown that ironically it was a Socialist government at the beginning 
of the 1980s which prepared the way for French privatisations. As early as 1983, 
beset by economic problems resulting largely from its expansionist and 
redistributive policies, the Mauroy government initiated a process of unofficial 
privatisations. The Socialists realised that the constraints of public ownership were 
inhibiting the prosperity of firms. A new prime minister in 1984, Laurent Fabius, 
turned even more decisively towards the market and introduced measures to 
enhance company profitability. By the mid 1980s demands from company chairmen 
for greater autonomy and to increase their capital, pressures from Brussels to 
abolish all kinds of preferential treatment, the influence of monetarist policies in 
Britain and the USA, were all reinforcing the decline of public ownership. When 
Jacques Chirac's right-wing government came to power in 1986, it was therefore a 
logical evolution that a wide-scale privatisation programme should form the 
centrepiece of its policies.
In his liberal phases Chirac considered that public ownership was inhibiting. State- 
owned companies had to obtain permission from government for investments, take­
overs, closures and major lay-offs. They were also subject to demands made by 
governments pursuing their own macro-economic objectives. The privatisers of 
1986 argued that state-owned companies were th^refôre less efficient than private
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ones. Privatisation would give them more flexible structures, greater autonomy to 
the Chairman and direct access to capital markets for the buying and selling of 
shares. In short, Chirac presented privatisation as a way of improving the 
performance of firms. However, governments would also benefit from privatisation. 
Money from the sale of state assets fills Treasury coffers and allows governments 
to reduce their debts and budget deficits. Financial aid given to state-owned 
companies can also be reduced once these firms have been handed over to private 
ownership.
Not only had the Socialists prepared the ground in advance, but many other factors 
favoured this first wave of privatisations in1986; the presence of the RPR in power 
enabling the privatisation of what de Gaulle had nationalised at the Liberation; the 
diffusion throughout Western Europe of a privatisation model based on the 
experience of the UK; negotiations for the signing of the Single European Act; the 
weakening of the trade unions through increasing unemployment; the opportunity 
for employees to buy shares; the enthusiasm for privatisation among public sector 
managers; the growth of the share market in France.
The case of Elfs partial privatisation in 1986 exemplified the ambitions of the 
privatisers. It was a test case and clear illustration of the privatisation procedures 
established. On the other hand, the changes introduced were not as radical as 
promised. Not only were the prerogatives of the state and Finance minister 
strengthened by the fact that the latter controlled every aspect of the scheme but 
the promise of a more extended shareholding class did not materialise. In addition, 
privatisation increased the mechanisms for the protection of the management of 
privatised firms. For example, not only was the Finance minister sensitive to the 
wishes of the management of privatised firms in choosing the noyau stable, but the 
system of cross share-holdings ensured that the leaders of linked firms were 
protecting rather than calling one another to account. Furthermore, the means by 
which top managers were chosen did not change. The qualifications of the heads 
of firms privatised in 1986 show that top posts were won through connections with
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the State, for example, membership of a grand corps or close friend of prime 
minister/president. In short, rather than "strengthening the market at the expense 
of the state", French privatisations showed a suspicion of the market and a greater 
concentration of private economic power. Such is the enduring ambiguity in 
government-company relations in France, torn between adaptation to the market 
forces of international business competition and a hankering after statist 
intervention in the service of national interests.
The conclusions which emerge from our case-study of a government - company 
relationship highlight the importance of institutional variables. Peter Hall in 
Governing the Economy led a revival in the application of the neo-institutional 
model as a way of explaining cross-national differences in economic policy. At the 
macro-economic level, Hall shows that there are strong continuities present in 
national patterns of economic policy which the institutionalist analysis is capable of 
explaining^ This approach emphasizes the role, responsibilities and influence of 
institutions, their organizational qualities, how they interact with other actors and 
how this relationship determines policy outcomes. Underpinning Hall’s analysis of 
economic policy in Britain and France from the post-war era until the mid-1980s are 
the questions; What is the connection between institutional relationships and 
patterns of policy? What distinctive national characteristics do these patterns 
reveal? Where our analysis of Elf has taken his approach further is to examine it 
in operation at the level of a major firm.
Hall’s analysis uses the organisations of labour, capital, the state, the political 
process and the position of the nation in the international economy as determinants 
of patterns in macro-economic policy. In our case-study similar variables and their 
impact on policy have been investigated, but at the level of the firm, showing that 
the institutional approach is especially apposite at the micro-economic level.
The government - company partnership which is central to our case-study is in itself 
an institutional variable but, as shown throughout the chapters, this tentacular
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relationship encompasses, generates and is affected by a multitude of further 
institutional features. Certain of these have figured largely in our study as 
determinants of policy: the presence within the company and state apparatus of the 
Corps des Mines', the international oil market; the European Community; the political 
and economic ties linking France and francophone African states. Our conclusions 
have revealed recurring patterns of policy at the level of the firm stemming from 
these organizational features, particularly in the networks linking government and 
public enterprises. These patterns can also be related to distinctive broader 
national trends.
During the decade with which we are concerned, 1976 -1986, the creation of larger 
industrial entities through restructuring, internationalisation and diversification 
resulted from the close linking of views between company managers, government 
ministers and their senior officials. Although traditional analyses of French 
technocracy have underlined the potential for state control inherent in the practice 
of infiltrating private industry by oTpublie-offictafs-ef the grands corps, our analysis 
suggests that the flow of ideas and communications is not simply one-way. On the 
contrary, the French grands corps, by linking together senior figures in politics, 
public administration and industry, whether public sector or private, created 
networks in which ideas circulate and professional and managerial practices are 
debated and changed. This circulation of ideas and notably those about private 
sector management techniques -  restructuring, diversification, internationalisation 
-  clearly does not change everything. The “economic nationalism” of many leading 
actors, whether public or private, remains unchanged. The management of French 
multinationals remains dominated by French personnel especially at the top level. 
The pursuit of French industrial growth and the strengthening of the French 
economy in the global market place, goals shared by generations of technocrats 
since the time of Jean Monnet at the Planning Commissariat, have not been 
abandoned. Nevertheless, the technocratic network encouraged the consideration 
of new options to achieve these goals. Internationalisation, diversification and 
privatisation were considered and adopted as a means to serve the traditional
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nationalist goals. The result may be a private sector, international, diversified group 
but it remains very much a French group, both in leadership and in outlook.
Hall’s analysis stressing the institutional pressure of the structuring of international 
economic relations on national macro-economic policy is also echoed at the micro­
level, especially when the firm in question has well-established links with the 
mechanisms of government devoted to maintaining influence in former colonies. In 
the early post-war period many French companies, both public and private, rebuilt 
the trading links with the colonies which had been broken during the war years. 
With independence these links were not always severed and successive 
governments and many private managers worked to maintain and develop these 
contacts. Naturally, much depended on the attitudes and policies of the post­
colonial rulers. In some cases, notably Vietnam and Algeria, links were deliberately 
severed by the new rulers. Such set-backs reinforced the pressure to maintain links 
elsewhere. When the product involved was such a valuable commodity as oil, both 
company and state leaders faced a strong institutional inducement to continue and 
develop the links -  by fair means or foul. In the context of this involvement, the oil 
industry is perhaps the best example.
Nevertheless, colonial linkages were only one side of the international institutional 
structuring. A second aspect was the development of international management 
strategies. As French firms, public or private, traded more and more in the 
international market place, they increasingly considered the behaviour of other firms 
based in other countries. Such firms might be considered ag models, partners or 
competitive rivals, but in all cases their behaviour and structures were of ever­
growing interest. When French companies were explicitly created to compete with 
existing firms based in other states, it was natural that their leaders should study 
and eventually emulate the management strategies of these firms.
A third crucial aspect was European integration. Initially, the development of the 
customs union and Common Market had little impact on national industrial policies.
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public ownership or management behaviour. Nationalisations and “non-tariff’ 
barriers to support “national champions” were used at least as much in France as 
elsewhere. The evolution of European integration, however, had its own 
institutional dynamics. Two aspects were of crucial importance. The first was the 
agreement to move towards a “single internal market” which implied the abolition 
of all non-tariff barriers, followed by a move to a single currency to increase 
transaction transparency. The second was participation in the GATT system -  and 
especially the Kennedy and Uruguay “rounds” which pushed towards more open 
global markets. However, even before the Single Market programme, between 
1976 and 1986, French governments’ increasing use of public sector firms to carry 
out the tasks hitherto assumed by ministers drove many company leaders to 
criticise the inhibiting effect of public ownership, to question the role of the public 
sector and to press for a reduction of the state’s share in the capital of their firm. 
The post-war solution of voluntarism, or active government -  company partnership 
to push French industry forward on the world stage had become irrelevant. That 
irrelevance was finally accepted by the French government in 1997 when the 
Ministry of Industry was abolished.
Company leaders were one of the influential groups who supported the wide-scale 
privatisation programme introduced by the Chirac government in 1986. Privatisation 
was the logical outcome both to pressures exerted by governments in need of 
revenue and to demands by public company leaders for greater freedom of 
manoeuvre in the management of their affairs. The privatisation programme of 
1986 was an illustration of government responding to a trend initiated by large 
companies over the previous decade. Companies, not governments, were the 
catalysts of change. It also illustrates the influence on French governments of Left 
and Right of monetarist policies adopted in the wider international community.
This case-study of Elf has shown how even before the impact of the Single 
European Market from the mid-1980s and of Economic and Monetary Union from 
the mid-1990s, the French state switched from old-style dirigiste industrial policy to
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a new-style market-centred industrialists’ po lio /. Developments that since 1986 
have become generalised vvere pioneered from within the public sector and by its 
leading national champion. Elf sowed the seeds of the privatised firm in a 
competitive world economy, with the French state taking an auxiliary rather than 
interventionist role.
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TABLE 3.1
DISTRIBUTION OF THE INGENIEURS DU CORPS DES MINES IN 1986
1986
I Administration
Regional Departments of Ministry of Industry and Research 55
Central Administration of Industry and Research 74
Other 30
II Ecole des Mines 30
III Research 56
IV Public Sector
- Energy 45
- Steel 26
- Chemicals 15
- Banking 14
- Other 27
V Private Sector
Energy 10
Mines, mineral industries, water 18
Steel, chemicals, mechanical and electrical industries 34
Banking services 16
Other 18
Source: Service du Conseil Général des Mines 1986
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TABLE 3.2
EVOLUTION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF INGENIEURS DU CORPS DES MINES
1 Position or 
1 place of activity
1949 1961 1970 1980 1986
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Civil Servants 
(in the strict sense) 109 43.4 115 37.1 120 35.9 145 35,5 153
...
33.1
On secondment to 
the public or para- 
public sectors 
(including public 
sector research and 
teaching) 69 27.5 98 31.6 109 32.6 156 38.1 213 46.1
Mining engineers 
active in the private 
sector 73 29.1 97 31.3 105 31.5 108 26.4 96 20.8
Totals 251 100 310 100 334 100 409 100 462 100
Source: 1949, 1961 and 1970: E. Friedberg and D. Desjeux, op.cit.
1980 and 1986: Annuaires du Corps des Mines, op.cit.
295
TABLE 3.3
DISTRIBUTION OF INGENIEURS OU CORPS DES MINES
IN THE ADMINISTRATION
Administrative
appointment
1949 1961 1970 1980 1986
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Arrondissements 
minéralogiques 
and mining service 
overseas 63 57.8 61 53.0 45 37.5 52 35.9 53 35.0
Conseil Général 
des Mines only 14 12.8 13 11.3 12 10 14 9.6 14 9.0
Central
Administration of 
the Ministry of 
Industry 24 22.0 30 26.1 40 33.3 47 32.4 51 33.0
Other ministries 
including
ministerial cabinets 8 7.4 11 9.6 23 19.2 32 22.1 35 23.0
Totals 109 100 115 100 120 100 145 100 153 100
Sources: 1949, 1961 and 1970: E. Friedberg and D. Desjeux, op.cit. 
1980 and 1988: Annuaires du Corps des Mines, op.cit.
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TABLE 3.4
DISTRIBUTION OF INGENIEURS DU CORPS DES MINES
IN THE PUBLIC OR PARA-PUBLIC SECTORS
1 1949 1961 1970 1980 1986
Area of activity No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Teaching (grandes 
écoles and univs.) 
Industrial research 
(IFP, CEA, CERCHAR)
23 33.3 26
15
26.5
15.3
36
26
33
23.9
53
26
41.7
20.5
56
30
38.5
20.2
Total teaching and 
research 23 33.3 41 41.8 62 56.9 79 62.2 86 58.7
Oil and nuclear sectors 4 5.8 19 19.4 19 17.4 19 15 31 20.6
"Traditional" sectors 
(coal mines, mining 
departments, SNCF, 
EOF, GDF) 42 60.9 38 38.8 28 25.7 29 22.8 33 23.1
Total public and para- 
public industrial sector 46 66.7 57 58.2 47 43.1 48 37.8 64 41.3
Total 69 100 98 100 109 100 127 100 150 100
Sources: 1949, 1961 and 1970: E. Friedberg and D. Desjeux, op.cit. 
1980 and 1986: Annuaires du Corps des Mines, op.cit.
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TABLE 3.5
DISTRIBUTION OF INGENIEURS DU CORPS DES MINES IN THE BANKING 
AND INSURANCE SECTOR, MANAGEMENT CONSULTANCY AND
ENGINEERING FIRMS
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Banking,
Insurance,
Financial
organisations 17 17 19 16 21 21 21
Engineering
firms.
Management
consultancy 12 11 13 13 12 17 18
Source: Annuaires du Corps des Mines for years 1980 - 1986
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TABLE 3.6
CAREER PATH OF THE THREE FOUNDERS OF 
THE BUREAU DE RECHERCHES DE PETROLE
Pierre Guillaumat Paul Moch
1945 DICA Director 
BRR Director
RAP Chairman 
DICA Délégué général 
BRR Délégué général
Jean Blancard 
DICA
1951 BRR Director 
DICA Director
1959 RAR Chairman 
UGR
1962 UGR Chairman RAR Chairman BRR Chairman
1966 SNRA) Chairman 
ERAR)
ERAR Délégué général ERAR Délégué 
(Refining and général
distribution) Exploration Rroduction
1976 SNEA Chairman
Source: Rierre Réan and Jean-Rierre Séréni, op.cit.
299
TABLE 3.7
DISTRIBUTION OF INGENIEURS DU CORPS DES MINES
IN THE ENERGY SECTOR 1980 -1986
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
CEA 24 25 27 27 27 30 30
SNEA 11 13 15 13 15 20 20
IFP 4 5 4 5 5 5 5
CDF G 7 7 6 6 7 7
EOF 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
GDF 4 4
Source:
4 4 4 4 4 
Annuaires du Corps des Mines for years 1980-1986
300
FIGURE 5.1
CHEMICAL PATHWAYS
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FIGURE 5.2
PATHWAYS FOR HALOGENS 
(CHLORINE, BROMINE, FLUORINE) 
AND THEIR DERIVATIVES
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SOURCE: Bulletin Mensuel d ’informations, S.N.E.A., November 1982
(Translation)
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Interviews
A series of forty interviews with senior managers in the energy sector and with top 
civil servants in ministries and government agencies was conducted between 1986 
and 1990. Several of the above agreed to second interviews towards the end of the 
fieldwork of this thesis. For reasons of confidentiality a list of names of those 
interviewees who are cited in the text will be made available to the examiners.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I have accumulated many debts in the writing of this thesis. I should particularly like 
to express my gratitude to Dr Howard Machin, my supervisor, and to Professor Jack 
Hayward for their encouragement, careful reading of drafts and helpful suggestions 
for revision. Michel Bauer was a valuable source of knowledge and insights into the 
workings of the grands corps in the initial stages of my research. The thesis would 
have been impossible without the cooperation of the numerous French officials and 
company executives who agreed to be interviewed. Their lucid explanations always 
clarified and enlivened the complex issues of government-industry relations in 
France. Finally, special thanks go to my sisters, Mary and Gabriel, for their patient 
editing which has prevented many errors and made my prose more readable.
310
